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CVE: CVE-2013-2115 CWE: 94 bugs: [] vccs: - note: | Defined static method attribute as mutable. No longer passing parameters to OGNL evaluation. commit: 0c543aef318341ca9bd482e15f1637497b8a4dfd fixes: - note: | Improved security by making static method attribute immutable (a final variable). No longer passing parameter name or value to OGNL evaluation. commit: d934c6e7430b7b98e43a0a085a2304bd31a75c3d bounty: amt: url: announced: lessons: yagni: note: applies: false question: | Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example of one of those lessons? Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put a quick explanation of how it applies. Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely that one or two of them apply. If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these. serial_killer: note: applies: false complex_inputs: note: applies: false distrust_input: note: | Before the fix was introduced, there was no way to escape/sanitize an unexpected malicious parameter in a request and since it won't get evaluated, the request parameters are processed. applies: true least_privilege: note: applies: false native_wrappers: note: applies: false defense_in_depth: note: applies: false secure_by_default: note: applies: false environment_variables: note: applies: false security_by_obscurity: note: applies: false frameworks_are_optional: note: applies: false upvotes: mistakes: answer: | This vulnerability was due to a fundamental flaw in the design of the url rendering system and the subsequent fix in 2.3.14.1 did not fully address all possible attack vectors. Rearchitecting the url rendering subsystem to not pass any vulnerable parameters and changing the allowStaticMethodAccess property to be immutable seemed to completely fix the original vulnerability reported in 2010. question: | In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes? Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications? Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper? Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those in the software engineering industry would find interesting. nickname: Execute Arbitrary OGNL reported: '2013-05-27' announced: '2013-07-10' subsystem: name: url answer: url rendering for OGNL evaluation question: | What subsystems was the mistake in? Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer" discovered: date: '2013-05-27' answer: | I looked in the linked CVE and NVD resources, including the Red Hat bugzilla report. Through the bugzilla entry I was able to find the initial reporter Vincent Danen, a Red Hat employee, but they gave no description as to how they found this vulnerability. apache: false contest: question: | How was this vulnerability discovered? Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Apache employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the vulnerability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there. The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil. The "apache" flag can be true, false, or nil. If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer". automated: description: | A specially crafted request parameter could be used to inject arbitrary code, which could then be used as request parameter of a URL or anchor tag. Then the URL/anchor tag tries to resolve every parameter present in the original request. This lets malicious users put arbitrary statements into any request parameter and have it evaluated to enable method execution and execute arbitrary methods, which bypasses any library protections. This vulnerability was introduced as a partial fix to a previously identified bug. unit_tested: fix: false code: false answer: The file this vulnerability was found in did have unit tests, however this bug was a design flaw (immutable variable) and the tests were not related to this vulnerability or the associated fix. question: | Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability? Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve improving the automated tests? Write the reasoning behind your answer in the "answer" field. For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved for this module. Must be just "true" or "false". For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again. Must be just "true" or "false". future_fixes: - note: commit: curation_level: 1 previous_fixes: - note: commit: - note: commit: CWE_instructions: | Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!) security_bulletin: S2-014 bounty_instructions: | If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank. interesting_commits: answer: There were no commits to the SecurityMemberAccess.java file between the VCC and the fix. However other components of the url rendering subsytem were modified during the three years between those commits. commits: - note: commit: - note: commit: question: | Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)? Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any emerging themes? If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix. curated_instructions: | If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly. If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is set to true. upvotes_instructions: | Students: when initially writing this, ignore this upvotes number. Once this work is being reviewed, you will be giving a certain amount of upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the upvotes score on your branch. nickname_instructions: | Nickname is optional. Provide a useful, professional, and catchy nickname for this vulnerability. Ideally fewer than 30 characters. This will be shown alongside its CVE to make it more easily distinguished from the rest. reported_instructions: | Was there a date that this vulnerability was reported to the team? You can find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE data. Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format. announced_instructions: | Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE data. Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format. fixes_vcc_instructions: | Please put the SVN commit number in "commit" below, and any notes about how this was discovered in the "note" field. description_instructions: | You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony. Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD description later to get more technical. Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Struts-specific stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon that outsiders to Struts would not understand. Technology like "regular expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to keep too. incomplete_fix_instructions: 'Yes this was a complete fix for a previous vulnerability (CVE-2013-1966). ' |
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