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CVE: CVE-2015-1220 CWE: - 146 bugs: - 437651 repo: vccs: - note: This commit is the last time that the affected code was edited commit: 217add8aebf21a09e5bae70843f103e9b51cfdec fixes: - note: This commit handles both the files code and the unit tests commit: 4f9c9adef4036aff60b734b4a0045c43c320fe1d bounty: date: '2015-03-03 15:53:00.000000000 -05:00' amount: 3000.0 references: - http://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2015/03/stable-channel-update.html lessons: yagni: note: applies: false question: | Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example of one of those lessons? Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put a quick explanation of how it applies. Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely that one or two of them apply. If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these. serial_killer: note: applies: false complex_inputs: note: applies: false distrust_input: note: This issue was found in corrupted gifs, or if the first frame of a gif was larger than the screen size. If there were more checks in place for proper gifs, then this vulnerability would not have been a concern. applies: true least_privilege: note: applies: false native_wrappers: note: applies: false defense_in_depth: note: applies: false secure_by_default: note: After the vulnerability was found and corrected, they added code in to ensure that the gifs were appropriately loaded and created. They also added exception handling for inappropriately constructed gifs, and do not attempt to load them if the sizing is incorrect. applies: true environment_variables: note: applies: false security_by_obscurity: note: applies: false frameworks_are_optional: note: applies: false reviews: - 868803008 - 813943003 upvotes: 10 mistakes: answer: "One thing that I found interesting about this vulnerability is that it was found\ntwo months before it was fixed or looked at. Once it was looked at and recreated, \nit was labelled high priority and had a larger bounty than other common vulnerabilities. \nThis probably could have been done on a quicker schedule, but there might have been \na release or some other thing more important in the employee's workload.\n\nFrom reading into this vulnerability, this is a common issue that many services that\nhave gif loading have. On the Chromium team's internal comments, there was mention of \nthis issue also occuring on firefox. I believe that this was created by a coding mistake.\nThe team also mentioned that there was a quick fix in place that did not cover the edge case\nof this vulnerability-when the first frame of the gif is larger than the screen size.\n\nThe CWE associated with this vulnerability is concerned with memory use after a free, because\nof the error that occurs after the before mentioned issue with gif frame sizes. There are two\nsuggested mitigatons in the CWE entry. The first mitigation suggests choosing a language that \nprovides automatic memory management. For a engine such as blink that is quite large, it is not\nrealistic to rewrite the rendering engine in a new language. The second mitigation is to be sure\nto set your variables to NULL after they are freed, but even the mitigation strategy mentions \nthat this fix may not be very useful if there are multiple of complex data structures, and blink\nis a very complicated engine.\n\nHowever, considering they fixed the issue at its root cause(mishandling gif decoding), and changed\nthe quick fix, it seems like the fix was handled properly. \n" question: | In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes? Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications? Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper? Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software engineering industry would find interesting. announced: '2015-03-08 20:59:13.327000000 -04:00' subsystem: name: blink answer: | Blink is chromium's gif renderer and decoder. The vulnerability is focused on the decoding of gifs, and all of the source code is found concerning that engine. question: | What subsystems was the mistake in? Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer" discovered: date: '2014-11-30' answer: "I am unable to see a large amount of data that was generated with the original\nreport when google tried to recreate the issue due to a lack of permission. \nThe original user that reported the bug did not say much in his post other \nthan the step by step guide for recreation. They had a gif that they provided, \nand the aforementioned denial of service error.\n" google: false contest: false question: | How was this vulnerability discovered? Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there. The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil. The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil. If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer". automated: false description: "In Google Chrome, there were multiple occasions where after a memory location is freed,\nthe location is then attempted to be used again. In this specific vulnerability, a \nlocation used for a GIF decoder is attempted to be used again after a gif fails to be\ndecoded. If a remote attacker chooses to attempt to take advantage of this vulnerability, \nthey could cause a denial of service for other users or other unpredicted behavior. \nThe way that it is anticipated that an attacker would take advantage of this is by a \n\"crafted frame size\" in a GIF. Any frame size larger than the screen size of a device \ncould cause the broken GIF to triggers a bug in the decoding code for the GIF.\n" unit_tested: fix: true code: false answer: "This code was unit tested after the vulnerability was found and corrected.\nIn fact, in what I believe to be the vcc, the author wrote that it was\n'simple refactoring, no tests' on the part of the code that they edited. While \nthey did not introduce the issue, they would have noticed it earlier had they \nadded tests into the framework at that time.\n" question: | Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability? Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve improving the automated tests? For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved for this module. For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again. major_events: answer: events: - date: '2014-11-30' name: Bug Reported - date: '2015-01-07' name: Work Started on Vulnerability - date: '2015-01-08' name: Issue Found - date: '2015-01-16' name: Fix Added, Merge Failed - date: '2015-02-06' name: Fix Approved - date: '2015-03-03' name: Reward Given to Reporter - date: '2015-04-23' name: Bug Released to Public question: | Please record any major events you found in the history of this vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem changed? Did the team change? The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather, we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time. curation_level: 0 CWE_instructions: | Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!) bounty_instructions: | If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank. interesting_commits: answer: commits: - note: This commit is interesting because part of the vcc is from refactoring, and the writer purposefully did not write tests for it. In previous classwork, we learned to always test when refactoring and this proves that. commit: 217add8aebf21a09e5bae70843f103e9b51cfdec question: | Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)? Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any emerging themes? If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix. curated_instructions: | If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly. If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is set to true. upvotes_instructions: | For the first round, ignore this upvotes number. For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the upvotes score on your branch. announced_instructions: | Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/). Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format. fixes_vcc_instructions: | Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format. description_instructions: | You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony. Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD description later to get more technical. Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to keep too. |
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