angler-fishThe Vulnerability History Project

CVE-2011-1122

CVE-2011-1122 allows attempts to read memory outside expected boundaries on the host operating system. This vulnerability specifically exploits mistakes in how vectors were handled. Specifically, it would use an integer overflow to force an out of bounds memory read from the webkit engine. It is a denial of service exploit as this would typically cause the operating system to terminate the application. It was fixed by preventing certain vector attributes from getting used with OpenGL ES 2.0.


The code in question handles WebGL rendering in the browser using OpenGL or OpenGL ES2. In transitioning to OpenGL ES2.0, they initialized a buffer that was needed by OpenGL but not OpenGL ES 2.0. Under specific circumstances, the buffer could overflow and lead to out of bounds memory access. This is a simple design oversite and was fixed by checking the OpenGL version before instantiating the buffer.
  • Big Fix 218 lines changed, 114 added / 104 deleted Learn more about Big Fix.
  • CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer Learn more about CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer.
  • CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read Learn more about CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read.
  • Discovered Internally The vulnerability was found by running a fuzz test on chromium, targeting the <canvas> element with the following command: D:\chromium\src\chrome\Release\chrome.exe --disable-click-to-play--disable-prompt-on-repost --disable-hang-monitor --disable-metrics --enable-accelerated-2d-canvas --enable-accelerated-compositing--enable-accessibility --enable-gpu-plugin --enable-gpu-rendering --enable-nacl --enable-native-web-workers --enable-search-provider-api-v2 --force-internal-pdf --force-renderer-accessibility --enable-experimental-extension-apis --enable-extension-timeline-api --enable-webgl --enable-extension-apps--enable-geolocation --enable-indexed-database --no-first-run --no-process-singleton-dialog --no-default-browser-check --enable-desktop-notifications --js-flags="--expose-gc" --single-process --new-window --disable-plugins --incognito --allow-file-access-from-files --disable-popup-blocking --user-data-dir=D:\FuzzTmp\t1677 D:\chromium\src\third_party\WebKit\LayoutTests\fast\canvas\webgl\index-validation-fuzz-1296820232.74.html The test seems to run a test in the form of a webpage that utilizes a <canvas> element to fuzz the WebGL subsystem. (regarding whether google was involved, the bug reports were authored by people affiliated with the Chromium project which is affiliated with Google. I will count that as google-true) Learn more about Discovered Internally.
  • Discovered Manually The vulnerability was found by running a fuzz test on chromium, targeting the <canvas> element with the following command: D:\chromium\src\chrome\Release\chrome.exe --disable-click-to-play--disable-prompt-on-repost --disable-hang-monitor --disable-metrics --enable-accelerated-2d-canvas --enable-accelerated-compositing--enable-accessibility --enable-gpu-plugin --enable-gpu-rendering --enable-nacl --enable-native-web-workers --enable-search-provider-api-v2 --force-internal-pdf --force-renderer-accessibility --enable-experimental-extension-apis --enable-extension-timeline-api --enable-webgl --enable-extension-apps--enable-geolocation --enable-indexed-database --no-first-run --no-process-singleton-dialog --no-default-browser-check --enable-desktop-notifications --js-flags="--expose-gc" --single-process --new-window --disable-plugins --incognito --allow-file-access-from-files --disable-popup-blocking --user-data-dir=D:\FuzzTmp\t1677 D:\chromium\src\third_party\WebKit\LayoutTests\fast\canvas\webgl\index-validation-fuzz-1296820232.74.html The test seems to run a test in the form of a webpage that utilizes a <canvas> element to fuzz the WebGL subsystem. (regarding whether google was involved, the bug reports were authored by people affiliated with the Chromium project which is affiliated with Google. I will count that as google-true) Learn more about Discovered Manually.
  • Known Origin (VCC) Learn more about Known Origin (VCC).
  • Language: C++ Learn more about Language: C++.
  • Lesson: Code Refactors 69 refactors took place during the vulnerability. Learn more about Lesson: Code Refactors.
  • Lesson: Fix Untested This vulenrability was caught using external conformance testing. Learn more about Lesson: Fix Untested.
  • Lesson: Reverting Codebase 75 reverts took place during the vulnerability. Learn more about Lesson: Reverting Codebase.
  • Lesson: Too Many Cooks 394 different developers made commits to the files fixed for this vulnerability. Learn more about Lesson: Too Many Cooks.
  • Lifetime: 5+ years 2258.0 days, or 6.2 years Learn more about Lifetime: 5+ years.
  • Project: Chromium Learn more about Project: Chromium.
  • Small Fix 11 lines changed, 4 added / 7 deleted Learn more about Small Fix.
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CVE: CVE-2011-1122
CWE:
- 119
- 125
bugs:
- 71960
repo: 
vccs:
- note: |
    'Blocks disabling of certain OpenGL attributes that otherwise
    would have caused testing to fail. A lot of tests were failing
    because required attributes were being disabled.'
  commit: b112298f642b44d190d201a64cdc60963266551a
fixes:
- note: Fix based on updated WebGL conformance test
  commit: 1071e57b86dc2cca01a4fe980a1517bbe7e166e9
- note: Changes how GL version is checked based on bug 429053 (5 years later)
  commit: f9d25cd702bd6b744eb2e2b605c2000426e69531
- note: Changes how GL version is checked through the entire file
  commit: 9b0c43932354d90f3d5e4882695f442bbbb4708c
bounty:
  date: 
  amount: 
  references: []
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: 
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: 
  distrust_input:
    note: 
    applies: 
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: 
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: 
  defense_in_depth:
    note: 
    applies: 
  misimplementation:
    note: |
      This bug was caused by incorrect implementation of OpenGL ES 2.0. This
      allowed the WebGL applications to push OpenGL ES 2.0 into a state where
      a buffer overflow eent is possible.
    applies: true
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: 
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
reviews:
- 6478013
- 6480013
- 6471012
- 6456016
upvotes: 
mistakes:
  answer: |
    The code in question handles WebGL rendering in the browser using
    OpenGL or OpenGL ES2. In transitioning to OpenGL ES2.0, they initialized a
    buffer that was needed by OpenGL but not OpenGL ES 2.0. Under specific
    circumstances, the buffer could overflow and lead to out of bounds memory
    access. This is a simple design oversite and was fixed by checking the
    OpenGL version before instantiating the buffer.
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
announced: '2011-03-01'
subsystem:
  name: 
  answer: |
    OpenGL ES 2.0, WebGL.
    The path the bug was found in is related to WebGL, but accessory documentation of the bug indicated it was OpenGL related.
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: February 4 2011
  answer: |
    The vulnerability was found by running a fuzz test on chromium, targeting
    the <canvas> element with the following command:

    D:\chromium\src\chrome\Release\chrome.exe --disable-click-to-play--disable-prompt-on-repost --disable-hang-monitor --disable-metrics --enable-accelerated-2d-canvas --enable-accelerated-compositing--enable-accessibility --enable-gpu-plugin --enable-gpu-rendering --enable-nacl --enable-native-web-workers --enable-search-provider-api-v2 --force-internal-pdf --force-renderer-accessibility --enable-experimental-extension-apis --enable-extension-timeline-api --enable-webgl --enable-extension-apps--enable-geolocation --enable-indexed-database --no-first-run --no-process-singleton-dialog --no-default-browser-check --enable-desktop-notifications --js-flags="--expose-gc" --single-process --new-window --disable-plugins --incognito --allow-file-access-from-files --disable-popup-blocking --user-data-dir=D:\FuzzTmp\t1677 D:\chromium\src\third_party\WebKit\LayoutTests\fast\canvas\webgl\index-validation-fuzz-1296820232.74.html

    The test seems to run a test in the form of a webpage that utilizes a <canvas> element to fuzz the WebGL subsystem.

    (regarding whether google was involved, the bug reports were authored by people affiliated with the Chromium project which is affiliated with Google. I will count that as google-true)
  google: true
  contest: false
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you
    may leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you
    looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: |
  CVE-2011-1122 allows attempts to read memory outside expected
  boundaries on the host operating system. This vulnerability specifically
  exploits mistakes in how vectors were handled. Specifically, it would
  use an integer overflow to force an out of bounds memory read from the
  webkit engine.

  It is a denial of service exploit as this would typically cause the operating
  system to terminate the application.

  It was fixed by preventing certain vector attributes from getting used with
  OpenGL ES 2.0.
unit_tested:
  fix: true
  code: true
  answer: This vulenrability was caught using external conformance testing.
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: This bug appears to have been handed off to the Webkit team and the fix
    merged into a later Chromium release. No major changes were made.
  events:
  - date: 
    name: 
  - date: 
    name: 
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: |
    This line was largely ignored between the VCC and the fix. It sat in the
    code for under a year before it was patched.

    There was no investigation until new conformance testing caused a bug
    report to be filed.
  commits:
  - note: 
    commit: 
  - note: 
    commit: 
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?

    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.

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