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CVE: CVE-2002-0661 CWE: 23 ipc: note: answer: question: | Did the feature that this vulnerability affected use inter-process communication? IPC includes OS signals, pipes, stdin/stdout, message passing, and clipboard. Writing to files that another program in this software system reads is another form of IPC. Answer should be boolean. Explain your answer bugs: - 20020809 - 20020816 i18n: note: answer: instructions: | Was the feature impacted by this vulnerability about internationalization (i18n)? An internationalization feature is one that enables people from all over the world to use the system. This includes translations, locales, typography, unicode, or various other features. Answer should be boolean. Write a note about how you came to the conclusions you did. repo: https://github.com/apache/httpd vccs: - note: |- Apache 1.3.9 baseline for the Apache 2.0 repository Formerly 5430f8800f5fffd57e7421dee0ac9de8ca4f9573 before HTTPD rewrote Git history. commit: 6f96ad52275b5b35226cdb2ce66b3832e9dfb605 fixes: - note: |- Security rollup for 2.0.40 release Formerly c45d52a8ffeb21a8eaecda00fde3bb0e9ad50454 before HTTPD rewrote Git history. commit: e85db78eaae29d8a9fef539b7e883139d6f5c1dc bounty: amt: url: announced: lessons: yagni: note: applies: question: | Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example of one of those lessons? Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put a quick explanation of how it applies. Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely that one or two of them apply. If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these. serial_killer: note: applies: complex_inputs: note: applies: distrust_input: note: "Sanitization is more than just checking for the obvious characters. \nYou need to think outside the box to find less obvious vulnerabilities, \nsuch as this, where '/' was covered, but not '\\', which can be used in \nnon-UNIX environments.\n" applies: true least_privilege: note: applies: native_wrappers: note: applies: defense_in_depth: note: applies: secure_by_default: note: applies: environment_variables: note: applies: security_by_obscurity: note: applies: frameworks_are_optional: note: applies: reviews: [] upvotes: 5 CWE_note: mistakes: answer: "The code mistake made here was only checking for '/' when sanitizing a \npotential path traversal vulnerability. If I try to put myself into the \nminds of the developers, I imagine they, likely with mostly UNIX experience, \nsimply did not consider that backslashes could be used for path traversal \nin other operating systems. Even one developer who looked at and commented \non the code in question between the VCC and the fix did not catch the issue \nbefore release. This shows the importance of thoroughly testing and viewing \nyour software from different perspectives, which might reveal new problems.\n" question: | In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes? Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications? Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper? Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software engineering industry would find interesting. nickname: reported: announced: '2002-08-12' published: subsystem: name: server answer: Based on filepaths (server/util.c) and bug report description. question: | What subsystems was the mistake in? Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how the bug report was tagged. discovered: date: '2002-08-07' answer: "The vulnerability was found by Auriemma Luigi, a third-party security researcher. \nHe found it by constructing an exploit by hand which allowed him to traverse the \nfilepath.\n" google: false contest: question: | How was this vulnerability discovered? Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the vulnerability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there. The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil. The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil. If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may leave this part blank. automated: false description: "This vulnerability was a simple example of directory traversal. Strings were \nsanitized for '/', but for nothing else. This allowed attackers to user '\\' \ninstead to bypass sanitization. This, paired with '..' could be used to traverse \nthe directory and access whatever files the attacker wishes.\n" unit_tested: fix: false code: false answer: "Automatic testing is sparse in this 20-year-old codebase, with none directly \ntesting the vulnerable code, and no tests were updated in the fix.\n" question: | Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability? Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve improving the automated tests? For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved for this module. For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again. specification: answer: answer_note: instructions: | Is there mention of a violation of a specification? For example, an RFC specification, a protocol specification, or a requirements specification. Be sure to check all artifacts for this: bug report, security advisory, commit message, etc. The answer field should be boolean. In answer_note, please explain why you come to that conclusion. curation_level: 1 CWE_instructions: | Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!) autodiscoverable: answer: answer_note: instructions: | Is it plausible that a fully automated tool could have discovered this? These are tools that require little knowledge of the domain, e.g. automatic static analysis, compiler warnings, fuzzers. Examples for true answers: SQL injection, XSS, buffer overflow Examples for false: RFC violations, permissions issues, anything that requires the tool to be "aware" of the project's domain-specific requirements. The answer field should be boolean. In answer_note, please explain why you come to that conclusion. yaml_instructions: bounty_instructions: | If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank. interesting_commits: commits: - note: "Much development occurred on mod_negotiation.c, the primary file containing \n\nthe vulnerability, but little was relevant to the vulnerability as the file \n\nis quite large. This is the only commit which works with this area of the code. \n\nIt adds a comment which illustrates that the author considered path traversal \n\nand the current way it is handled but did not consider that checking for '/' \n\nwould be insufficient.\n\n\nFormerly 238a9d6e51ba186e6903272c16a6ec695e3654d6 before HTTPD rewrote Git history." commit: 7552c9cb16a58a708b327ae8e8f8e7a85ef07bab question: | Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)? Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any emerging themes? curated_instructions: | If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly. If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is set to true. upvotes_instructions: | For the first round, ignore this upvotes number. For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the upvotes score on your branch. nickname_instructions: | A catchy name for this vulnerability that would draw attention it. If the report mentions a nickname, use that. Must be under 30 characters. Optional. reported_instructions: announced_instructions: | Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/). Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format. fixes_vcc_instructions: | Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format. published_instructions: description_instructions: | You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony. Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD description later to get more technical. Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to keep too. |
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