CVE-2011-1184

CVE: CVE-2011-1184
CWE: 294
bugs: []
vccs:
- note: "They added preemptive authentication, but never added checks to if the authetication
    \nwas already done. Missed a corner case / did not know about the corner case.
    \n"
  commit: b7b5c63a932f6c1ea05f9b65ad9054247bb5af57
fixes:
- note: "Added a function to check the nonce. The nonce is used to check if the message
    is old \nor already used. Now attackers can not use the same authentication message
    they found. \nSince the server will be looking for a different nonce value. \n"
  commit: 639e20992a66d7a42fb59c974db91c8a0f730a1e
bounty:
  amt: 
  url: 
  announced: 
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: 
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?
    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.
    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.
    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: 
  distrust_input:
    note: 
    applies: 
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: 
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: 
  defense_in_depth:
    note: "They have a good authenticator which works, but they should have taken
      the \nnext step to see what happens if a user was able to find an authenticated\nmessage.
      Another layer of protection just in case an attacker got past their \nauthentication.
      \n"
    applies: true
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: 
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: "It seems that nonce is part of many security libraries. Most of these libraries
      send\na nonce with the message on default. if this is the case they should have
      used the\nframework correctly and continued using the nonce. \n"
    applies: true
upvotes: 
mistakes:
  answer: "I think this problem comes down to a coding mistake. So it seems that\nnonce
    is usually sent and authenticated by default in security libraries. The \ndeveloper
    went around it and did not implement the functionality. This could \nalso be a
    design mistake because when the design of the authentication was planned\nthis
    idea of nonce never came up. We can tell it never came up because they added \na
    full function to check the nonce. But in the end this is a fix to the problem,
    \nsince the user will never be able to reuse an authenticated message. \n"
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?
    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?
    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
nickname: 
reported: '2012-02-02'
announced: '2012-01-14'
subsystem:
  name: authenticator
  answer: The Java application Authenticator, all the src files under java folder
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?
    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged.
    Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '2012-11-05'
  answer: "The developers had found a separate weakness in the Tomcat's implementation
    for authentication \nabout 3 months ago. They came out with a solution for that
    problem and when they \nwent to code review the fix, they found that there could
    be stale nonce values, and\nthe system would still accept them. Nonce is a value
    that will update as new messages are \nsent, so this can be used to see if a message
    is old or not. Which allows attackers to \nget elevated privilidges. \n"
  contest: false
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?
    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found.
    * Answer in longform below in "answer"
    * Fill in the date in YYYY-MM-DD
    * If it's clear that the vulnerability was discovered by a contest,
      fill in the name there.
    * The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you
    may leave the entries blank except for "answer", BUT please write down
    where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: "Attackers can look at all the messages being sent between the server
  and client, and get \nautheticated information. Then the attacker can use it by
  repeatedly sending the server the \ninformation. The server at this moment would
  authenticate the attacker because the message sent\nhas the correct username and
  password. The server should have seen the message was used already or \nold and
  dropped the message. In this case the server will give the attacker autheticated
  privlidges. \n"
unit_tested:
  fix: true
  code: true
  answer: "The original code had unit tests but it did not catch this specific vulnerability.\nSince
    the nonce function is new, they did not have any existing test in the automated\nsystem
    for it. Now that the function is implemented, they are going to use automated
    \ntesting to make sure the vulnerability is fixed. So the automated testing is
    part of the \nsolution. \n"
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?
    Write the reasoning behind your answer in the "answer" field.
    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module. Must be just "true" or "false".
    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
    Must be just "true" or "false".
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
incomplete_fixes:
- note: Complete fix! The fix above worked against the Capture replay attacks. Attackers
    cannot use the same autheticated message, since the system will now check the
    nonce and deny access to that request.
  commit: 
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: 
  commits:
  - note: "This commit was created to add a new security functionality and fix an
      old one.\nBut it introduces a new one which they caught pretty quickly. \n"
    commit: b7b5c63a932f6c1ea05f9b65ad9054247bb5af57
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?
    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?
    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this
    section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  Students: when initially writing this, ignore this upvotes number.
  Once this work is being reviewed, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
nickname_instructions: |
  Nickname is optional. Provide a useful, professional, and catchy nickname for
  this vulnerability. Ideally fewer than 30 characters. This will be shown
  alongside its CVE to make it more easily distinguished from the rest.
reported_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was reported to the team? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE data.
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE data.
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the Git commit SHA in "commit" below, and any notes about how this
  was discovered in the "note" field.
  Refer to our instructions on how to find a Git SHA from an SVN revision.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.
  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.
  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.
incomplete_fix_instructions: |
  Did the above "fixes" actually fix the vulnerability?
  Please list any fix commits for this vulnerability that had to be corrected
  at a later date.