CVE-2010-1623

CVE: CVE-2010-1623
CWE: 119
ipc:
  note: 
  answer: 
  question: |
    Did the feature that this vulnerability affected use inter-process
    communication? IPC includes OS signals, pipes, stdin/stdout, message
    passing, and clipboard. Writing to files that another program in this
    software system reads is another form of IPC.

    Answer should be boolean. Explain your answer
bugs: []
i18n:
  note: 
  answer: 
  instructions: |
    Was the feature impacted by this vulnerability about internationalization
    (i18n)? An internationalization feature is one that enables people from all
    over the world to use the system. This includes translations, locales,
    typography, unicode, or various other features.

    Answer should be boolean. Write a note about how you came to the conclusions
    you did.
repo: 
vccs:
- note: Formerly ed10ef0f7f93cba9f05887f0343895a2cd05964e before HTTPD rewrote Git
    history.
  commit: 3596598324dbc99a5ae88230f6a73fe4817e070d
- note: 
  commit: 
fixes:
- note: |-
    Just a CHANGELOG change

    Formerly 970eadfab2f1a3c912c5f561f284221e487d832a before HTTPD rewrote Git history.
  commit: 9e741f07950d52d9837167f4373cdf5a52a5a41d
- note: |-
    This fix involved a significant rewrite of the functionality.

    Formerly 15109e4e5f13314c97dc040aa96ef6ad7770f9e3 before HTTPD rewrote Git history.
  commit: 627c50ed2db10fce146efce135a0b99c391861c3
- note: Formerly ca1a8f6a297b7875d53393d0e8e7de1627bf0f9b before HTTPD rewrote Git
    history.
  commit: 34a23d2a7b0447f7ad561e85d4c2b3ef4856b2a4
- note: Formerly c022637bd8328a7fc9019bf252b30f60db0d2303 before HTTPD rewrote Git
    history.
  commit: 3805c80c552b193d50e0670346f8404cbf4d3dee
- note: Formerly ceadbb2ba891b0822f5f6a493a80e4adda23431d before HTTPD rewrote Git
    history.
  commit: d814b8320690cb668b158e4d04c1a94c440c5082
bounty:
  amt: 
  url: 
  announced: 
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: 
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: 
  distrust_input:
    note: 
    applies: 
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: 
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: 
  defense_in_depth:
    note: 
    applies: 
  secure_by_default:
    note: The fix for this vulnerability was about changing a timing policy, which
      is essentially hardcoded into the system.
    applies: true
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
reviews: []
upvotes: 10
CWE_note: 
mistakes:
  answer: |
    The fix to this vulnerability was a signifiant rewrite of the original
    functionality. The issue was not a small coding mistake, but a poor algorithm
    choice and poor defaults. More integration testing would have helped with this,
    especially with a memory management tool like Valgrind.
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
nickname: 
reported: 
announced: 2010-10-04T21:00Z
published: 
subsystem:
  name: core
  answer: Based on their commit messages
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged.
discovered:
  date: 
  answer: 'No evidence on how this vulnerability was originally reported. Fix just
    appears

    '
  google: false
  contest: 
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave this part blank.
  automated: false
description: |
  When HTTPD processes non-SSL (unencrypted) traffic, the way they process that
  data was flawed that allowed for memory to fill up. With carefully timed
  packets, an attacker could make the HTTPD process fill up on memory and cause
  a denial of service. The logic has to do with how timeout policies are
  enforced across core multiple modules in HTTPD.

  The subsystem, mod_reqtimeout, is designed to be "a convenient way to set
  timeouts and minimum data rates for receiving requests. Should a timeout occur
  or a data rate be to low, the corresponding connection will be closed by the
  server" (from https://httpd.apache.org/docs/trunk/mod/mod_reqtimeout.html).
  It is a filtering module, which works with HTTPD's "bucket brigade" model of
  accepting and parsing network data into the HTTPD quickly.

  In this vulnerability, the policy was loose by allowing 30 seconds to "linger"
  when a connection was scheduled for closing. This gives ample time for
  attackers to send crafted packets and fill up RAM. Instead, the policy was
  changed to 2 seconds, along with a big rewrite of how the policies are
  enforced.
unit_tested:
  fix: false
  code: false
  answer: |
    No unit tests were changed for this fix, and no tests were found for this part
    of the system in the source tree.
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
specification:
  answer: 
  answer_note: 
  instructions: |
    Is there mention of a violation of a specification? For example,
    an RFC specification, a protocol specification, or a requirements
    specification.

    Be sure to check all artifacts for this: bug report, security
    advisory, commit message, etc.

    The answer field should be boolean. In answer_note, please explain
    why you come to that conclusion.
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
autodiscoverable:
  answer: 
  answer_note: 
  instructions: |
    Is it plausible that a fully automated tool could have discovered
    this? These are tools that require little knowledge of the domain,
     e.g. automatic static analysis, compiler warnings, fuzzers.

    Examples for true answers: SQL injection, XSS, buffer overflow

    Examples for false: RFC violations, permissions issues, anything
    that requires the tool to be "aware" of the project's
    domain-specific requirements.

    The answer field should be boolean. In answer_note, please explain
    why you come to that conclusion.
yaml_instructions: 
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  commits:
  - note: 
    commit: 
  - note: 
    commit: 
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
nickname_instructions: |
  A catchy name for this vulnerability that would draw attention it. If the
  report mentions a nickname, use that. Must be under 30 characters.
  Optional.
reported_instructions: 
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
published_instructions: 
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.