CVE-2011-3045

aka Image Library Pest

CVE: CVE-2011-3045
CWE:
- 190
bugs:
- 116162
repo: 
vccs:
- note: Introduced from updating an external library to fix another issue
  commit: 71b9d6403ceaaef6b2b258fbb32f1a77b7c875e6
fixes:
- note: Limits the amount of space allowed for unpacked images
  commit: 4cf106cdb83dd6b35d3b26d06cc67d1d2d99041e
- note: fixed security issues with 32 & 64 bit integers
  commit: 6e8e1fd24400ecbf1153162e67100ad7665c2679
bounty:
  date: 
  amount: 
  references:
  - https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2012/03/stable-channel-update_21.html
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: false
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: false
  complex_inputs:
    note: |
      Due to the nature of this vulnerability, the only way to trigger it is with
      a specificly crafted PNG file, thus requiring a file much more complex than
      any ordinary image.
    applies: true
  distrust_input:
    note: "The developers didn't think that an image file could be crafted in such\na
      way that when unpacked for use in the browser, the image overflows a 32-bit\ninteger.
      There was an assumption that the input image would be valid, and \nreasonably
      sized.\n"
    applies: true
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: false
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: false
  defense_in_depth:
    note: 
    applies: false
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: false
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: false
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: false
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: false
reviews:
- 9546033
- 9363013
- 9768001
- 9689019
upvotes: 10
mistakes:
  answer: "I believe the mistake made that resulted in this vulnerability occurred
    due\nto the team's acceptance of the third-party library, it appears they assumed\nthe
    library would take care of the vulnerabilities within without checking \nif it
    did. When they first introduced this bug, they probably didn't realize\na PNG
    file can unpack to overflow a 32-bit integer.\nAdditionally, there doesn't appear
    to be any unit tests related to the library,\nwhich means they assumed its open-source
    nature would result in security issues\nbeing fixed without much hassle. While
    this is true, there was a length of\ntime between the issue and the fix where
    special PNG images could DoS Chromium.\n"
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those in the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
nickname: Image Library Pest
announced: '2012-03-22 12:55:01.160000000 -04:00'
subsystem:
  name: libpng
  answer: Third Party Library
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '2012-02-28'
  answer: |
    This vulnerability was discovered manually by a user, not from Google, by simply
    navigating to a website specifically designed to serve crafted PNG files for
    testing and security purposes.
  google: false
  contest: false
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulnerability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: |
  Lack of a controlled space for use in an added image library allowed for certain
  PNG images to expand to 3 or 4 Gigabytes in size, triggering a 32-bit signed
  integer overflow leading to a Denial of Service.
unit_tested:
  fix: true
  code: false
  answer: |
    It does not appear that unit tests were part of finding the vulnerability,
    although they were used to help recreate & fix the issue.
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: |
    This vulnerability exists in a third-party library used by Chromium, as such
    the developers of Chromium didn't interact with this file a lot, leaving only a
    handful of commits within the 2 years this bug was active.
  events:
  - date: 
    name: 
  - date: 
    name: 
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 0
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: 
  commits:
  - note: |
      Library was updated again to fix a different vulnerability. This issue
      must have existed in both versions of the libpng library
    commit: 6f7a602151b8a9c4437f9756766782d8b0f8196f
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?

    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.