CVE-2013-2845

CVE: CVE-2013-2845
CWE:
- 119
bugs:
- 179522
repo: 
vccs:
- note: |
    creation of AudioBus.cpp files that uses PassOwnPtr
    returns AudioBus.release rather than just AudioBus (heap-use-after-free)
  commit: 8aff1a748e5d83ddee8ea327d4e5025c40645d09
- note: creation of AudioFileReader files that uses PassOwnPtr
  commit: be645bf50c48af4302003cea4388249170ee8b51
- note: creation of AudioResampler files that uses adoptPtr
  commit: 0713da7ae2992cfc9c34138f47e39bac622405a8
- note: creation of HRTFElevation.cpp that utilizes OwnPtr
  commit: 239ef45ce0a3c51f43cc2a7878e6a0d7a5313346
- note: creation of MultiChannelResampler.cpp that uses adoptPtr
  commit: 6dbc720ab63cac75200c5942b92f9a7b76d0e088
- note: Unreviewed buildfix for strict OwnPtr. Creation of Reverb.cpp that uses adoptPtr
  commit: f4138a90d422907d9193342b0504b7eb8c90e04d
- note: creation of Reverb.h using OwnPtr
  commit: ccc7701e56e41cee004b12524a5a6835d07ff37d
- note: modification of AudioBusChromium.cpp to use PassOwnPtr
  commit: 4526d944aef2e68828a225b529eda628b5c8c4a9
- note: creation of WebAudioBus.cpp that uses PassOwnPtr
  commit: 8a365ec4ced054e4a1d9ca60aabe948f44956585
- note: creation of AudioBuffer.cpp that uses OwnPtr
  commit: a1e775bff79314ab8068aef688451e51adb517ef
- note: creation of AudioNodeInput files that use adoptPtr
  commit: e92134aaa8090cc868d701dbe38eeba3a0407230
- note: creation of AudioNodeOutput files that use adoptPtr
  commit: 1d7c606995d07f296100386726067a1b63aea0a4
- note: creation of OfflineAudioDestinationNode files that use adoptPtr
  commit: 8949d00284ae5a8a0ff36ff2e95cb3f39e549a86
fixes:
- note: "fix seems to replace PassOwnPtr with PassRefPtr in many files. \nAlso return
    the PassRefPtr instead of the free-d PassOwnPtr in a few functions. \n"
  commit: 0d826badb021d97efa2bd8d00a282ecfc348f716
bounty:
  date: '2013-05-21 12:30:00.000000000 -04:00'
  amount: 3133.7
  references:
  - http://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2013/05/stable-channel-release.html
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: 
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: 
  distrust_input:
    note: 
    applies: 
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: 
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: 
  defense_in_depth:
    note: "The checking of buffer use after it was freed should occur, and not just
      assumed \nthat it is being safely used. There should be more checks at various
      levels.  \n"
    applies: true
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: 
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
reviews:
- 14957010
- 14042005
upvotes: 3
mistakes:
  answer: "The developers did not know that that the buffer was being used after it
    was freed. \nI did not see any checks in place to ensure that the buffer was being
    cleared properly. \nIt looks like there was a design mistake with OwnPtr, and
    then a design decision to \nchange OwnPtr to RefPtr, and recreate the corresponding
    functions required. \n\nSeems like the fix was not very simple. It took the creation
    of new RefPtr functions, \nreplacing many OwnPtr with RefPtr in many files, and
    realizing that some functions\nreturned the AudioBus after it has been free-d.\n"
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
announced: '2013-05-22 09:29:56.080000000 -04:00'
subsystem:
  name: third_party
  answer: all files are in the thirdparty/WebKit/Source directory
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '2013-03-01'
  answer: "Credit was rewarded to Atte Kettunen of OUSPG for finding this vulnerability.
    \nIt appears that Atte Kettunen reported this to the dev team, and they confirmed
    the issue\non March 19, 2013 by running the automated fuzzer cluster-fuzz against
    the files.\n"
  google: 
  contest: 
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: true
description: "A heap-use-after-free vulnerability in the Web Audio implementation
  of Google \nChrome, for playing audio through the Chrome web-browser, allows remote
  attackers \nto cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact.
  This kind of \ndenial of service is caused by memory corruption. \n\nThe fix for
  this vulnerability is to ensure that variables are not used once they\nare free-d
  or released. Also pointers should be passed by reference. \n"
unit_tested:
  fix: false
  code: false
  answer: "The fix did not mention the use of tests. All of the VCC commit \nmessages
    indicated that no new tests since audio API is not yet implemented.\n"
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: I didn't observe any major events during this time.
  events:
  - date: 
    name: 
  - date: 
    name: 
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: 
  commits:
  - note: For AudioNodeOutput files, not much was changed, but also the bug was not
      discovered.
    commit: 4c0b4a4340796ec961b4dc335fa6f4890ccef2c3
  - note: |
      Also for AudioNodeOutput files, but the only lines modified were for paths to files.
      Interestingly, these were the only 2 commits that appeared in the logs between VCC & fix
      commits for the specific files.
    commit: eba7abc84aec970ce85a25cf7b655e424918a3e0
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?

    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.