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CVE: CVE-2005-3357 CWE: 690 ipc: note: answer: question: | Did the feature that this vulnerability affected use inter-process communication? IPC includes OS signals, pipes, stdin/stdout, message passing, and clipboard. Writing to files that another program in this software system reads is another form of IPC. Answer should be boolean. Explain your answer bugs: - 37791 i18n: note: answer: instructions: | Was the feature impacted by this vulnerability about internationalization (i18n)? An internationalization feature is one that enables people from all over the world to use the system. This includes translations, locales, typography, unicode, or various other features. Answer should be boolean. Write a note about how you came to the conclusions you did. repo: vccs: - note: |- This commit changed and introduced the parameters that would go on to cause this vulnerability. Formerly aee1c6e7613e1fafa0f3f7700d379f162f925690 before HTTPD rewrote Git history. commit: 74c5908625298214006685b6f4e7b1ce0a8c324d - note: commit: fixes: - note: |- This was the fix commit that prevented NPE from occuring by checking if ssl was in use. Formerly 00b900faa0db3b7903fb0d356714871659347dd8 before HTTPD rewrote Git history. commit: 16e5cdde498027254084025a100b219073f8d56f bounty: amt: url: announced: lessons: yagni: note: applies: question: | Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example of one of those lessons? Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put a quick explanation of how it applies. Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely that one or two of them apply. If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these. serial_killer: note: applies: complex_inputs: note: applies: distrust_input: note: | The NPE comes from a non-ssl request being sent through an ssl port. The vulnerability would have been preventable if additional checks were in place to make sure no non-ssl request could be sent to an ssl port, or if verification would happen before the local variable "ssl" was reffered to when it was still null applies: true least_privilege: note: applies: native_wrappers: note: applies: defense_in_depth: note: applies: secure_by_default: note: applies: environment_variables: note: | This vulnerability is based entirely on the fact that the interaction between when a request was sent in and when the handler attempts to access the ssl hook, is done with the same variable and there is no handling for when the current ssl is null. applies: true security_by_obscurity: note: applies: frameworks_are_optional: note: applies: reviews: - 354394 upvotes: 2 CWE_note: mistakes: answer: | The main mistake with this vulnerability was the lack of handling if ssl was null. The team never accounted for a non-ssl request to be made on a ssl port when if ssl is not currently in use. They seem to have had it written so that all requests that came to an ssl port would go through a ssl control check, regardless of the state of SSL. The fix that was implemented seems to effectively eliminate the problem as it immediately stops the problem from arising before it has a chance to raise an NPE. It was changed from only checking if the ssl protocol was on to verifying that ssl was acutally in use and not null, otherwise it would stop, as it was no longer relevant. question: | In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes? Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications? Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper? Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software engineering industry would find interesting. nickname: reported: announced: 2005-12-31T05:00Z published: subsystem: name: SSL answer: | Based on the component in the bug report and the path in the fix commit question: | What subsystems was the mistake in? Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how the bug report was tagged. discovered: date: '2005-12-05' answer: | This vulnerability appears to have been found by a random user who discovered the NPE. They give a brief description on the setup they used through solaris debug and then gave a suggestion on a fix for it. google: false contest: false question: | How was this vulnerability discovered? Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there. The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil. The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil. If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may leave this part blank. automated: false description: "There was a component of httpd where, if the user had a specific type of a \nSecure Socket Layer (SSL) and created a custom error page, they could cause \na denial of serivce through making the application crash. This was done by \nsubmitting an unsupported request to a certain type of port, which would \ncause a Null Pointer Expection.\n" unit_tested: fix: false code: false answer: | There did not appear to be test cases that were mentioned in the fix commit or other related commits. There were no mentions of tests being updated or lines being added or removed from files that would seem like test files. question: | Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability? Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve improving the automated tests? For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved for this module. For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again. specification: answer: answer_note: instructions: | Is there mention of a violation of a specification? For example, an RFC specification, a protocol specification, or a requirements specification. Be sure to check all artifacts for this: bug report, security advisory, commit message, etc. The answer field should be boolean. In answer_note, please explain why you come to that conclusion. curation_level: 1 CWE_instructions: | Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!) autodiscoverable: answer: answer_note: instructions: | Is it plausible that a fully automated tool could have discovered this? These are tools that require little knowledge of the domain, e.g. automatic static analysis, compiler warnings, fuzzers. Examples for true answers: SQL injection, XSS, buffer overflow Examples for false: RFC violations, permissions issues, anything that requires the tool to be "aware" of the project's domain-specific requirements. The answer field should be boolean. In answer_note, please explain why you come to that conclusion. yaml_instructions: bounty_instructions: | If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank. interesting_commits: commits: - note: |- This commit dealt with additions to the module that this vulnerability came from. These do not appear to have a direct corrolation to the NPE that was generated by the original vulnerability, but may have added a component that was a part of the NPE request. There was an addition of an ssl io buffer and mulitple functions related to the ssl engine were added. Formerly e8c5a47a0b1befdcc525189278aaaf6bf63b6a4d before HTTPD rewrote Git history. commit: 23a3c20db2ba540c8e3557772944c0513086f3ed - note: |- This commit was a fix for another vulnerability that is in this list. This dealt with a bug that was located very closely to this vulenrability. Formerly a344c639929f8f53a47ba5eab157162294c676f3 before HTTPD rewrote Git history. commit: a1e9d51be373b9c9e537d129a48e140232643a9e question: | Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)? Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any emerging themes? curated_instructions: | If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly. If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is set to true. upvotes_instructions: | For the first round, ignore this upvotes number. For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the upvotes score on your branch. nickname_instructions: | A catchy name for this vulnerability that would draw attention it. If the report mentions a nickname, use that. Must be under 30 characters. Optional. reported_instructions: announced_instructions: "Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can\nfind this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good \nsource for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel\n(https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).\nPlease enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.\n" fixes_vcc_instructions: | Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format. published_instructions: description_instructions: | You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony. Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD description later to get more technical. Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to keep too. |
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