CVE-2011-2358

CVE: CVE-2011-2358
CWE:
- 20
bugs:
- 75821
repo: https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8/chrome/browser/extensions/
vccs:
- note: no opening of confirmation dialog on download
  commit: 63cda0c1ef4637c345c286e72c5e4af9e4f94fb0
fixes:
- note: Add a webstore install method that lets us prompt the user before downloading.
  commit: 5349ac6df87c8ddaa04f398375b571430e7c0372
- note: cannot find commit
  commit: 9eb1fd426a04adac0906c81ed88f1089969702ba
- note: Partially deprecate the old webstorePrivate.beginInstall method
  commit: cd2920af211d2ba926381c80b853a2e1d3eef3bc
- note: Change the web store private install API to accept a localized extension name.
  commit: ad93c6baf3651dc050ab436bd0cfd84bdabf7127
bounty:
  date: '2011-08-02'
  amount: none
  references: https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2011/08/stable-channel-update.html
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: false
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: false
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: false
  distrust_input:
    note: The vulnerability could lead to xss, don't trust the input.
    applies: true
  least_privilege:
    note: "Don't give any extensions the ability to download and change the system
      without user \nconfirmation\n"
    applies: true
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: false
  defense_in_depth:
    note: "Don't rely on the user or the system to understand what they're downloading/if
      they're \ndownloading something. Don't rely on the users firewalls, etc to prevent
      malicious downloads.\n"
    applies: true
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: false
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: false
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: false
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: false
reviews:
- 6794010
- 6900059
- 7003100
- 7131001
- 6992047
upvotes: 3
mistakes:
  answer: "I think this problem was brought about by a requirements issue. \nIt seems
    no one thought of the impact of downloading extensions without prompt until a
    similar \nssue happened  on Android that was very damaging. The fix was very straight
    forward and makes \nsense. Adding a prompt for free extensions ensures that the
    user at least understands that \nthey are downloading something. Not showing the
    confirmation for paid extensions also makes \nsense as the user will have to put
    in their payment info, ensuring that they understand \nthat they are buying and
    downloading something.\n"
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
announced: '2011-08-02 20:55:01.190000000 -04:00'
subsystem:
  name: extensions
  answer: The issue was found within the extensions module located /chrome/browser/extensions/
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '2011-03-11'
  answer: "Android had an xss notorious security bug that occured in a similar way
    where xss within the \ngallery led to installs on the machine. An employee realized
    chrome extensions had the same \nvulnerability as there was no required prompt
    to begin a download.\n"
  google: true
  contest: 
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: "All extensions completed installation without first prompting the user
  with a ui to confirm \ninstallation completion. This could lead to the user downloading
  malicious extensions without \nrealizing it if they clicked on a fake download link
  or something similar. Malicous \nchanges to a user's system could occur because
  of this without the user's knowledge.\n"
unit_tested:
  fix: true
  code: true
  answer: "lines @@ -67,9 +67,10 @@ in crx_installer_browsertest.cc for commit \ncd2920af211d2ba926381c80b853a2e1d3eef3bc
    and lines @@ -11,8 +11,44 @@ in \nextension_gallery_install_apitest.cc for commit
    cd2920af211d2ba926381c80b853a2e1d3eef3bc\n"
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: "This bug occured right after the creation of the extension store. It began
    with them creating \nsign in and profile functionality which is very widely used
    now in chrome and they added the \nextension store on top of that. This bug occurred
    durring the original creation of the \nsubsystem.\n"
  events:
  - date: '2010-10-25'
    name: BrowserSignin* GetBrowserSignin(Profile* profile)
  - date: 
    name: 
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 0
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: 
  commits:
  - note: "\"This function must be called during a user gesture\" seems like they
      were thinking about \nrequiring user confirmation but didn't test correctly
      or think about all circumstances.\n"
    commit: b1f04cca79abf21ec97b227caf95eff9871a044a
  - note: 
    commit: 
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?

    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.