CVE-2010-4488

CVE: CVE-2010-4488
CWE:
- 287
bugs:
- 61701
repo: 
vccs:
- note: 
  commit: e772db3f04f1079a07d702c6aa4e0394f2147af9
fixes:
- note: |
    The VCC was the second commit since the initial commit.
    This was likely an oversight in the initial development/design.
    The http_network_transaction file has been heaviliy modified since
    the fix for this. More case handling like the one added to fix this
    have since been added. Early in a project it is hard to see all the
    possible conditions under which something will be used, this vulnerabilty
    was a result of exactly that.
  commit: 7a67a81536b664eb4145731ec1e97bf2f7990e30
bounty:
  date: 
  amount: 
  references: []
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: false
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: false
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: false
  distrust_input:
    note: 
    applies: false
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: false
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: false
  defense_in_depth:
    note: 
    applies: false
  secure_by_default:
    note: |
      A more over-arching exception handler should have been catching this exception
      and reporting back to google the exception, but allowing the browser to continue.
    applies: true
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: false
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: false
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: false
reviews:
- 4604001
- 4575001
- 4606001
- 4526002
upvotes: 5
mistakes:
  answer: |
    This could be a coding or design error, there was obviously no
    system designed for handling this case. However, when coding this, the developer
    did not see the possibility of failure and all it took to fix this was an if condition
    to test whether the connection behind a proxy succeeded. The fix does adhere to the
    CWE mitigations and the fix does appears to be correct. However, in more recent
    versions of the file, the original fix is not present. Handling this scenario
    is still present, just in a differnt form, this makes it seem that the original fix
    was not as rock-solid as it should have been.
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
announced: '2010-12-07 16:00:09.280000000 -05:00'
subsystem:
  name: http_network_transaction
  answer: |
    The bug was in chrome underlying network transaction system. When this
    system tried to establish http connections and recieved a 407 error,
    it did not know how to properly proceed.
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '2010-10-03'
  answer: |
    The bug was discovered by someone working at denyall.com
    who stumbled upon the bug and reported it. They were using a proxy and were
    testing their page which generated a 407 error, leading to the discovery of
    the bug.
  google: false
  contest: false
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: |
  This bug involves an unhandled case in which the user is behind a proxy and the
  page they are requesting returns a 407 error (proxy authentication required).
  Chrome did not handle this situation, causing the app to crash. Exploitation of
  this could ultimately cause a denial of service on the chrome app.
unit_tested:
  fix: true
  code: true
  answer: true
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: |
    There was a great deal of change all around the project at this point as
    it was in such early stages. At this time there was a lot of adding to /
    modifying of this file.
  events:
  - date: '2008-10-03'
    name: Added unique error code for receiving 407
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: 
  commits:
  - note: |
      It looks like there were a few bugs in the network transaction methods, as this
      was in 2010, chrome was still in its early stages. It appears they were squashing
      early bugs in the code.
    commit: adb0024aa0bdd5c1d50de0fe4653747ed6c19c69
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?

    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.