CVE-2016-1655

CVE: CVE-2016-1655
CWE:
- 416
bugs:
- 582008
repo: 
vccs:
- note: 
  commit: 
fixes:
- note: "This fix allows the developers to cancel un-trusted code execution after
    a \nframe has been removed. This was done by moving code execution from an \nobserver
    to a callback.\n"
  commit: 43ea0649d4b70fdcf3e9fa5c03aee1bbba0b04bb
bounty:
  date: '2016-04-13'
  amount: 1500
  references: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=582008
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: "Because of the use of observables rather than callbacks, people never \nthought
      of the need to cancel them. Due to their implementation, the \nobservables were
      not able to be cancelled, and so the switch to callbacks \nwas necessary.\n"
    applies: true
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: false
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: false
  distrust_input:
    note: "Crafted extensions with the goal to gain access to memory were not \nprotected
      against.\n"
    applies: true
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: false
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: false
  defense_in_depth:
    note: 
    applies: false
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: false
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: false
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: false
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: false
reviews:
- 1825873002
- 1642283002
upvotes: 
mistakes:
  answer: "This was mainly a design mistake with a slight requirements mistake.\nThe
    design mistake was using observables that were not able to be cancelled.\nIt was
    never explicitlly stated, however I believe if the ability to easily\ncancel them
    was available, a developer would have had the thought to protect\nagainst this
    vulnerability. This is a requirements mistake because it was \nnot specifically
    stated to test against this. However, this requirements \nmistake is within reason,
    beacuse this exploit was extremely well crafted \nand required many layers of
    exploitation. It is not reasonable to plan for \nthis exact vulnerability beforehand.
    I believe this fix is a correct balance\nbetween how invasive it is, and how well
    thought designed it is.\n"
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
announced: '2016-01-28 '
subsystem:
  name:
  - extensions
  - renderer
  answer: |
    Extensions & Renderer
    The vulnerability is in extentions because of the way it handles observables
    and it is in renderer because of the way it executes the observables in the
    renderer.
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '2016-01-28'
  answer: "This vulnerability was found manually by someone bug hunting most likely
    \nfor the reward money. It required setting up a local server that \nspecifically
    targeted this vulnerability, and then executing things at a \ncertain time. Although
    not specifically stated, the likelihood this was found\non accident is slim.\n"
  google: false
  contest: false
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: "Before 50.0.2661.75, a denial of service / use-after-free vulnerability
  exists \nin Google Chrome where a crafted extension can be used to create an infinite
  \namount of new hidden windows that each have an observer tied to it that is\nnot
  deleted on frame removal\n"
unit_tested:
  fix: true
  code: true
  answer: "This code was unit tested before and after the patch. Before, there were
    \nunit tests that did not test for this vulnerability, but similar ones, and \nafter
    there were unit tests that specifically tested for this\n"
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: "This bug as described before is a design flaw that has been apparent from
    \nthe beginning. The only noteworthy event was the choice to use observables \nfrom
    the start without the thought to need to ever cancel them. Because of \nthis,
    I'm sure people did not want to change over to callbacks to allow for \nthem to
    be queued up and cancelled if neccessary.\n"
  events:
  - date: 
    name: 
  - date: 
    name: 
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: 
  commits:
  - note: |
      This entire commit is one giant patch, and within this patch there is code
      duplication. I'm surprised it was not abstracted out in any way.
    commit: 43ea0649d4b70fdcf3e9fa5c03aee1bbba0b04bb
  - note: 
    commit: 
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?

    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.