CVE-2010-2299

CVE: CVE-2010-2299
CWE:
- 843
- 94
bugs:
- 43307
repo: 
vccs:
- note: ''
  commit: e344c910c5f4a1c88e3da37e074873a6360f3624
fixes:
- note: ''
  commit: 7473b624aff7e1db5b22d7a856d1f21509fa04bc
bounty:
  date: '2010-06-08'
  amount: 2000
  references:
  - https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2010/06/stable-channel-update.html
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: false
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: false
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: false
  distrust_input:
    note: |
      Distrusting input applies very heavily with this vulnerability. Since
      the root problem related to giving a certain input that was interpreted
      incorrectly leading to access to an arbitrary pointer, more work was
      needed to sanitize the input.
    applies: true
  least_privilege:
    note: |
      This vulnerability allowed for access to various memory pointers that
      access would not normally be given to. As a result, there was clearly
      some degree of a privilege issue involved. Someone who shouldn't have
      had privilege to view said memory pointers was able to gain access
      regardless.
    applies: true
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: false
  defense_in_depth:
    note: 
    applies: false
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: false
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: false
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: false
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: false
reviews:
- 2125022
- 1973002
upvotes: 
mistakes:
  answer: |
    It seems that the main cause of this issue was a small oversight by the
    developers. The developers could have run through all possible Clipboard
    objects that are run through the dispatchObject function. If this had been
    done, they would have realized that one of the objects leads to the
    vulnerability. Likewise, due to the fact that this was likely a minor
    oversight by the developers, the vulnerability is also something that should
    have been able to have been caught by looking at the code review a bit more
    closely.
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
announced: '2010-06-15 14:00:02.217000000 -04:00'
subsystem:
  name: clipboard
  answer: Clipboard (chrome/browser/renderer_host/)
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '2010-05-05'
  answer: 
  google: true
  contest: 
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: |
  There are certain objects that are read in through the DispatchObject()
  function as clipboard objects. One of the types of objects that could be
  read through this function, CBF_SMBITMAP to be exact, contains information
  that points to a shared memory object. If someone who normally does not have
  access to the shared memory object obtains access, they could potentially
  modify the object which may affect other processes using it. This dangerous
  process is normally okay since there are other methods that make it secure.
  However, there was a particular instance where said methods were not used,
  resulting in an unsecure use of the CBF_SMBITMAP object.
unit_tested:
  fix: false
  code: true
  answer: |
    There were no unit tests that were involved with the fix for this
    vulnerability. There are unit tests that test certain aspects of the render
    process. However, no unit tests exist to specifically test the vulnerability
    fix.
    The code review: https://codereview.chromium.org/1973002
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: |
    There do not appear to be many major events between the VCC and the fix
    commit. Due to the very small nature of the fix commit, it is fair to assume
    that the issue had a short lifecycle and was patched quietly without much
    attention being drawn to it.
  events:
  - date: 
    name: 
  - date: 
    name: 
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 0
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: 
  commits:
  - note: 
    commit: 
  - note: 
    commit: 
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?

    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.