CVE-2015-1267

CVE: CVE-2015-1267
CWE:
- 346
- 254
bugs:
- 497507
repo: 
vccs:
- note: 'The buffer was isolated to get the global instance and then passed instead
    of the contents of the buffer.

    '
  commit: 2c140e476e28593139fa8c754666ba9862c0c14e
fixes:
- note: 'The bug was discovered and reported in this commit.

    '
  commit: 42bd05a2bf4260f500687a2457d01e298033f2bb
- note: "The commit tried to stop using the creatingContext from public APIs because
    they were not validated.  \nreturn toV8(PassRefPtr<DOMArrayBuffer>(*buffer), creationContext,
    isolate);\ninto \nreturn toV8(PassRefPtr<DOMArrayBuffer>(*buffer), isolate->GetCurrentContext()->Global(),
    isolate);\n"
  commit: ca9573d5b634524afefe1e65bb905b89b6545970
- note: 'Asserts were added to check the creation context.

    '
  commit: 001ed55baaec557fb136375ed74cf696ca3f8b28
bounty:
  date: 
  amount: 
  references: No bounty. https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2015/06/chrome-stable-update.html
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: 
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: 
  distrust_input:
    note: 'The developers tried to separate methods that were not related in order
      to improve validation.

      '
    applies: true
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: 
  native_wrappers:
    note: 'Context is not restricted when creating the DOM wrapper.

      '
    applies: true
  defense_in_depth:
    note: 
    applies: 
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: 
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
reviews:
- 1186023004
- 1174343003
- 1166793006
- 1168973003
- 1181943005
upvotes: 0
mistakes:
  answer: 'The mistake was chiefly in the design/architecture domain, as developers
    failed to recognized that context needed to be validated. The mitigation was in
    accordance to the CWE recommendations, which involved obtaining the origin of
    the request (by passing in the global instance). An additional mitigation could
    have been whitelisting trusted applications using manifest.xml; however, it is
    not Chrome''s intention to limit others applications as there are plenty of plug-ins
    and APIs. It is necessary to assume risk in order to reach the broader audience.  '
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those in the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
announced: '2015-06-26 10:59:01.907000000 -04:00'
subsystem:
  name: blink
  answer: Source code paths
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '2015-06-06'
  answer: 'The vulnerability was found by a user looking to exploit bindings to fake
    the context to get the value oject in a different context. The person who found
    it took two screenshots and insisted in having a separate thread from other related
    JavaScript bugs that were discovered.

    '
  google: false
  contest: 
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: "Scripts can pass any objects to the API as the chief context, meaning
  cross-origin scripting is possible. Therefore, information from one system can be
  passed into another and be considered as another system.   \n"
unit_tested:
  fix: true
  code: false
  answer: |
    The initial code did not involve any tests for unsafe context because the developers wrote the program to be used internally and did not realize that inputs from the public API could be introduced.
    The fix involved automated tests that were later added after realizing that context could be unsafe from the public API. The final commit message added assert statements so that context would be checked.
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: I did not observe any major events during this time.
  events:
  - date: 
    name: 
  - date: 
    name: 
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 0
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: 
  commits:
  - note: "The commit responded to the bugs by moving V8-specific methods out of WebArray
      Buffer. It was interesting because the developers realized that they needed
      to keep the methods because refactoring would require a change in public API.
      Therefore, they had to consider the tradeoff between good design and bugs.  \n"
    commit: 6831707b3a83da02f527d6653ffc3834ce3d8457
  - note: 
    commit: 
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?

    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.