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CVE: CVE-2014-1714 CWE: - 159 - 20 bugs: - 352395 repo: vccs: - note: Does not verify or sanitize format type of data commit: b7c04c11491d6c37c22b9ebb49696cafefb38c09 fixes: - note: Revert a previous commit that verified the format type commit: bf150e4672691674b7da069c13d97d5ea98d187c - note: This commit is the final fix, which re-introduces the commit that sanitizes the clipboard types commit: 639515b59f024dd12f42a13e6b96f4a810384a86 - note: Revert the previous clipboard sanitization commit commit: e82a750a739a620495eaee902dd7759cdb1e20a1 - note: Add clipboard sanitization commit: 5b0d76edd5d6d4054b2e1263e23c852226c5f701 - note: Re-added the verify format type of clipboard objects commit: edc1250e0cf03038db503086dfd31082ed694d69 - note: Revert the previous commit that verified format type commit: 1ab5bdd0ca665f2135b0e93dbf4c6e7051348b53 - note: Verify format type of clipboard objects commit: 6f397fae0d7b27692bedd4ec636ed50df7fe7b71 bounty: date: '2014-03-14 20:30:00.000000000 -04:00' amount: 50000.0 references: - http://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2014/03/stable-channel-update_14.html lessons: yagni: note: applies: question: | Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example of one of those lessons? Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put a quick explanation of how it applies. Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely that one or two of them apply. If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these. serial_killer: note: applies: complex_inputs: note: applies: distrust_input: note: | Instead of blindly writing to the clipboard, the fix was to validate the input by checking the format of the data and ensuring it is of an allowed type and sanitize it before writing it. applies: true least_privilege: note: applies: native_wrappers: note: applies: defense_in_depth: note: | Even if the function expects to get data from a trusted source, it should stll be validating that the data is properly formatted. applies: true secure_by_default: note: applies: environment_variables: note: applies: security_by_obscurity: note: applies: frameworks_are_optional: note: applies: reviews: - 198063009 - 196723022 - 200743002 - 201263002 - 201223003 - 196943018 - 195893021 - 197763013 - 199613003 - 200523004 - 200813002 - 198783004 - 199893002 - 200733002 - 200833002 - 199763002 - 196223015 - 201253002 - 195813012 - 200593003 upvotes: 3 mistakes: answer: | This vulnerability is a case of missing code, and not incorrect code. The function of copying to the clipboard worked perfectly, but only during an abuse case did it malfunction. It takes a lot of domain knowledge on the functionality of this clipboard write function and the ways that the clipboard data is used by the application (or other applications) over IPC to realize the possibilities of malformed data an the consequences of not sanitizing it. This is potentially an issue that arose because of a lack of tests. If tests were involved, there would be thought of possible failure cases of the method instead of just the ideal case. question: | In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes? Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications? Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper? Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software engineering industry would find interesting. announced: '2014-03-16 10:06:45.647000000 -04:00' subsystem: name: clipboard answer: Based on method name and file location question: | What subsystems was the mistake in? Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer" discovered: date: '2013-03-16' answer: discovered by VUPEN Security company during the Pwn2Own contest google: false contest: Pwn2Own question: | How was this vulnerability discovered? Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there. The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil. The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil. If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer". automated: description: | This was used as part of an exploit that potentially allowed for code execution outside of a sandbox environment in Windows. A method that wrote objects to the clipboard did not validate or sanitize the format of objects that are passed to it and instead wrote them directly to the clipboard. This had the potential to cause issues with Inter-Process Communication (IPC), as malformed objects could be read by an IPC handler and may cause a denial of service. unit_tested: fix: false code: false answer: One of the code reviews mentioned adding tests later, but none seemed to be added. question: | Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability? Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve improving the automated tests? For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved for this module. For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again. major_events: answer: I don't see any major events at this time. events: - date: name: - date: name: question: | Please record any major events you found in the history of this vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem changed? Did the team change? The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather, we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time. curation_level: 1 CWE_instructions: | Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!) bounty_instructions: | If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank. interesting_commits: answer: commits: - note: The original fix was a "horrible hack" that was later reverted commit: 6f397fae0d7b27692bedd4ec636ed50df7fe7b71 - note: commit: question: | Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)? Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any emerging themes? If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix. curated_instructions: | If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly. If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is set to true. upvotes_instructions: | For the first round, ignore this upvotes number. For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the upvotes score on your branch. announced_instructions: | Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/). Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format. fixes_vcc_instructions: | Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format. description_instructions: | You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony. Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD description later to get more technical. Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to keep too. |
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