CVE-2010-0660

CVE: CVE-2010-0660
CWE:
- 201
- 200
bugs:
- 29920
repo: 
vccs:
- note: |
    The vulnerability was present from the start of the repository.
    It is clear that from the start it was known that a HTTPS url should
    not be sent as the referrer for a HTTP request; however, the redirect
    edge case was not handled.
  commit: 586acc5fe142f498261f52c66862fa417c3d52d2
fixes:
- note: Fixing commit
  commit: 7844480ae4f50930ca66fd3658790b52d344826d
- note: Updated test expectations
  commit: f8bc33be983c60bdd7de7a34fc76cc7ddd2f7dfd
bounty:
  date: 
  amount: 
  references: []
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: 
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: 
  distrust_input:
    note: 
    applies: 
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: 
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: 
  defense_in_depth:
    note: 
    applies: 
  secure_by_default:
    note: |
      Instead of relying on the server to clear possible sensitive data from the
      referrer, the browser does this as a default.
    applies: true
  cognitive_complexity:
    note: "The vulnerability involves dependencies on server implementations \noutside
      the control of the browser's developers. The developers have to \nbrainstorm
      the possible usages of the referrer header as well as in what \ncases it should
      and should not be sent with a request. This is further \ncomplicated by the
      number of methods a request can use and by the number\nof protocols handled
      by the browser. \n"
    applies: true
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
reviews:
- 486015
- 500129
- 502038
- 501109
upvotes: 8
mistakes:
  answer: "The mistake was essentially not handling an edge case where a request\nwas
    made from a secure site to an unsecure site using a redirect. The fix\nitself
    was only 2 lines of code to check to see if the referrer header should \nbe cleared
    before redirecting. It was clear that the developer's knew from the\nbeginning
    of the repository that the referrer should not be sent from an HTTPS \nsite to
    an HTTP, and did not in other cases, but this was not implemented in \nredirecting.\n\nThe
    CWE vulnerability mitigations suggest that this could have been avoided\nin the
    Architecture and Design phase by drawing unambiguous trust boundaries.\nIt would
    be interesting to see if there were updates to security related\ndesign documentation
    to show how a redirect can be used to leave a site\nsecured by HTTPS. \n\nThe
    fix itself appears well enough, but it is hard to tell if there was a lesson \nlearned
    by the developers from this mistake since it is unclear why this case\nwas missed
    (other than just complexity). It is not even safe to say that all\ninstances of
    the referrer crossing trust boundaries are handeled or that future\nfunctionality
    will not repeat the same mistakes.\n"
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
announced: '2010-01-25'
subsystem:
  name: internals
  answer: Based on the Issue report and source code.
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '2009-12-09'
  answer: "Found by manually examining the referrer header after first visiting a
    URL \nsecured by HTTPS and then clicking a secure HTTPS link that triggers a redirect
    \nto an unsecure HTTP URL.\n"
  google: true
  contest: false
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: "Chromium sends an HTTPS URL in the Referer header to an HTTP site when
  redirecting\nfrom a secure HTTPS site to an unsecure HTTP site. \n\nThe 'Referer'
  header is the address of the previous web page from which a link \nto the currently
  requested page was followed. An unsecure HTTP site may obtain \nsensitive information
  embedded in the HTTPS URL such as password reset links.\n\nEven if the security
  of the site is not compromised, the user of the site may \nnot want the information
  shared.\n"
unit_tested:
  fix: true
  code: true
  answer: "From looking at the fix code it is clear that the code was tested and that
    \nthere were new unit tests for validating the fix.\n"
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: 
  events:
  - date: 
    name: 
  - date: 
    name: 
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: 
  commits:
  - note: "They added a method to sanitize the referrer header to remove potential
      usernames \nand passwords. It is not clear from the issue referenced if this
      change was for \nautomated testing purposes only or if this was an attempt to
      mitigate leaking sensitive data\nin the wild.\n"
    commit: e600c8212f8922d77815316ff41fd8ce9d95bca7
  - note: |
      They worked on some CSRF issues with following a temporary redirect (307 error) for a moved URL.
      It appears that the redirect allowed for custom headers and body of the original request
      to be re-transmitted to the victim site which could result in session hijacking and
      loss of sensitive information.
    commit: 6568a9e384e0f92422c68d4f31fb401df4acbaed
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?

    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.