angler-fishThe Vulnerability History Project

CVE-2014-3201

core/rendering/compositing/RenderLayerCompositor.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 38.0.2125.102 on Android, does not properly handle a certain IFRAME overflow condition, which allows remote attackers to spoof content via a crafted web site that interferes with the scrollbar. This CVE allowed applications in an iframe to modify the scrollbar via css, allowing the iframe to spoof content on the website outside of it's actual frame.


This vulnerability came about not because of any direct mistakes per say, rather the fact that the iframe was able to modify the scrollbar, and use that to spoof content. While this was fixed by bounding the frames overflow, it likely could have been fixed somewhere else.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
CVE: CVE-2014-3201
CWE:
- 119
bugs:
- 406593
repo: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink/trunk
vccs:
- note: |
    This vcc set the root contianer layer not to maskToBounds, instead of the clip layer.
    This was an interesting vcc, because it mentioned the only reason it might be
    needed would be to avoid overlapping the scrollbars.
  commit: 19a0bb3d5af98720d0159b148a1f625c9596e5f8
fixes:
- note: 'The fix was simple, and included clipping the iframe overflow controls via
    m_overflowControlsHostLayer

    '
  commit: e80ebbdab2ce3d2e343fb6d9e2fe9ce149986377
bounty:
  date: '2014-10-07'
  amount: 1500.0
  references:
  - http://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2014/10/chrome-for-android-update.html
  - https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=406593#c30
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: 
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: 
  distrust_input:
    note: 
    applies: 
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: 
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: 
  defense_in_depth:
    note: |
      In the case of this vulnerability, it was fixed by clipping the iframe overflow controls.
      However, there are multiple levels this issue can be fixed on, including restricting permissions for
      iframes, such as not allowing them to modify the scrollbar.
    applies: true
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: 
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
reviews:
- 564983003
- 579073002
upvotes: 4
mistakes:
  answer: |
    This vulnerability came about not because of any direct mistakes per say,
    rather the fact that the iframe was able to modify the scrollbar, and use
    that to spoof content. While this was fixed by bounding the frames overflow,
    it likely could have been fixed somewhere else.
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
announced: '2014-10-09 21:55:08.680000000 -04:00'
subsystem:
  name: renderer
  answer: The vulnerability was in the class RenderLayerCompositor
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '2014-08-22'
  answer: 'The reporter found the bug, and provided a high quality proof of concept

    '
  google: false
  contest: 
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: |
  core/rendering/compositing/RenderLayerCompositor.cpp in Blink,
  as used in Google Chrome before 38.0.2125.102 on Android,
  does not properly handle a certain IFRAME overflow condition,
  which allows remote attackers to spoof content via a crafted web site that interferes with the scrollbar.

  This CVE allowed applications in an iframe to modify the scrollbar via css,
  allowing the iframe to spoof content on the website outside of it's actual frame.
unit_tested:
  fix: true
  code: true
  answer: 'A test expectation was added based on the new functionality

    '
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: |
    The only major event between these times were the change of the name of the module,
    which likely did not affect or cause this vulnerability
  events:
  - date: '2014-06-18'
    name: Rename WebCore namespace to Blink
  - date: 
    name: 
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: |
    There were not many interesting commits between the VSS and the fix, aside from one,
      that affected how the root graphics layer was scaled for mobile devides
  commits:
  - note: This commit affected how the root graphics layer was scaled for mobile devices
    commit: 6bac145510b27faae57809327bdaf93b2fd0e5cc
  - note: 
    commit: 
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?

    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.

See a mistake? Is something missing from our story? We welcome contributions! All of our work is open-source and version-controlled on GitHub. You can curate using our Curation Wizard.

Use our Curation Wizard

Or go to GitHub

  • There are no articles here... yet

Timeline

Hover over an event to see its title.
Click on the event to learn more.
Filter by event type with the buttons below.

expand_less