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CVE: CVE-2015-5346 CWE: 384 bugs: - 58809 vccs: - note: commit message "Add a per context option to select the cookie parser to use and add the necessary plumbing to pass that choice to the cookie parser." Basically, they were working on the cookie parser, and also made additions to the Coyote Adapter which is when they recycled the cookie. They forgot to also recycle the session here commit: 2fe82d9ff7602aa3cf79d2be8af8327b240a53c1 - note: Working on the request class, clearing the cookies and setting session to null. Forgot to also set RequestedSSLSession to false commit: eae54419c6e196933998f63358367040edaa4a8c fixes: - note: SVN rev 1713184, from the Tomcat website. commit: 83679b99cd40caa401d173c8f8e72fc98eb5d5be - note: SVN rev 1723414, from the Tomcat website. commit: 04164c1f01b973e548d95511d417f414ca723cb8 - note: SVN rev 1713185, from the Tomcat website. commit: 41fbee7ba15435a831f765597ff907c56ebf2169 - note: SVN rev 1723506, from the Tomcat website. commit: c39b7ffc2145644f7f3cf9e3cd4aada5048e56a0 - note: SVN rev 1713187, from the Tomcat website. commit: 6287be37d8d06c320215c45f7e2b8380411692e0 - note: commit: bounty: amt: url: announced: '2016-02-24' lessons: yagni: note: applies: question: | Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example of one of those lessons? Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put a quick explanation of how it applies. Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely that one or two of them apply. If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these. serial_killer: note: applies: complex_inputs: note: applies: distrust_input: note: applies: least_privilege: note: applies: native_wrappers: note: applies: defense_in_depth: note: Instead of depending solely on the session id to authenticate, if the developers used defense in depth to create an additional layer of security such as two-factor authentication, then the vulnerability would be avoidable. applies: true secure_by_default: note: applies: environment_variables: note: applies: security_by_obscurity: note: applies: frameworks_are_optional: note: applies: upvotes: 2 mistakes: answer: From looking at the prior code and the fix, it seems evident that the developers were falling into the long method trap. When this happens, the code can become hard to follow and one method ends up doing multiple different things. In this case postParseRequest handled logic for cookies and sessions. When session was being cleared, multiple lines to clear the attributes of the session were written, instead of creating a helper method that focused solely on session clearing. This led them to forget to clear one attribute that opened the system up to session fixation. In the future, it is important that you write helper functions to eliminate long methods, and improve readibility to prevent errors like this. question: | In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes? Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications? Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper? Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software engineering industry would find interesting. nickname: reported: '2014-06-22' announced: '2016-02-22' subsystem: name: - catalina - connector answer: it lists the component in the bug report question: | What subsystems was the mistake in? Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer" discovered: date: '2014-06-22' answer: This vulnerability was discovered by the tomcat security team. They discovered it when they realized Tomcat incorrectly handled different session settings when multiple versions of the same web application was deployed contest: false question: | How was this vulnerability discovered? Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was originally found. * Answer in longform below in "answer" * Fill in the date in YYYY-MM-DD * If it's clear that the vulnerability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there. * The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil. If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may leave the entries blank except for "answer", BUT please write down where you looked in "answer". automated: false description: | The vulnerability is an example of session fixation. This is when a malicious actor hijacks a valid user session. Usually, when a user is authenticated the application should be assigned a new session Id, but when they are not, the attacker can reuse that session id to gain access. In this case, there was a field in the request object that was not renewed (requestSessionSSL), for new sessions, so theoretically if an attacker created a request object and forced the user to somehow use it, then they could gain access because they would have the requestSessionSSL field to authenticate. This attack would also require the web application to be set up to use ssl session id as the http session id which is an uncommon setup. unit_tested: fix: false code: true answer: I can tell this was unit tested by reading the bug report. Author Mark Thomas says that the tests passed against the session vulnerability. As for fix, I do not see any unit tests that were added as part of the fix. question: | Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability? Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve improving the automated tests? Write the reasoning behind your answer in the "answer" field. For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved for this module. Must be just "true" or "false". For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again. Must be just "true" or "false". curation_level: 0 CWE_instructions: | Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!) incomplete_fixes: - note: This was a two part fix, first patch was in commit 83679b99cd40caa401d173c8f8e72fc98eb5d5be commit: 04164c1f01b973e548d95511d417f414ca723cb8 - note: commit: bounty_instructions: | If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank. interesting_commits: answer: Yes there is a revision 1667546 that implemented Tomcat authorization. It takes a user and adds roles to it. During this revision, multiple files were changed at once from the FormAuthenticator to the AuthenticatorBase. Of which, both Request.java and CoyoteAdapter were changed. In this, they recycled the authtype along with other user information. It is interesting because you would think in this large feature addition, they would add a check for ensuring the session was cleared after a new deployment began. Session and authentication go hand in hand. If the session is compromised then authentication is rendered useless. commits: - note: Authenticator for adding roles to users commit: 1ee6bfce5d53af47aee398a38691423608bf6b83 - note: commit: question: | Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)? Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any emerging themes? If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix. curated_instructions: | If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly. If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is set to true. upvotes_instructions: | Students: when initially writing this, ignore this upvotes number. Once this work is being reviewed, you will be giving a certain amount of upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the upvotes score on your branch. nickname_instructions: | Nickname is optional. Provide a useful, professional, and catchy nickname for this vulnerability. Ideally fewer than 30 characters. This will be shown alongside its CVE to make it more easily distinguished from the rest. reported_instructions: | Was there a date that this vulnerability was reported to the team? You can find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE data. Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format. announced_instructions: | Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE data. Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format. fixes_vcc_instructions: | Please put the Git commit SHA in "commit" below, and any notes about how this was discovered in the "note" field. Refer to our instructions on how to find a Git SHA from an SVN revision. description_instructions: | You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony. Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD description later to get more technical. Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to keep too. incomplete_fix_instructions: | Did the above "fixes" actually fix the vulnerability? Please list any fix commits for this vulnerability that had to be corrected at a later date. |
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