CVE-2010-3411

CVE: CVE-2010-3411
CWE:
- 617
- 787
bugs:
- 51709
repo: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/
vccs:
- note: ananta@chromium.org introduced this vulnerability by not clamping the hotspot
    to the cursor size
  commit: 9ec8771f15b2e73ae132b294f86ef74d36034408
fixes:
- note: The fix bounded the hotspot to the custom cursor's dimension.
  commit: 4605be79a582881a1987b79694437be52df959af
bounty:
  date: 
  amount: 
  references: []
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: false
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: false
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: false
  distrust_input:
    note: 
    applies: false
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: false
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: false
  defense_in_depth:
    note: 
    applies: false
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: false
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: false
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: false
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: false
reviews:
- 3168003
- 3244006
upvotes: 
mistakes:
  answer: |
    The cause of this vulnerability was a coding mistake. The issue was that the hotspot was not bounded to the custom cursor size (custom image's dimensions). As a result, using Linux on chrome crashed because of the out-of-bounds hotspot.

     The CWE entry I chose was out-of-bounds Write. If the hotspot is not bounded to the cursor's custom dimension when the cursor moves outside of the hotspot then the UI crashes. To mitigate this weakness there should be a check to verify that the hotspot is bounded to a custom cursor. This mitigation happens in the implementation phase, however, in this case, it was not realized and became a vulnerability.
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
announced: '2010-09-16'
subsystem:
  name: UI
  answer: 'According to the bug report, the issue was classified as part of the "UI"
    component. The source code files that were impacted are located in the src/webkit/glue
    directory.

    '
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: August 10, 2010
  answer: 'There is not an explicit answer for how this vulnerability was found, however,
    looking at the bug report blog it seems that a user came across this issue and
    documented the error. The user who found the vulnerability gave specific instructions
    on how to reproduce the error and what are the expected results.

    '
  google: false
  contest: false
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulnerabilitywas discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: |
  Google Chrome before 6.0.472.59 on Linux did not properly handle cursors, which might have allowed attackers to cause a denial of service (assertion failure) via unspecified vectors.

  For example, if a user were to login to my.safaribooks, click on a link to a book and move the mouse around, the user should still be able to move the mouse around and continue to use chrome. However, what happens instead is a fatal assertion failure with a message of the backtrace.
unit_tested:
  fix: true
  code: true
  answer: 'The original code did have unit tests, however, the tests did not provide
    sufficient coverage. As a result, when the hotspot was outside the bounds of the
    image the UI crashed.  Once the fix was implemented, unit tests were added to
    verify that an out-of-bounds error was properly handled.

    '
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: 'There were no major events connected to this vulnerability. The development
    team was fixing with a lot of UI issues during this time which did not have any
    impact on this vulnerability. The dev channel was delivered with UI updates, a
    stable update was introduced and the beta channel was released.

    '
  events:
  - date: August 10, 2010
    name: Dev Channel Update
  - date: August 10, 2010
    name: Stable Channel Update
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: 'There were no interesting commits between the VCC and the fix. The code
    changes were relatively small and straightforward. The commits included Clamping
    the hotspot on custom cursors to the custom cursor image''s dimensions and adding
    unit tests.

    '
  commits:
  - note: 
    commit: 
  - note: 
    commit: 
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?

    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.