CVE-2010-0663

CVE: CVE-2010-0663
CWE:
- 200
- 119
bugs:
- 31307
repo: 
vccs:
- note: |
    This vulnerability has been present since the migration of chromium
    from SVN to git. The vulnerability when it was fixed was located in
    chrome/common/common_param_traits.cc, but before that it was part of
    chrome/common/ipc_message_utils.cc and before that it was part of
    chrome/common/ipc_message_utils.h.
  commit: '09911bf300f1a419907a9412154760efd0b7abc3'
fixes:
- note: ''
  commit: d3d98bc21e6fe0ea6aa0186194347a1f5e4d7be8
bounty:
  date: 
  amount: 
  references: []
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: 
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: 
  distrust_input:
    note: |
      While this doesn't relate to untrusted user input, it does relate to
      untrusted "external" input. Rather than relying on external metadata
      regarding the bitmap buffer, the function should have relied on the
      buffer itself as the sole source of truth, calculating any necessary
      metadata (e.g. row size) itself.
    applies: true
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: 
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: 
  defense_in_depth:
    note: |
      This vulnerability could have been prevented if the function handling
      the bitmap buffer didn't rely on an externally given property of the
      buffer. Instead, it should have used the buffer itself as a sole source
      of truth.
    applies: true
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: 
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
reviews:
- 517023
- 518030
upvotes: 
mistakes:
  answer: |
    This problem arose from the fact that certain properties of the data
    being used were derived from different sources of truth. Namely, the
    size of a bitmap buffer could be calculated from the buffer itself,
    however in one instance, a function accepted a parameter which it used as
    it's source of truth for the buffer size. This led to the possibility that
    the actual size of the buffer could be different than the size given by
    the parameter, which led to logical inconsistencies. This potentially
    allowed for a buffer overread as well as limited escalation.
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
announced: '2010-02-18 13:00:01.097000000 -05:00'
subsystem:
  name: utilities
  answer: |
    The code for bitmap reading was located in a "common" directory, so if I
    had to give the subsystem a name I would call it Utilities.
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '2009-12-30'
  answer: |
    It's not clear whether this bug was found due to any conspicuous crashes
    or testing errors. Rather, it seems to have been discovered by a
    security contractor who was specifically searching for vulnerabilities.
  google: false
  contest: false
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: |
  This vulnerability can be described as a buffer overread, in which an
  attacker can force an array index to read beyond the bounds of the array.
  An attacker can use this to induce a system crash or to potentially read
  memory they shouldn't have access to.
  This vulnerability occurs in chromium's bitmap buffers. The bitmap buffer
  itself and the row size of the bitmap buffer are given
  by two different sources which can fall out of sync, causing the bitmap
  reader to read beyond the contents of the actual buffer (e.g. if the given
  buffer is small).
unit_tested:
  fix: false
  code: false
  answer: |
    It does not appear that automated tests played any role in identifying
    this vulnerability, nor were any tests written to verify that the
    unintended behavior was fixed. However, since the bug originated from
    the presence of two out-of-sync sources of truth and one of those was
    removed, it seems safe to say that the behavior should be fixed.
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: |
    In 2008, the chromium project migrated version control systems from SVN
    to Git. This vulnerability was present since before that migration.
  events:
  - date: '2008-07-26'
    name: Chromium migrated from SVN to git
  - date: 
    name: 
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: 
  commits:
  - note: |
      The vulnerable code was moved in a refactoring, but functionally
      unchanged
    commit: e1981f43505c69351e5786eac1bff1913f4c96db
  - note: 
    commit: 
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?

    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.