CVE-2015-1255

CVE: CVE-2015-1255
CWE:
- 416
bugs:
- 473253
repo: 
vccs:
- note: "Author crogers@google.com <crogers@google.com@0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98>\nDate
    \  Thu Jan 17 03:32:29 2013 +0000\n\n  Add chromium support for MediaStreamAudioDestinationNode\n
    \ \n  We add smarts into MediaStreamDependencyFactory::CreateNativeLocalMediaStream()\n
    \ to handle MediaStreams originating from WebAudio.\n  \n  Please see companion
    WebKit patches\n  https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=101815\n  https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=106053\n
    \ \n  BUG=none\n  TEST=manual test\n  http://www.corp.google.com/~henrika/WebAudio/MediaStreamAudioDestinationNode.html\n
    \ \n  Review URL https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11369171\n  \n  git-svn-id
    svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@177330 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98\n"
  commit: 3c89eaf563f7e5665b4b3194c3e83950eee54042
fixes:
- note: "Author guidou <guidou@chromium.org>\nDate   Fri Apr 10 06:00:37 2015 -0700\n\n
    \ Fix heap-use-after-free issue with WebAudioCapturerSource.\n  \n  WebAudioCapturerSource
    registers with a blink WebMediaStreamSource.\n  When the audio track was stopped,
    the WebAudioCapturerSource was\n  destroyed and the WebMediaStreamSource was left
    with a dangling\n  pointer, which it tried to use, resulting in access to freed\n
    \ memory and usually a crashed tab.\n  \n  This CL makes WebAudioCapturerSource
    aware of the WebMediaStreamSource\n  with which it is registered, so that it can
    be deregistered when the\n  audio track is stopped.\n  \n  BUG=473253\n  TEST=See
    testcase.html in crbug.com/473253\n  \n  Review URL https://codereview.chromium.org/1071063005\n
    \ \n  Cr-Commit-Position refs/heads/master@{#324622}\n"
  commit: 228cd9447121ede4d32ab48c8dfe066736cfdae2
bounty:
  date: '2015-05-19 11:49:00.000000000 -04:00'
  amount: 3000.0
  references:
  - http://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2015/05/stable-channel-update_19.html
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: 
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: 
  distrust_input:
    note: 
    applies: 
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: 
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: 
  defense_in_depth:
    note: 
    applies: 
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: 
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
reviews:
- 1071063005
- 1136803003
upvotes: 
mistakes:
  answer: "This appears to be an mistake with the design approach.\nSince the instance
    of WebAudioCapturerSource could have a shorter\nlife then Blink it should have
    been considered\nwhat things need to be done at time of destruction. In the case
    of the fix,\nadding to the destructor in WebAudioCapturerSource to remove its
    pointer\nto itself from Blink was the solution.    \n"
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
announced: '2015-04-02 00:00:00.0 -04:00'
subsystem:
  name:
  - renderer
  - media
  answer: content/renderer/media/webaudio_capturer_source.cc
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '2015-04-02'
  answer: "This specific vulnerability was discovered through a crash report submitted
    by user Khalil Zhani.  \n"
  google: false
  contest: ''
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: "In Chromium, Blink, a rendering engine, is used with almost a one to
  one \nrelationship with each browser tab instance. It takes on the responsibility
  \nof rendering most of the content in a browser tab. In the \ncase of this vulenrability,
  Blink was trying to use a particular \nobject instance to stop playback of music
  content in the browser tab process after that instance \nwas destroyed. This Use-after-free
  vulnerability in the WebAudio implementation \nof Chromium allowed remote attackers
  to cause a denial of service \nor possibly have other unspecified impacts.\n\nThe
  fix adds to the empty an destructor to call newly introduced function \nwhich removes
  the instance of particular pointer from the Blink renderer engine instance so that
  \nit is not used later on by Blink. Even though initially in the VCC the destructor
  \nis empty, in C++ at time of destruction it will still destroy member variables
  \nof the class which is what caused our use-after-free issue being addressed here.\n"
unit_tested:
  fix: false
  code: false
  answer: "It is not 100% apparent if automated testing is involved. A replication\ntest
    case was provided that looks like a UI automation script, which would \nmake one
    think there is.\n"
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: 
  events:
  - date: 
    name: 
  - date: 
    name: 
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: |
    More than 20 commits exist betweem the vcc and the fix commit. 40-50% of these commits are fixing bugs.
    This makes one think that code was not sufficiently tested before being introduced into Chromium.
  commits:
  - note: 
    commit: 
  - note: 
    commit: 
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?

    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.