CVE-2014-3161

CVE: CVE-2014-3161
CWE:
- 284
- 264
bugs:
- 334204
repo: 
vccs:
- note: They were working on a fix for something else at the time.
  commit: 313455f9ed06b7873cabcda46390e5d427c1ebc0
fixes:
- note: ''
  commit: f689da10139d76dd3fb8a0e92d5732324cb2d90c
- note: ''
  commit: 207c0196c0d8c4d82c1ab15adde3ad6ffce14e47
bounty:
  date: 
  amount: 
  references: []
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: 
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: 
  distrust_input:
    note: "The input URL that the native Android videoplayer gets was always trusted,
      allowing bad \nactors to redirect it to another domain. \n"
    applies: true
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: 
  native_wrappers:
    note: |
      There was a failure to define a wrapper around the native video app, allowing
      unprivileged users to exploit it.
    applies: true
  defense_in_depth:
    note: 
    applies: 
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: 
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
reviews:
- 247573004
- 251113005
- 430773002
upvotes: 8
mistakes:
  answer: "I believe that this should be thought of as a design mistake. This is because\nit
    is part of the design of the product to securely handle browser requests at \nevery
    level, from the browser, to the actual native Android videoplayer. The \ncurrent
    fix at this time fixed the issue by always treating media urls as cross-origin.\nThis
    is not proper because although the approach did resolve the issue, it still \nsacrificed
    functionality by not trusting any URL to be same origin. \n"
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
announced: '2014-07-20 07:12:50.290000000 -04:00'
subsystem:
  name: renderer
  answer: 'The bug seemed to be in the Renderer subsystem based on looking at the
    filepath and blogpost.

    '
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '2014-01-14'
  answer: "The vulnerability was first found by Håvard Molland at Opera and reported
    by \n\"phillipj@opera.com\". I was not able to find clear evidence on whether
    or not this \nvulnerability was discovered in a contest.\n"
  google: false
  contest: false
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulnerability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: "\nWhen playing video from <video> tag, chromium on android uses a native
  media player. But once the video url is sent to the media player, Chromium has no
  longer control, and that opens up attackers to bypass Same Orgin policies. \n\nUnder
  the Same Origin Policy a web browser allows scripts in one webpage access data of
  another webpage, but only if both web pages have the same origin. But, if the policy
  is bypased, it allows outside sources access data of a particular website. \n\nFor
  example, the attack would go something like this:\n    1. User is logged in on myvideos.com,
  and visits evil.com, which had a <video> tag\n    2. User plays a video on evil.com,
  evil.com handles the request from the browser and serves a response.\n    3. Then,
  the browser sends the url of evil.com to the native video player to play the video.
  Now the browser has lost control of the interaction.\n    4. After that, evil.com
  recieves the request redirects the video to myvideos.com, allowing it to play cross-origin
  videos from myvideos.com that it should not have access to under the Same Origin
  Policy.  \n"
unit_tested:
  fix: false
  code: false
  answer: |
    There were no automated unit test involving this vulnerability based on what
    I saw after checking the git logs and running git blame.
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: 'I did not see any major events at this time that pertain to this specific
    bug or CVE.

    '
  events:
  - date: 
    name: 
  - date: 
    name: 
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: 
  commits:
  - note: "This commit creates a temporary fix for the vulnerability by always treating
      media \nurls as cross-origin for the time being. \n"
    commit: f689da10139d76dd3fb8a0e92d5732324cb2d90c
  - note: 
    commit: 
  question: "Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?\n\nWrite
    a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was\ninteresting
    in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any\nemerging themes?\n\nIf
    there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section
    by \nexplaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.\n"
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.