angler-fishThe Vulnerability History Project

CVE-2014-3183

Hosts send data to a USB HID (Human Interface Devices) using HID reports. By sending a maliciously crafted HID report, a heap overflow vulnerability in the HID driver for the Logitech Unifying receivers could disclose data and allow writes to the kernel heap.


Following the framework, this is mainly a "slip" mistake: The bug is that the operator "<" was used instead of ">". The original author probably intended to use ">", but typed "<" instead as a mistake, probably because they are next to each other on the keyword. Because the two signs are similar otherwise, both the original author and subsequent reviewers perhaps didn't catch it. The condition that the bug affected was to limit the size of a buffer to an upper bound, but instead, the condition enforced that the buffer size must be above a lower bound instead. Depending on if the true buffer size was smaller or larger than the bound, arbitrary kernel heap read or write could be achieved. If the buffer size is smaller, it's forced to be equal to the bound. memcpy was then used to copy the buffer to another kernel buffer. Because the size was forced to be larger than the actual size, memcpy would copy data beyond the original buffer, including data in the kernel heap, into the destination buffer. This buffer was then sent to the HID device, which could be intercepted. If the buffer size is larger, memcpy will try to copy the entire buffer into the kernel buffer allocated on the heap. However, the kernel buffer was allocated with a size smaller than the source buffer size. This allowed writing attacker-control data beyond the end of the kernel buffer, and into other data on the heap.
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    CVE: CVE-2014-3183
    CWE:
    - 119
    - 125
    - 787
    - 788
    ipc:
      note: |
        The kernel driver uses IPC to receive the HID report from userspace before
        preparing it to be sent to the target device.
      answer: true
      question: |
        Did the feature that this vulnerability affected use inter-process
        communication? IPC includes OS signals, pipes, stdin/stdout, message
        passing, and clipboard. Writing to files that another program in this
        software system reads is another form of IPC.
    
        Answer must be true or false.
        Write a note about how you came to the conclusions you did, regardless of
        what your answer was.
    CVSS: AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
    bugs: []
    i18n:
      note: 'This HID driver is not related to any i18n features.
    
        '
      answer: false
      question: |
        Was the feature impacted by this vulnerability about internationalization
        (i18n)?
    
        An internationalization feature is one that enables people from all
        over the world to use the system. This includes translations, locales,
        typography, unicode, or various other features.
    
        Answer should be true or false
        Write a note about how you came to the conclusions you did, regardless of
        what your answer was.
    vccs:
    - note: Discovered automatically by archeogit. Manually confirmed.
      commit: 0e40d35637d68f654b66f4562c9a914be7d06bd1
    fixes:
    - note: |
        Automatically taken from NVD references list, manually confirmed.
        The patch fixed a wrong bounds check.
      commit: 51217e69697fba92a06e07e16f55c9a52d8e8945
    vouch:
      note: 'According to the commit message, another person reviewed and signed it.
    
        '
      answer: true
      question: |
        Was there any part of the fix that involved one person vouching for
        another's work?
    
        This can include:
          * signing off on a commit message
          * mentioning a discussion with a colleague checking the work
          * upvoting a solution on a pull request
    
        Answer must be true or false.
        Write a note about how you came to the conclusions you did, regardless of what your answer was.
    bounty:
      amt: 
      url: 
      announced: 
    lessons:
      yagni:
        note: 
        applies: false
      question: |
        Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
        vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
        of one of those lessons?
    
        Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
        not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
        a quick explanation of how it applies.
    
        Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
        that one or two of them apply.
    
        If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
        free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
      serial_killer:
        note: 
        applies: false
      complex_inputs:
        note: 
        applies: false
      distrust_input:
        note: 
        applies: false
      least_privilege:
        note: 
        applies: false
      native_wrappers:
        note: 
        applies: false
      defense_in_depth:
        note: 
        applies: false
      secure_by_default:
        note: 
        applies: false
      environment_variables:
        note: 
        applies: false
      security_by_obscurity:
        note: 
        applies: false
      frameworks_are_optional:
        note: 
        applies: false
    reviews: []
    sandbox:
      note: |
        Bug can be used to disclose kernel heap data, which are normally guarded
        from userspace applications. Bug can also be used to manipulate kernel heap
        which could escalate to sandbox escape.
      answer: true
      question: |
        Did this vulnerability violate a sandboxing feature that the system
        provides?
    
        A sandboxing feature is one that allows files, users, or other features
        limited access. Vulnerabilities that violate sandboxes are usually based on
        access control, checking privileges incorrectly, path traversal, and the
        like.
    
        Answer should be true or false
        Write a note about how you came to the conclusions you did, regardless of
        what your answer was.
    upvotes: 7
    CWE_note: Manually confirmed
    mistakes:
      answer: |
        Following the framework, this is mainly a "slip" mistake: The bug is that the
        operator "<" was used instead of ">". The original author probably intended to
        use ">", but typed "<" instead as a mistake, probably because they are next
        to each other on the keyword. Because the two signs are similar otherwise,
        both the original author and subsequent reviewers perhaps didn't catch it.
    
        The condition that the bug affected was to limit the size of a buffer to an
        upper bound, but instead, the condition enforced that the buffer size must be
        above a lower bound instead. Depending on if the true buffer size was smaller
        or larger than the bound, arbitrary kernel heap read or write could be achieved.
    
        If the buffer size is smaller, it's forced to be equal to the bound.
        memcpy was then used to copy the buffer to another kernel buffer. Because
        the size was forced to be larger than the actual size, memcpy would copy
        data beyond the original buffer, including data in the kernel heap, into
        the destination buffer. This buffer was then sent to the HID device,
        which could be intercepted.
    
        If the buffer size is larger, memcpy will try to copy the entire buffer into
        the kernel buffer allocated on the heap. However, the kernel buffer was
        allocated with a size smaller than the source buffer size. This allowed writing
        attacker-control data beyond the end of the kernel buffer, and into other
        data on the heap.
      question: |
        In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
        led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
        Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?
    
        There can, and usually are, many mistakes behind a vulnerability.
    
        Remember that mistakes can come in many forms:
        * slip: failing to complete a properly planned step due to inattention
                  e.g. wrong key in the ignition
                  e.g. using < instead of <=
        * lapse: failing to complete a properly planned step due to memory failure
                  e.g. forgetting to put car in reverse before backing up
                  e.g. forgetting to check null
        * planning error: error that occurs when the plan is inadequate
                  e.g. getting stuck in traffic because you didn't consider the
                       impact of the bridge closing
                  e.g. calling the wrong method
                  e.g. using a poor design
    
        These are grey areas, of course. But do your best to analyze the mistakes
        according to this framework.
    
        Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
        they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?
    
        Write a thoughtful entry here that people in the software engineering
        industry would find interesting.
    nickname: 
    subsystem:
      name: hid
      note: Logitech Unifying receiver driver.
      question: |
        What subsystems was the mistake in? These are WITHIN linux kernel
    
        Determining the subsystem is a subjective task. This is to help us group
         similar vulnerabilities, so choose a subsystem that other vulnerabilities would be in. Y
    
        Some areas to look for pertinent information:
          - Bug labels
          - Directory names
          - How developers refer to an area of the system in comments,
            commit messages, etc.
    
        Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
        directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
        the bug report was tagged.
    
        Example linux kernel subsystems are:
          * drivers
          * crypto
          * fs
          * net
          * lib
    
        Name should be:
          * all lowercase English letters
          * NOT a specific file
          * can have digits, and _-@/
    
        Can be multiple subsystems involved, in which case you can make it an array
        e.g.
            name: ["subsystemA", "subsystemB"] # ok
            name: subsystemA # also ok
    discovered:
      answer: |
        Bug (disclosed in https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=90)
        appeared to be found around the same time as another bug (CVE-2014-3182,
        disclosed in https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=89),
        in the same driver (hid-logitech-dj.c). Both were similar in spirit (incorrect
        bound checks)
    
        Looking at https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/09/11/21 where the CVEs
        were announced, all CVEs were about overflow vulnerabilities in HID drivers. It is
        assumed the author found these bugs by manually auditing Linux HID drivers and
        looked for places where potential overflows / incorrect bound checks might exist.
    
        The author is a Google employee working for Project Zero.
      contest: false
      question: |
        How was this vulnerability discovered?
    
        Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
        originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
        YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
        employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
        vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.
    
        The automated, contest, and developer flags can be true, false, or nil.
    
        If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then please
        explain where you looked.
      automated: false
      developer: true
    discussion:
      note: "According to https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=90,\nthe
        bug was first privately discovered and disclosed to the Linux Kernel\nsecurity
        team. After a patch was available, the issue was disclosed publicly.\nAfter that,
        a CVE was assigned\n(https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/09/11/21)\nIt
        appears there are no other public discussions about this bug.\nThere were some
        discussions in if the bug applies in RHEL\n(https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1141344)
        / \nFedora (https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1141347)\n"
      question: |
        Was there any discussion surrounding this?
    
        A discussion can include debates, disputes, or polite talk about how to
        resolve uncertainty.
    
        Example include:
          * Is this out of our scope?
          * Is this a security?
          * How should we fix this?
    
        Just because you see multiple comments doesn't mean it's a discussion.
        For example:
          * "Fix line 10". "Ok" is not what we call a discussion
          * "Ping" (reminding people)
    
        Check the bugs reports, pull requests, and mailing lists archives.
    
        These answers should be boolean.
          discussed_as_security: true or false
          any_discussion: true or false
    
        Put any links to disagreements you found in the notes section, or any other
        comment you want to make.
      any_discussion: false
      discussed_as_security: false
    stacktrace:
      note: |
        No stack traces were given either in the commit message or the Project Zero
        bug report.
      question: |
        Are there any stacktraces in the bug reports?
    
        Secondly, if there is a stacktrace, is the fix in the same file that the
        stacktrace points to?
    
        If there are no stacktraces, then both of these are false - but be sure to
        mention where you checked in the note.
    
        Answer must be true or false.
        Write a note about how you came to the conclusions you did, regardless of
        what your answer was.
      any_stacktraces: false
      stacktrace_with_fix: false
    description: Hosts send data to a USB HID (Human Interface Devices) using HID reports.
      By sending a maliciously crafted HID report, a heap overflow vulnerability in the
      HID driver for the Logitech Unifying receivers could disclose data and allow writes
      to the kernel heap.
    unit_tested:
      fix: false
      code: false
      question: |
        Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
        Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
        improving the automated tests?
    
        For code: and fix: - your answer should be boolean.
    
        For the code_answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
        code near the fix in related directories and determine if and was there were
        unit tests involved for this subsystem.
    
        For the fix_answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
        adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
      fix_answer: Original code had no unit tests, and the fix did not add any new tests.
      code_answer: Original code had no unit tests.
    reported_date: '2014-08-18'
    specification:
      note: "This is a implementation bug, when trying to limit the size of \na buffer
        above a cutoff point.\n"
      answer: false
      instructions: |
        Is there mention of a violation of a specification? For example, the POSIX
        spec, an RFC spec, a network protocol spec, or some other requirements
        specification.
    
        Be sure to check the following artifacts for this:
          * bug reports
          * security advisories
          * commit message
          * mailing lists
          * anything else
    
        The answer field should be boolean. In answer_note, please explain
        why you come to that conclusion.
    announced_date: '2014-09-28'
    curation_level: 2
    published_date: '2014-09-28'
    forgotten_check:
      note: |
        The bug is a logic error in a bound check, where instead of checking if a size
        is larger than the largest permitted size, it checks if the size is smaller instead.
      answer: false
      question: |
        Does the fix for the vulnerability involve adding a forgotten check?
    
        A "forgotten check" can mean many things. It often manifests as the fix
        inserting an entire if-statement or a conditional to an existing
        if-statement. Or a call to a method that checks something.
    
        Example of checks can include:
          * null pointer checks
          * check the current role, e.g. root
          * boundary checks for a number
          * consult file permissions
          * check a return value
    
        Answer must be true or false.
        Write a note about how you came to the conclusions you did, regardless of
        what your answer was.
    CWE_instructions: |
      Please go to http://cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE
      entry that describes your vulnerability. We recommend going to
      https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/699.html for the Software Development
      view of the vulnerabilities. We also recommend the tool
      http://www.cwevis.org/viz to help see how the classifications work.
    
      If you have anything to note about why you classified it this way, write
      something in CWE_note. This field is optional.
    
      Just the number here is fine. No need for name or CWE prefix. If more than one
      apply here, then place them in an array like this
        CWE: ["123", "456"] # this is ok
        CWE: [123, 456]     # also ok
        CWE: 123            # also ok
    autodiscoverable:
      note: |
        A generic fuzzer cound generate random HID requests and send them using the
        `hidraw` driver. Since the bug resulted in out of bounds access, a kernel built with
        AddressSanitizer should be able to flag this issue. However, the fuzzer must be
        run on a system with a Logitech Unifying receiver installed.
      answer: true
      instructions: |
        Is it plausible that a fully automated tool could have discovered
        this? These are tools that require little knowledge of the domain,
         e.g. automatic static analysis, compiler warnings, fuzzers.
    
        Examples for true answers: SQL injection, XSS, buffer overflow
    
        In systemd, the actually use OZZ Fuzz. If there's a link to it, add it here.
    
        Examples for false: RFC violations, permissions issues, anything
        that requires the tool to be "aware" of the project's
        domain-specific requirements.
    
        The answer field should be boolean. In answer_note, please explain
        why you come to that conclusion.
    vcc_instructions: |
      The vulnerability-contributing commits.
    
      These are found by our tools by traversing the Git Blame history, where we
      determine which commit(s) introduced the functionality.
    
      Look up these VCC commits and verify that they are not simple refactorings,
      and that they are, in fact introducing the vulnerability into the system.
      Often, introducing the file or function is where the VCC is, but VCCs can be
      anything.
    
      Place any notes you would like to make in the notes field.
    bugs_instructions: |
      What bugs are involved in this vulnerability?
    
      Please list bug IDs to https://bugzilla.kernel.org/
    
      Bug ID's can appear in several places:
        * Mentioned in commit messages
        * Mentioned in mailing list discussions
        * References from NVD entry
        * Various other places
    yaml_instructions: |
      =================
      ===YAML Primer===
      =================
      This is a dictionary data structure, akin to JSON.
      Everything before a colon is a key, and the values here are usually strings
      For one-line strings, you can just use quotes after the colon
      For multi-line strings, as we do for our instructions, you put a | and then
      indent by two spaces
    
      For readability, we hard-wrap multi-line strings at 80 characters. This is
      not required, but appreciated.
    fixes_instructions: |
      Please put the commit hash in "commit" below.
    
      This must be a git commit hash from the systemd source repo, a  40-character
      hexademical string/
    
      Place any notes you would like to make in the notes field.
    bounty_instructions: |
      If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
      vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
      was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
    interesting_commits:
      commits:
      - note: |
          Similar bug (incorrect bounds check) in the same driver,
          reported around the same time
        commit: ad3e14d7c5268c2e24477c6ef54bbdf88add5d36
      question: |
        Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?
    
        Use this to specify any commits you think are notable in some way, and
        explain why in the note.
    
        Example interesting commits:
          * Mentioned as a problematic commit in the past
            e.g. "This fixes regression in commit xys"
          * A significant rewrite in the git history
          * Other commits that fixed a similar issue as this vulnerability
          * Anything else you find interesting.
    order_of_operations:
      note: 'The bug is because the wrong operator is used ("<" instead of the correct
        ">")
    
        '
      answer: false
      question: |
        Does the fix for the vulnerability involve correcting an order of
        operations?
    
        This means the fix involves moving code around or changing the order of
        how things are done.
    
        Answer must be true or false.
        Write a note about how you came to the conclusions you did, regardless of
        what your answer was.
    curated_instructions: |
      If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it.
    
      Set the version number that you were given in your instructions.
    
      This will enable additional editorial checks on this file to make sure you
      fill everything out properly. If you are a student, we cannot accept your work
      as finished unless curated is properly updated.
    upvotes_instructions: |
      For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.
    
      For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
      upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
      interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
      upvotes score on your branch.
    nickname_instructions: |
      A catchy name for this vulnerability that would draw attention it.
      If the report mentions a nickname, use that.
      Must be under 30 characters. Optional.
    reported_instructions: |
      What date was the vulnerability reported to the security team? Look at the
      security bulletins and bug reports. It is not necessarily the same day that
      the CVE was created.  Leave blank if no date is given.
    
      Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
    announced_instructions: |
      Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
      find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date.
    
      This is not the same as published date in the NVD - that is below.
    
      Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
    published_instructions: |
      Is there a published fix or patch date for this vulnerability?
      Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
    description_instructions: |
      You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
      descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.
    
      Rewrite this description IN YOUR OWN WORDS. Make it interesting and easy to
      read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
      description later to get more technical.
    
      Try to still be specific in your description, but remove project-specific
      stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
      that outsiders to this project would not understand. Technology like "regular
      expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
      keep too.
    
      Your target audience is people just like you before you took any course in
      security
    

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