CVE-2010-1231

CVE: CVE-2010-1231
CWE:
- 644
bugs:
- 33572
repo: 
vccs:
- note: 
  commit: 92b24c11f42b31158cca43921eac16f33c98839c
- note: 
  commit: e3c404b92dcfc8e45225039ad5d2a9cff844cb4e
- note: |
    The git blame output on the problem file in the problem code area
    brought up a few commits that contributed to around 10 lines of code that
    created the vulnerability. This one was caused by multiple developers.
  commit: 363119947a1e9111c19c326a2844bc60a29fabba
fixes:
- note: 
  commit: 4670de0e4ab9e02165d2b0d0c24ff9825e5bbff9
bounty:
  date: 
  amount: 
  references: []
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: 
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: "Once run before the url is parsed, an exploit that uses headers to execute
      code, set cookies, \ndownload a file, etc. is probably going to be complex due
      to headers not really being the\nplace for functionality. Trying to programatically
      figure out what a header is doing would\nbe difficult.\n"
    applies: true
  distrust_input:
    note: "The key problem here is that headers were loaded and run before they were\ntested
      to be trustworthy. Headers of files are considered input and should \nbe verified
      before running.s\n"
    applies: true
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: 
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: 
  defense_in_depth:
    note: "The key problem here is that headers were loaded and run before they were\ntested
      to be trustworthy. Defense in depth would've caught this because\nthe principle
      advocates for security at every layer, and this layer would\nhave been included
      in the principle since it is outwardly facing incoming \ncontent.\n"
    applies: true
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: 
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
reviews:
- 661399
- 660396
upvotes: 8
Nickname: Just The Head(er)
mistakes:
  answer: "The mistake was attributed to mostly a design flaw. \n\nAt the point in
    time of development, SafeBrowsing was a generally new feature \nof Chrome 4.0
    (released Jan 25 2010) when the vulnerability was discovered (Jan 29 2010).\nThe
    team had only recently set up the process for checking blacklists, blocking cookies,\nand
    parsing urls before loading partial resources for the page. Most likely the specific\nsteps
    of the process were disjoint and not easily extendable or easily added to. There
    \nwas just a miscommunication of what had to get done when and steps ended up
    out of order.\n"
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
announced: '2010-03-17'
subsystem:
  name: SafeBrowsing
  answer: "Based on the CVE title and the bug report conversation. The surrounding
    directory\ncontains files that are responsible for loading and rendering resource
    content. It \nmakes sense that the SafeBrowsing feature is here because it has
    the responsibility\nto check if resources are safe before loading.\n"
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '2010-01-29'
  answer: "The vulnerability was found by general user mike.dougherty@gmail.com of
    \"dotSyntax, LLC\". \nmike.dougherty@gmail.com created link to a malicious pdf
    file that exploited a known Adobe \nReader bug, and then told Chrome to load the
    link. Chrome correctly detected a malicious url \nand displayed a warning, but
    still downloaded the pdf with no further user interaction.\n"
  google: false
  contest: false
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulnerability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: "The vulnerability was in Chrome's SafeBrowsingResourceHandler which
  controls a\nchain of ResourceHandlers that, when browsing in safe mode, do processing
  \non a url or a resource and decide whether it can be loaded or not.\n\nThe implementation
  of SafeBrowsingResourceHandler simultaneously did protective\nparsing of a url and
  retrieved the resource's HTTP headers. This caused the headers\nof the resource
  to possibly be processed before identifying if the url was safe\nto load or not.
  Once the headers were processed, ResourceHandlers further down the \nchain could
  use the post-processing header response to do a number of actions such\nas load
  the requested url, load a url from the header response, tell the DownloadManager\nto
  download a file from the url location, apply cookies to the browser, etc.\n\nThis
  could be exploited by using custom HTTP headers to start a download of a malicious
  \nfile that could exploit a program on the OS (ex. a .pdf file that exploits a know
  Adobe\nReader bug) or just be straight malware.\n"
unit_tested:
  fix: true
  code: true
  answer: |
    An empty unit test file was included in the same directory as the file with
    the fix. Doing a git log and git blame on that file shows that after the fix
    commit, unit tests were developed for the fix and surrounding code up until
    1d8a3d1fe0e07d5aaf1f0a5527097b9e313d23b6 when the unit test file was either
    moved or deleted.
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: There were no major events during this time.
  events:
  - date: 
    name: 
  - date: 
    name: 
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: 
  commits:
  - note: "Relates to adding a notification UI element that tells the user when and
      what cookies are blocked.\nThis commit is interesting because cookies are commonly
      applied in the header sections of HTML files and\nwere listed as a possible
      exploit by discoverer mike.dougherty@gmail.com and fixer eroman@chromium.org.
      The test for this\ncommit noted to turn on 'block cookies' and navigate to a
      website such as 'cnn.com' to see if the notification \npopped up. If the testing
      was more robust, they could have requested a known malicious link and then upon
      page load \nfailure, they would have noticed the cookies were still attempting
      to be applied. Thus a symptom of \nthe vulnerability would've been exposed earlier.\n"
    commit: 3dbb80bca45a4fdf674250ed833842a71de41838
  - note: "Relates to delaying resource requests until privacy blacklists are ready.
      This commit is interesting\nbecause the team implemented delaying resource requests
      for another reason instead of url parsing;\nthis time it was blacklist loading.
      It makes sense that urls should not be loaded until they have\nbeen checked
      against blacklists. The fixer, eroman@chromium.org, probably modeled his delayer
      for url parsing\nbased off of the work done in this commit. \n"
    commit: 363119947a1e9111c19c326a2844bc60a29fabba
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?

    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.