CVE-2012-4387

aka LongParameterNameDenialOfServi

CVE: CVE-2012-4387
CWE: 641
bugs: []
vccs:
- note: Moved XWork cure under struts 2
  commit: 0c543aef318341ca9bd482e15f1637497b8a4dfd
- note: 
  commit: 
fixes:
- note: Restricted parameter length
  commit: 80e03182d66d9e6ab18f9a9a9b3c42725a1c89e9
- note: 
  commit: 
bounty:
  amt: 
  url: 
  announced: 
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: 
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?
    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.
    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.
    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: |
      Similar to the above point on not trusting inputs, perhaps it would've been
      wiser from an architectural perspective to make requests not directly translate
      into OGNL, perhaps having an intermediate step where more processing occurred to
      validate input.
    applies: true
  distrust_input:
    note: |
      Since the input in this case was being parsed and executed as OGNL, extra
      consideration needed to be taken to ensure that destructive commands cannot
      be run. Any inputs that may result in complex commands being executed should
      be carefully controlled.
    applies: true
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: 
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: 
  defense_in_depth:
    note: 
    applies: 
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: 
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
upvotes: 8
mistakes:
  answer: |
    This was caused by not properly validating user inputs that were being translated
    to complex expressions with the potential for exploitation, which I would classify
    as a coding mistake. As this is critical to the overall function of the application,
    extra care needed to be taken to handle these sensitive inputs, and a number of test
    cases should be written to test different scenarios, which is was completed. Aside
    from a redesign that treats these inputs differently, this was an appropriate solution
    to the problem.
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?
    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?
    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those in the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
nickname: LongParameterNameDenialOfServi
reported: '2012-08-03'
announced: '2012-10-09'
subsystem:
  name: interceptor
  answer: xwork2 interceptor subsystem
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?
    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: 
  answer: |
    From what I can find on the issue itself, this bug was found (and patched) by Johno
    Crawford, a developer for an Italian software company, Sulake, of no affiliation to Apache.
    The above information is pulled from the following sources:
      - This confluence bulletin - https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-011
      - Johno Crawford's linkedin - https://it.linkedin.com/in/johnocrawford
    NOTE: the date Crawford reported this bug is not given.
  apache: false
  contest: false
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?
    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Apache
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulnerability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.
    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "apache" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: |
  Request parameters handled by Struts 2 are effectively treated as OGNL expressions,
  which may take some time to process if they're sufficiently complex. A possible DOS
  attacker might craft requests to a Struts 2 based application with extremely long
  parameter names. OGNL evaluation of the parameter name then will consume significant
  CPU cycles, thus promoting the effectiveness of the DOS attack.
unit_tested:
  fix: true
  code: true
  answer: |
    Yes, some test cases were written for this new check that was implemented in the file
    xwork-core/src/test/java/com/opensymphony/xwork2/interceptor/ParametersInterceptorTest.java.
    They do a pretty comprehensive job of covering the new max length check on requests that
    was created to fix this issue.
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?
    Write the reasoning behind your answer in the "answer" field.
    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module. Must be just "true" or "false".
    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
    Must be just "true" or "false".
future_fixes:
- note: 
  commit: 
curation_level: 1
previous_fixes:
- note: 
  commit: 
- note: 
  commit: 
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
security_bulletin: S2-011
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: |
    Looking back at the history of the file, there was nothing in the year prior to the
    fix that would've introduced bad behavior or made the file any worse. A handful of
    other bug fixes were made by @lukaszlenart and @mcucchiara, but nothing that would've
    had a direct impact on this bug.
  commits:
  - note: 
    commit: 
  - note: 
    commit: 
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?
    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?
    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section
    by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  Students: when initially writing this, ignore this upvotes number.
  Once this work is being reviewed, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
nickname_instructions: |
  Nickname is optional. Provide a useful, professional, and catchy nickname for
  this vulnerability. Ideally fewer than 30 characters. This will be shown
  alongside its CVE to make it more easily distinguished from the rest.
reported_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was reported to the team? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE data.
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE data.
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the SVN commit number in "commit" below, and any notes about how this
  was discovered in the "note" field.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.
  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.
  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Struts-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Struts would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.
incomplete_fix_instructions: |
  Did the above "fixes" actually fix the vulnerability?
  Please list any fixes for the same issue before and after
  this CVE below.