CVE-2004-0747

CVE: CVE-2004-0747
CWE: CWE-119
ipc:
  note: 
  answer: 
  question: |
    Did the feature that this vulnerability affected use inter-process
    communication? IPC includes OS signals, pipes, stdin/stdout, message
    passing, and clipboard. Writing to files that another program in this
    software system reads is another form of IPC.

    Answer should be boolean. Explain your answer
bugs:
- 11182
i18n:
  note: 
  answer: 
  instructions: |
    Was the feature impacted by this vulnerability about internationalization
    (i18n)? An internationalization feature is one that enables people from all
    over the world to use the system. This includes translations, locales,
    typography, unicode, or various other features.

    Answer should be boolean. Write a note about how you came to the conclusions
    you did.
repo: 
vccs:
- note: |
    Original commit of the ap_resolve_env function that claims that the change for handling environment variable constructs
    is pretty useless and is an instance of feature creep. Developer (dirkx) does not seem to keen on the change.
  commit: 99a9d6e3e02dcd0d996097e8c4d23a39c5dbbf44
- note: 
  commit: 
fixes:
- note: "Github contributor \"notroj\" had to rewrite the ap_resolve_env function
    to avoid buffer overflow. The rewritten function\nuses a SMALL_EXPANSION (set
    to 5) variable which the function checks to make sure expansion does not occur
    \nbeyond this to avoid obverlow. It also casts the ap_resolve_env function to
    (char *).\n"
  commit: f2d3d37f2dd9e1c31efff9e08c6508f1c6198318
bounty:
  amt: 
  url: 
  announced: 
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: 
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: 
  distrust_input:
    note: "User supplied strings through config files were not being validated by
      length. This caused the overflow \nand subsequent gain of privleges.\n"
    applies: true
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: 
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: 
  defense_in_depth:
    note: 
    applies: 
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: 
  environment_variables:
    note: Environment variable expansion is what caused the buffer overflows.
    applies: true
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
reviews: []
upvotes: 3
CWE_note: 
mistakes:
  answer: "The mistakes that were made were primarily coding mistakes as the code
    written worked as intended but failed\nto check for boundary cases in which overflows
    could occur. Lots of changes were made between the VCC and the fix,\nand even
    a patch to the fix was made. It appears there are a lot of factors not considered
    initially and during the\nlifetime of the vulnerability, as different developers
    had to keep coming back to the logic. This seems like simple\nmiscommunication.
    They didn't cover all their tracks.\n\nLooking over their solution, it appears
    that they opted for the implementation mitigation of CWE-119, \nas they rewrote
    all the logic for the function in question, adding length checks, casting, etc.
    to check for\nextraneous inputs and to avoid harmful overflows. This fix needed
    one patch, and that was to handle a different \nuse case of the function separate
    from the issue (miscommunication once again). Since then the function was moved
    \nto a different file but not modified. For these reasons, it appears the solution
    was ultimately proper.\n"
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
nickname: 
reported: 
announced: '2004-10-20'
published: 
subsystem:
  name: server
  answer: Server environment configuration
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged.
discovered:
  date: '2004-09-15'
  answer: Discovered by Ulf Harnhammar.
  google: false
  contest: false
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave this part blank.
  automated: false
description: "The application fails to validate length for user-inputed strings through
  the form of\n.httaccess and or httpd.conf config files which can, when malicious,
  cause a buffer overflow \nwhen this string is parsed, expanded, and copied into
  a finite buffer. This\ncan affect an environment variable and gives the user elevated
  privledges locally.\n"
unit_tested:
  fix: false
  code: false
  answer: Code was not unit tested, and was not after.
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
specification:
  answer: 
  answer_note: 
  instructions: |
    Is there mention of a violation of a specification? For example,
    an RFC specification, a protocol specification, or a requirements
    specification.

    Be sure to check all artifacts for this: bug report, security
    advisory, commit message, etc.

    The answer field should be boolean. In answer_note, please explain
    why you come to that conclusion.
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
autodiscoverable:
  answer: 
  answer_note: 
  instructions: |
    Is it plausible that a fully automated tool could have discovered
    this? These are tools that require little knowledge of the domain,
     e.g. automatic static analysis, compiler warnings, fuzzers.

    Examples for true answers: SQL injection, XSS, buffer overflow

    Examples for false: RFC violations, permissions issues, anything
    that requires the tool to be "aware" of the project's
    domain-specific requirements.

    The answer field should be boolean. In answer_note, please explain
    why you come to that conclusion.
yaml_instructions: 
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  commits:
  - note: "This commit moved the ap_resolve_env function from server/util.c to server/core.c
      in preparation\nof a new feature. Does not appear to be for security reasons,
      as the code written for the fix in 2004 was\nunmodified. As it was used as part
      of a new feature and wasn't modified, this solidifies the probability that \nthe
      fix was a good one.\n"
    commit: 58f17628acc2446d1811095b38fdcbb1357d6d55
  - note: Message is - Style police were called back from their vacation. This team
      is witty.
    commit: 7310a8c6b5a6013667a780b6d849f184e06627e8
  - note: Fix of original code to ensure only environment variable is passed to the
      getenv function.
    commit: 721890ad66b8c44a1a0fa910293f0b9a769897d2
  - note: Lots of minor syntax and function parameter changes. Claims to fix command
      initialisation.
    commit: c0a4cb787356028a11170db449f9a7d2f8237885
  - note: |
      patch of the fix commit that corrects some regression introduced in the case that the function is called
      an environment variable (getenv doesn't return anything).
    commit: 1b036562191b5f27453bdb15da66aba036c77b44
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
nickname_instructions: |
  A catchy name for this vulnerability that would draw attention it. If the
  report mentions a nickname, use that. Must be under 30 characters.
  Optional.
reported_instructions: 
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
published_instructions: 
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.