CVE-2010-3247

CVE: CVE-2010-3247
CWE:
- 20
- 451
bugs:
- 37201
repo: 
vccs:
- note: They were working on a fix for a different bug at the time.
  commit: b5b2385af64eb08b1feb53fb0ad65c835f472912
fixes:
- note: Add URL filter to trigger punycode for Japanese homographic sequences.
  commit: 9e7fbfea4a79dbb7f3aa8e71f41b3ca4e40fe3b7
bounty:
  date: '2010-09-02'
  amount: 0
  references:
  - https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2010/09/stable-and-beta-channel-updates.html
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: 
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: |
      japanese characters in homographic sequences which are complex characters
      (especially since they were not handled) affected the URL
    applies: true
  distrust_input:
    note: |
      The fix for this vulnerability filtered code going into the url, so distrust
      of input was applied.
    applies: true
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: 
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: 
  defense_in_depth:
    note: 
    applies: 
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: 
  character_conversion:
    note: |
      japanese characters in which when typed in a homographic sequence were not filter/handled
      and this allowed attackers to be able to spoof
    applies: true
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
reviews:
- 3015056
- 3011012
upvotes: 10
mistakes:
  answer: |
    The common mistake that led to this vulnerability was the lack of internationalization
    and localization for the URL. If it was considered, the url spoofing through the usage
    of homographic sequenced japanese characters would not have been possible. The lack of testing
    in regards to internalization and localization also contributed to this. If they tested foreign
    characters in their test case for the URL, they could've caught this earlier on. The lack of
    testing on Google's end meant that it had to take the outside testing of a security
    company to happen to find this vulnerability for it to start to get addressed.
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
announced: '2010-09-07 14:00:02.510000000 -04:00'
subsystem:
  name: Omnibox
  answer: This mistake was in the net utilities subsystem where it handled internationalisation
    and localization and in Omnibox of browser's UI
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '2010-03-02'
  answer: |
    It was discovered by a person working at a security company called Casaba.  It
    was not clear if the bug was discovered by automated or manual testing on their
    end, but it can assumed that they found this bug in the process of searching for
    possible vulnerability as part of his job working in security.
  google: false
  contest: false
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: 
description: |
  Google Chrome doesn't properly restrict the characters in urls, allowing
  remote attackers to visually spoof the url bar using sequences of characters that
  are being used for a different purpose than their intended use (specifically homographic sequences)
unit_tested:
  fix: true
  code: true
  answer: |
    There appeared to be unit tests both before and after the fix, but the tests
    that existed before the fix did not cover the issue that caused the vulnerability.
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: A large change in code occurred in between the vcc and the fixing commit
    that change the way that urls were autocompleted which could have changed the
    nature of the vulnerability.
  events:
  - date: '2009-11-07'
    name: url autocompletion commit
  - date: 
    name: 
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: 
  commits:
  - note: |
      A lot of code was added/deleted in this commit.  This code changed how urls
      autocompleted by changing several properties of the url that affect the autocompletion.  Given
      that the vulnerability's is about visually spoofing urls, this commit may have
      affected the vulnerability.
    commit: ce85f60cd9d399109dab39fe5a9613879ab9a8f7
  - note: |
      This commit put certain unit tests into their own file and changed how icu
      string conversions were handled, which may have affected how urls were handled,
      which would affect the vulnerability.
    commit: d6e58c6ef48f52cce6cdf781c5a507e254322425
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?

    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.