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CVE: CVE-2013-0306 CWE: 400 ipc: note: | This vulnerability deals with the use of creating formsets. A formset is a layer of abstraction to work with multiple forms on the same page. A form is a collection of elements that allow a visitor to do things like enter text, select options, manipulate objects or controls, and then send that information back to the server. answer: true question: | Did the feature that this vulnerability affected use inter-process communication? IPC includes OS signals, pipes, stdin/stdout, message passing, and clipboard. Writing to files that another program in this software system reads is another form of IPC. Answer should be boolean. CVSS: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P bugs: [] i18n: note: 'Did not see any information that showed that the feature dealt with internationalization. ' answer: false question: | Was the feature impacted by this vulnerability about internationalization (i18n)? An internationalization feature is one that enables people from all over the world to use the system. This includes translations, locales, typography, unicode, or various other features. Answer should be boolean. Write a note about how you came to the conclusions you did. repo: vccs: - note: | This VCC was discovered automatically via archeogit. Removed ambiguity with regard to the max_num option of formsets and as a result of admin inlines. commit: aba95dcc0b5370ffac3d3b701c3ca7782ee999c1 - note: | This VCC was discovered automatically via archeogit. In Django 1.3 ``FormSet`` creation behavior is modified slightly. Historically the class didn't make a distinction between not being passed data and being passed empty dictionary. This was inconsistent with behavior in other parts of the framework. Starting with 1.3 if you pass in empty dictionary the ``FormSet`` will raise a ``ValidationError``. commit: 65b380e74ab79ee011f7556e342dd4d656b018a5 - note: | This VCC was discovered automatically via archeogit. Ensure formsets evaluate to True even if they have no forms. commit: e061b036a54597b6a994573ea6aa2ee02ca8838e fixes: - note: 'Added a default limit to the maximum number of forms in a formset. ' commit: d7094bbce8cb838f3b40f504f198c098ff1cf727 bounty: amt: url: announced: lessons: yagni: note: applies: question: | Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example of one of those lessons? Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put a quick explanation of how it applies. Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely that one or two of them apply. If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these. serial_killer: note: applies: complex_inputs: note: applies: distrust_input: note: | Since a remote attacker could use this flaw to their advantage just by sending a large number of forms to be created, the program should check that form values could possibly disrupt the system. The value given as an input should be always checked against a max in order to avoid an error. applies: true least_privilege: note: applies: native_wrappers: note: applies: defense_in_depth: note: applies: secure_by_default: note: applies: environment_variables: note: applies: security_by_obscurity: note: applies: frameworks_are_optional: note: applies: reviews: [] sandbox: upvotes: 9 CWE_note: | Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. mistakes: answer: | It was stated that the vulnerability was present due to an uncaught Overflow Error. This coding mistake was probably due to believing the program would not be given value that would overwhelm it. Setting a default value that is still large enough to handle most cases and allowing developers the ability to modify that max value to fit their needs was a smrt mitigation to the issue. question: | In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes? Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications? Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper? Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software engineering industry would find interesting. nickname: subsystem: name: Horizon answer: RHSA-2013:0670 - Security Advisory question: | What subsystems was the mistake in? Most systems don't have a formal list of their subsystems, but you can usually infer them from path names, bug report tags, or other key words used. A single source file is not what we mean by a subsystem. In Django, the "Component" field on the bug report is useful. But there may be other subsystems involved. Your subsystem name(s) should not have any dots or slashes in them. Only alphanumerics, whitespace, _, - and @.Feel free to add multiple using a YAML array. In the answer field, explain where you saw these words. In the name field, a subsystem name (or an array of names) e.g. clipboard, model, view, controller, mod_dav, ui, authentication discovered: answer: 'It was not stated how the vulnerability was found but it was reported by Mozilla. ' contest: false question: | How was this vulnerability discovered? Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the vulnerability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there. The automated, contest, and developer flags can be true, false, or nil. If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then please explain where you looked. automated: false developer: false description: | It was discovered that Django incorrectly handled a large number of forms when generating formsets. An attacker could use this flaw to cause Django to consume memory, resulting in a denial of service. This has been fixed by adding a default maximum number of forms of 1,000. Developers can still manually specify a bigger max_num. unit_tested: fix: true code: true question: | Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability? Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve improving the automated tests? For code: and fix: - your answer should be boolean. For the code_answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding code near the fix in related directories and determine if and was there were unit tests involved for this subsystem. The code For the fix_answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again. fix_answer: "Since Raphaël Hertzog asked Thijs Kinkhorst to perform some testing before \nreleasing. What was prepared also included the fixes for a previous security\nupdate that didn't get any DSA. On 25 Feb 2013 Thijs gave confirmation no\nproblems were spotted in their environment. This led me to believe that\nadditional testing was performed before being uploaded to security-master.\n" code_answer: | The bug reported for this CVE was #701186. Within its report logs, Raphaël Hertzog asked Thijs Kinkhorst to perform some testing before releasing the patches on 24 Feb 2013. It was stated that they required changes to apply and/or pass the test suite. This led me to believe that testing was already present. discoverable: reported_date: '2012-12-06' specification: answer: false answer_note: | There has been no mention of violation. All steps taken were to avoid memory exhaustion. Even with the fix of having a default value for maximum number of forms, application developers can still manually specify the max_num to fit their needs. instructions: | Is there mention of a violation of a specification? For example, an RFC specification, a protocol specification, or a requirements specification. Be sure to check all artifacts for this: bug report, security advisory, commit message, etc. The answer field should be boolean. In answer_note, please explain why you come to that conclusion. announced_date: 2013-05-02T14:55Z curation_level: 1 published_date: '2013-05-02' CWE_instructions: | Please go to http://cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry that describes your vulnerability. We recommend going to https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/699.html for the Software Development view of the vulnerabilities. We also recommend the tool http://www.cwevis.org/viz to help see how the classifications work. If you have anything to note about why you classified it this way, write something in CWE_note. This field is optional. Just the number here is fine. No need for name or CWE prefix. If more than one apply here, then choose the best one and mention the others in CWE_note. yaml_instructions: | ===YAML Primer=== This is a dictionary data structure, akin to JSON. Everything before a colon is a key, and the values here are usually strings For one-line strings, you can just use quotes after the colon For multi-line strings, as we do for our instructions, you put a | and then indent by two spaces For readability, we hard-wrap multi-line strings at 80 characters. This is not absolutely required, but appreciated. bounty_instructions: | If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank. interesting_commits: commits: - note: | This commit is interesting to me because the developer changed the maxForms.value from 0 to none. It makes sure to stop user for adding another if forms currently displayed is greater than max num. Also clarifies consistently that value of none puts no limit on the number of forms displayed. These fixes were added without putting in checks for if the system could handle unsuitably large cases. It makes me question how was it missed to set a high limit on the number of forms displayed. commit: aba95dcc0b5370ffac3d3b701c3ca7782ee999c1 - note: commit: question: | Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)? Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any emerging themes? curated_instructions: | If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the version number that you were given in your instructions. This will enable additional editorial checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly. If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is properly updated. upvotes_instructions: | For the first round, ignore this upvotes number. For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the upvotes score on your branch. nickname_instructions: | A catchy name for this vulnerability that would draw attention it. If the report mentions a nickname, use that. Must be under 30 characters. Optional. reported_instructions: | What date was the vulnerability reported to the security team? Look at the security bulletins and bug reports. It is not necessarily the same day that the CVE was created. Leave blank if no date is given. Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format. announced_instructions: | Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/). Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format. fixes_vcc_instructions: | Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format. published_instructions: | Is there a published fix or patch date for this vulnerability? Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format. description_instructions: | You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony. Rewrite this description IN YOUR OWN WORDS. Make it interesting and easy to read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD description later to get more technical. Try to still be specific in your description, but remove project-specific stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon that outsiders to this project would not understand. Technology like "regular expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to keep too. Your target audience is people just like you before you took any course in security |
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