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CVE: CVE-2006-3747 CWE: 189 ipc: note: answer: question: | Did the feature that this vulnerability affected use inter-process communication? IPC includes OS signals, pipes, stdin/stdout, message passing, and clipboard. Writing to files that another program in this software system reads is another form of IPC. Answer should be boolean. Explain your answer bugs: [] i18n: note: answer: instructions: | Was the feature impacted by this vulnerability about internationalization (i18n)? An internationalization feature is one that enables people from all over the world to use the system. This includes translations, locales, typography, unicode, or various other features. Answer should be boolean. Write a note about how you came to the conclusions you did. repo: vccs: - note: |- Initial creation of the method "escape_absolute_uri" which contains the vulnerability. Formerly f3f74792957ae7efb70cdf10ea6ca050069d80c5 before HTTPD rewrote Git history. commit: 5cede9cd451dd268da07f5f088b69fce2e5101a7 - note: commit: fixes: - note: |- SVN rev 426141 Formerly 3ecb8262a2fe504162cd12c3fa5aea188f9b5da2 before HTTPD rewrote Git history. commit: 9d0be9d9520437aa516090d625713319a533a30b - note: |- SVN rev 426138 Formerly e2a9028db5b079e01eb6b9ac06299bd06dd59574 before HTTPD rewrote Git history. commit: 862dd4e3e7a3391afd6fe392e4ab568d73b9c873 bounty: amt: url: announced: lessons: yagni: note: applies: question: | Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example of one of those lessons? Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put a quick explanation of how it applies. Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely that one or two of them apply. If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these. serial_killer: note: applies: complex_inputs: note: applies: distrust_input: note: This vulnerability focused on overflowing the stack by inputting in a url that exceeded the character limit. Additional checks should have been made to see if the input was within the boundaries. applies: true least_privilege: note: applies: native_wrappers: note: applies: defense_in_depth: note: applies: secure_by_default: note: applies: environment_variables: note: applies: security_by_obscurity: note: applies: frameworks_are_optional: note: applies: reviews: [] upvotes: 4 CWE_note: mistakes: answer: It seems like the fault was in the code. The fix was a simple change by decreasing a variable in an if statement by 1. Considering that the change was a simple fix of just editing one line of code, the cause was likely due to accidently overlooking a size limit when the code was made. Vulnerabilities that have to do with size boundaries are easily overlooked which is why I think additional boundary checking should have been done. Boundary tests should always check for extreme cases like maximum inputs. question: | In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes? Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications? Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper? Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software engineering industry would find interesting. nickname: reported: announced: '2006-07-27' published: subsystem: name: modules answer: mod_rewrite is one of the C modules that Apache provides. question: | What subsystems was the mistake in? Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how the bug report was tagged. discovered: date: '2006-07-27' answer: An employee at McAfee Avert Labs that goes by Mark Dowd reported this vulnerability to Apache. google: false contest: false question: | How was this vulnerability discovered? Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the vulnerability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there. The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil. The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil. If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may leave this part blank. automated: false description: |- This was a vulnerability that affected people who used Apache HTTPD versions 1.3 from 1.3.28 and 2.0.46. This vulnerability allowed malicious users to perform remote attacks that cause denial of service or random code executions. This vulnerability makes use of a off-by-one error which is when data being added to a stack overwrites an extra bit. This situation was only able to happen when certain functions of the rewrite module was used with Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) urls. The rewrite module is capable of manipulating urls so that requests from one url can be sent to another url. When data overflows past its intended boundaries, it allows for the next section of code in the stack to execute or it could even crash the whole program. unit_tested: fix: false code: true answer: The commit changes did not indicate that any test files were altered. There were test files for testing the C modules. question: | Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability? Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve improving the automated tests? For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved for this module. For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again. specification: answer: answer_note: instructions: | Is there mention of a violation of a specification? For example, an RFC specification, a protocol specification, or a requirements specification. Be sure to check all artifacts for this: bug report, security advisory, commit message, etc. The answer field should be boolean. In answer_note, please explain why you come to that conclusion. curation_level: 1 CWE_instructions: | Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!) autodiscoverable: answer: answer_note: instructions: | Is it plausible that a fully automated tool could have discovered this? These are tools that require little knowledge of the domain, e.g. automatic static analysis, compiler warnings, fuzzers. Examples for true answers: SQL injection, XSS, buffer overflow Examples for false: RFC violations, permissions issues, anything that requires the tool to be "aware" of the project's domain-specific requirements. The answer field should be boolean. In answer_note, please explain why you come to that conclusion. yaml_instructions: bounty_instructions: | If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank. interesting_commits: answer: There were no commits that changed the method where the vulnerability was present between the VCC and fix except for the fix itself. There were numerous commits between the VCC and fix which mostly had to do with optimizations, updating licenses, fixing copyrights, and altering functionality for other methods. commits: - note: commit: - note: commit: question: | Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)? Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any emerging themes? curated_instructions: | If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly. If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is set to true. upvotes_instructions: | For the first round, ignore this upvotes number. For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the upvotes score on your branch. nickname_instructions: | A catchy name for this vulnerability that would draw attention it. If the report mentions a nickname, use that. Must be under 30 characters. Optional. reported_instructions: announced_instructions: | Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/). Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format. fixes_vcc_instructions: | Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format. published_instructions: description_instructions: | You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony. Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD description later to get more technical. Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to keep too. |
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