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CVE: CVE-2014-3190 CWE: - 416 bugs: - 400476 repo: vccs: - note: | Committed by rob.buis@samsung.com on Fri Jun 13 00:11:09 2014. They were working on a fix for BUG=313438 which seems to be related to a vulnerability with the shadow DOM. commit: c0fcf79e84996c055b61d1bf6a1064e2e62b18bf fixes: - note: | Committed by tkent@chromium.org on Tue Sep 2 01:55:04 2014 +0000 This commit removed some of the tests that they had provided to test the fix for the vulnerability as they were 'unacceptably flaky'. commit: e1e0d82b8d3ac7c6466eb4e26fce10ba84e2c2ed - note: | Committed by vogelheim@chromium.org on Mon Sep 1 18:52:48 2014 +0000 This commit added unit tests to verify the fix that was provided for the vulnerability. commit: 036d70de468f6a86386526b970a256272720ebe1 - note: | Committed by vogelheim@chromium.org on Tue Sep 2 12:34:05 2014 Initial fix for the vulnerability and creation of tests to verify the fix. commit: 4fa78b4d12db5b5511c6d2a28e098a0c96cfcfd8 bounty: date: '2014-10-07 16:12:00.000000000 -04:00' amount: 3000.0 references: - http://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2014/10/stable-channel-update.html lessons: yagni: note: applies: question: | Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example of one of those lessons? Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put a quick explanation of how it applies. Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely that one or two of them apply. If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these. serial_killer: note: applies: complex_inputs: note: applies: distrust_input: note: applies: least_privilege: note: applies: native_wrappers: note: | A wrapper ended up being a part of the fix for this vulnerability. Originally the function containing the vulnerability returned a raw pointer to an ivar, which was utilized after the memory pointed to by the pointer was freed, causing the application to crash. A wrapper function call replaced the return value, which made it so that instead of a raw pointer being returned it was a reference pointer. applies: true defense_in_depth: note: applies: secure_by_default: note: applies: environment_variables: note: applies: security_by_obscurity: note: applies: frameworks_are_optional: note: applies: reviews: - 532593002 - 545493002 - 544683002 - 516843004 - 543773002 - 533633002 upvotes: 5 mistakes: answer: | The coding mistake that was made was essentially returning a raw pointer to memory, rather than a reference. Using the raw pointer to access the corresponding object after that memory had been freed resulted in a memory violation and application crash. This mistake could have been avoided by having a stronger sense of awareness for the existing functionality of the subsystem being worked in. Simply knowing that the value being returned was a raw pointer to memory could have inspired a more defensive programming approach. There seemed to be a bit of an issue in terms of team communication. The original author of the code that contained the vulnerability was still on the team at the time of the commit, but seemed reluctant to admit that the vulnerability that was reported could be a cause of their code. A different team member took over the bug fix after a supervisor had asserted that someone needed to claim responsibility for the bug fix. The supervisor seemed irritated that a major security vulnerability took over a month to fix after being first reported. question: | In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes? Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications? Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper? Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software engineering industry would find interesting. announced: '2014-10-08 06:55:06.347000000 -04:00' subsystem: name: - blink - webcore answer: | Based on the description in the CVE and review of the commit history. The name of the subsystem was renamed between the VCC and the fix for the vulnerability, from WebCore to blink within the Core directory. question: "What subsystems was the mistake in? \n\nLook at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get\ndirectory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how\nthe bug report was tagged. Examples: \"clipboard\", \"gpu\", \"ssl\", \"speech\", \"renderer\"\n" discovered: date: '2014-08-04 19:54:19.000000000 +00:00' answer: The vulnerability was reported to Google employees by Credit to cloudfuzzer, Chen Zhang (demi6od) of NSFOCUS Security Team. google: false contest: false question: | How was this vulnerability discovered? Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there. The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil. The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil. If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer". automated: false description: A use-after-free vulnerability present in the currentTarget function on Event objects with the core/events subsystem in Google Chrome allowed remote attackers to cause Chrome to crash or have unspecificed other impacts via Javascript code that would access the source of this vulnerability. An attacker would be able to construct vectors and infect Chrome user's browsers remotely via download of a simple javascript program from a visited website. The result would be a Denial of Service attack, preventing the user from accessing any functionality in Chrome. unit_tested: fix: true code: true answer: | There were tests for the original vcc, but none of the tests that were created targeted the vulnerability. There were several rounds of review for the fix of the vulnerability that included automated regression tests. question: | Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability? Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve improving the automated tests? For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved for this module. For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again. major_events: answer: There was one major event in the history of this vulnerability. events: - date: Fri Jul 18 22:10:43 2014 name: Rename of the subsystem of this vulnerability from WebCore to blink. question: | Please record any major events you found in the history of this vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem changed? Did the team change? The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather, we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time. curation_level: 0 CWE_instructions: | Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!) bounty_instructions: | If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank. interesting_commits: answer: commits: - note: commit: - note: commit: question: | Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)? Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any emerging themes? If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix. curated_instructions: | If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly. If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is set to true. upvotes_instructions: | For the first round, ignore this upvotes number. For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the upvotes score on your branch. announced_instructions: | Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/). Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format. fixes_vcc_instructions: | Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format. description_instructions: | You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony. Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD description later to get more technical. Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to keep too. |
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