CVE-2015-1292

CVE: CVE-2015-1292
CWE:
- 79
- 264
bugs:
- 522791
repo: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/blink
vccs:
- note: This defect has been in webKit since they added service Workers
  commit: afdddad9b5e0f61b1c79f29f637e07c3137c94bc
fixes:
- note: ''
  commit: c62d8db228d01f75d74b5a3420c6dec8f7d961fd
- note: ''
  commit: 7ee897723127d0b8fecc5e67d45e20179c760e6e
bounty:
  date: '2015-09-01 15:15:00.000000000 -04:00'
  amount: 7500.0
  references:
  - http://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2015/09/stable-channel-update.html
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: 
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: 
  distrust_input:
    note: 
    applies: 
  least_privilege:
    note: 'Only requests that come from the same origin should be granted access to
      resources, specifically . No others.

      '
    applies: true
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: 
  defense_in_depth:
    note: "Just because someone knows how to request access to a service does not
      mean\nthat they are necessarily authorized to get one. If they get a service
      worker \nthen they can use it to inject their own code.\n"
    applies: true
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: 
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 'If no one knew about this weird behaviour, it would not have ever been
      a problem

      '
    applies: true
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
reviews:
- 1308723003
- 1307883002
- 1320533003
- 1314293002
- 1305903007
upvotes: 
mistakes:
  answer: |
    The coding mistake made here was being too excited in implementing a new feature
    and not checking that the entities using the feature are who they say they are.

    This was a design mistake mostly. The code written in this library does (and did)
    what it is intended to do. The designers of the subsystem did not think about the
    case of untrusted users accessing the worker and so never thought to check.

    The principle of defense in depth applies here mostly. Since service workers
    are a heavily integrated component of modern web browsers, any malicious user
    could have injected arbitary code into browsers if they were able to somehow
    invoke a service worker in the wrong context.
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
announced: '2015-09-03'
subsystem:
  name: WebKit
  answer: Based on the description in the CVE and blog post.
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '08-20-2015'
  answer: |-
    Marius Mlynski, a Google engineer, discovered the defect manually and documented it with reproducable instructions on the chromium bug tracker in August 2015.
    There are not any details about how he discovered the bug.
  google: true
  contest: 
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: |-
  Blink, the rendering engine of Google Chrome since 2013, had a defect where an internal navigation function had no verification on the origin of a request.
  This allowed a malicious attacker to perform arbitary cross site scripting if they were able to call this function.
unit_tested:
  fix: false
  code: false
  answer: From looking at the fix code there is no evidence of any testing.
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: 
  events:
  - date: 02-12-2014
    name: Implementation of Service Workers feature in WebKit
  - date: 
    name: 
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: There were not really any interesting commits between the vcc and the fixes
    commits. The subsystem is a utility one for developers using Webkit(a front end
    technology) and so the code has been broken up and simplified over time. It has
    been reorganized to become easier to use. The particular exploit of the service
    workers being described here has been possible since the initial release of them
    in 2014.
  commits:
  - note: 
    commit: 
  - note: 
    commit: 
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?

    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.