angler-fishThe Vulnerability History Project

CVE-2014-1701

The Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was located in the GenerateFunction function in the path bindings/scripts/code_generator_v8.pm in Blink. It existed because the aforementioned function didn't implement a specific cross-origin restriction for the EventTarget::dispatchEvent function. The "events" processing component wasn't able to properly filter user input from the HTML code before displaying the input. A way this vulnerability can be exploited is that a remote attacker can trigger Universal XSS (UXSS) attacks via vectors involving events, and can essentially force the execution of arbitrary scripting code by the target user's browser within the context of a different domain. Such as how it affected iframes, as it permitted a page on an arbitrary site to retrieve the document element of any target page so long as the following conditions concerning the target page were met - (1) it may be imbedded in an iframe, (2) it has a handler for any window event, (3) it gets or sets any property of the event in any jQuery listener, and (4) it returns a dom node from the handler.


The mistake seemed to stem from a lack of proper security checks in place. As stated previously in the description above, The "events" processing component wasn't able to properly filter user input from the HTML code before displaying the input.
  • Bounty Awarded $3000.0 awarded. Learn more about Bounty Awarded.
  • Chromium subsystem: blink Learn more about Chromium subsystem: blink.
  • CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') Learn more about CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting').
  • Discovered Externally According to the information provided at https://www.debian.org/security/2014/dsa-2883, a user by the name "aidanhs" had been the first one to discover a cross-site scripting issue in event handling. They presented the conditions in which a page on an arbitrary site was permitted to retrieve the document element of any target page, and they included: (1) the target page may be embedded in an iframe; (2) the target page has a handler for any window event; (3) the target page gets or sets any property of the event in the handler (any jQuery listener); and (4) the target page returns a dom node from the handler. They explained that this vulnerability could be exploited by calling the event handler directly to obtain the dom node, and thus they were able to gain access to the targeted document. However, they were unable to execute an exploit without relying on the site returning a dom node in the event handler. Learn more about Discovered Externally.
  • Discovered Manually According to the information provided at https://www.debian.org/security/2014/dsa-2883, a user by the name "aidanhs" had been the first one to discover a cross-site scripting issue in event handling. They presented the conditions in which a page on an arbitrary site was permitted to retrieve the document element of any target page, and they included: (1) the target page may be embedded in an iframe; (2) the target page has a handler for any window event; (3) the target page gets or sets any property of the event in the handler (any jQuery listener); and (4) the target page returns a dom node from the handler. They explained that this vulnerability could be exploited by calling the event handler directly to obtain the dom node, and thus they were able to gain access to the targeted document. However, they were unable to execute an exploit without relying on the site returning a dom node in the event handler. Learn more about Discovered Manually.
  • Known Origin (VCC) Learn more about Known Origin (VCC).
  • Language: C++ Learn more about Language: C++.
  • Language: Python Learn more about Language: Python.
  • Lesson: Code Refactors 42 refactors took place during the vulnerability. Learn more about Lesson: Code Refactors.
  • Lesson: Distrust Input A remote attacker could be able to conduct cross-site scripting attacks by executing arbitrary scripting code in the targer user's browser in the context of a different domain, and the fix for this vulnerability was about preventing input that could lead to cross-site scripting attacks. Learn more about Lesson: Distrust Input.
  • Lesson: Fix Untested The fix code clearly specifies that test cases should be added, and following the link, https://codereview.chromium.org/150203016, we can see that these tests were indeed successfully created and added. Learn more about Lesson: Fix Untested.
  • Lesson: Too Many Cooks 68 different developers made commits to the files fixed for this vulnerability. Learn more about Lesson: Too Many Cooks.
  • Lifetime: 90 to 180 days 112.2 days, or 0.3 years Learn more about Lifetime: 90 to 180 days.
  • Project: Chromium Learn more about Project: Chromium.
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CVE: CVE-2014-1701
CWE:
- 79
bugs:
- 342618
- 239771
repo: 
vccs:
- note: |
    Initial methods CL used to support void() methods in IDL compiler for the
    sake of simplicity.
  commit: bb5f5a26a2cc47c2cbdd63b8665d56aa7e763e22
fixes:
- note: "The fix was adding cross-origin BindingsSecurity checks to \n'EventTarget:
    :dispatchEvent' on the Python side. For the IDL\ncompiler, Python and r16999 were
    synced.\nI also noticed that this commit has a different bug, 239771, associated\nwith
    it. This bug has to do primarily with poor maintainability of the IDL\ncompiler.\nThis
    commit, however, is necessary to find the vcc as it provides the \ncorrect file
    path,third_party/WebKit/Source/bindings/scripts/unstable/v8_methods.py,\nfor doing
    so.\n"
  commit: 3c8dc8dac23722aa5b605b1f576d3948cf17af1e
- note: "This is the commit that is associated with the bug 342618, and the fix was
    \nadding cross-origin BindingsSecurity checks to 'EventTarget: :dispatchEvent'.\n"
  commit: 1842dcb929820618efbc5fabda7c82d08846c25a
bounty:
  date: '2014-03-11 11:00:00.000000000 -04:00'
  amount: 3000.0
  references:
  - http://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2014/03/stable-channel-update_11.html
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: 
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: 
  distrust_input:
    note: |
      A remote attacker could be able to conduct cross-site scripting attacks by executing
      arbitrary scripting code in the targer user's browser in the context of a different
      domain, and the fix for this vulnerability was about preventing input that could
      lead to cross-site scripting attacks.
    applies: true
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: 
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: 
  defense_in_depth:
    note: 
    applies: 
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: 
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
reviews:
- 150203016
- 187313004
upvotes: 
mistakes:
  answer: "The mistake seemed to stem from a lack of proper security checks in place.
    As stated\npreviously in the description above, The \"events\" processing component
    wasn't able \nto properly filter user input from the HTML code before displaying
    the input.\n"
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
announced: '2014-03-16 10:06:45.350000000 -04:00'
subsystem:
  name: Blink
  answer: Based on the CVE description.
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '2014-02-11'
  answer: "According to the information provided at https://www.debian.org/security/2014/dsa-2883,\na
    user by the name \"aidanhs\" had been the first one to discover a cross-site scripting\nissue
    in event handling. They presented the conditions in which a page on an arbitrary
    site \nwas permitted to retrieve the document element of any target page, and
    they included:\n(1) the target page may be embedded in an iframe; (2) the target
    page has a handler \nfor any window event; (3) the target page gets or sets any
    property of the event in \nthe handler (any jQuery listener); and (4) the target
    page returns a dom node from the handler.\nThey explained that this vulnerability
    could be exploited by calling the event handler\ndirectly to obtain the dom node,
    and thus they were able to gain access to the targeted\ndocument. However, they
    were unable to execute an exploit without relying on the site returning\na dom
    node in the event handler.\n"
  google: false
  contest: 
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: "The Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was located in the GenerateFunction
  \nfunction in the path bindings/scripts/code_generator_v8.pm in Blink. It existed
  \nbecause the aforementioned function didn't implement a specific cross-origin \nrestriction
  for the EventTarget::dispatchEvent function.\n\nThe \"events\" processing component
  wasn't able to properly filter user input from \nthe HTML code before displaying
  the input.\n\nA way this vulnerability can be exploited is that a remote attacker
  can trigger\nUniversal XSS (UXSS) attacks via vectors involving events, and can
  essentially \nforce the execution of arbitrary scripting code by the target user's
  browser within \nthe context of a different domain. Such as how it affected iframes,
  as it permitted \na page on an arbitrary site to retrieve the document element of
  any target page so \nlong as the following conditions concerning the target page
  were met - \n(1) it may be imbedded in an iframe, (2) it has a handler for any window
  event,\n(3) it gets or sets any property of the event in any jQuery listener, and\n(4)
  it returns a dom node from the handler.\n"
unit_tested:
  fix: true
  code: true
  answer: |
    The fix code clearly specifies that test cases should be added, and following
    the link, https://codereview.chromium.org/150203016, we can see that these
    tests were indeed successfully created and added.
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: I did not see any major events during this time.
  events:
  - date: 
    name: 
  - date: 
    name: 
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: "There were well over 20 commits recorded between the VCC and the fix, most
    of which\nare updates to the IDL compiler associated with the 239771 bug, which
    leads me\nto suspect that these implementations didn't have properly defined requirements\nupon
    beginning to make them, nor were they properly tested before committing. \n"
  commits:
  - note: |
      This is the first commit I observed specifically mention that they'd included
      tests to ensure that 'implements' worked. It also adds new features to Python
      for the new test cases and removes the unused test cases for which Perl
      generated incorrect code. The EventHandler type method, methods with arguments
      in dependency, and [RaisesException] on interface methods were all added as
      new features.
    commit: 3eb847af3710daeda0fa4453bd4662cd8fc1823a
  - note: 
    commit: 
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?

    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.

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