CVE-2016-1668

CVE: CVE-2016-1668
CWE:
- 284
- 346
bugs:
- 605910
repo: 
vccs:
- note: This vulnerability first happened when the vulnerable file was created.
  commit: '09ad01ee8bcc372af9d5d3564f27edbfe0a735fb'
fixes:
- note: This fix makes it so that the global proxy object doesn't change.
  commit: 0cd7a9f853e3cb7c035b4ab9e07a503552267f9d
bounty:
  date: '2016-05-11 14:04:00.000000000 -04:00'
  amount: 7500.0
  references:
  - http://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2016/05/stable-channel-update.html
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: false
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: false
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: false
  distrust_input:
    note: |
      This applies because scripts run from one page to another should have
      validation in some way, other than both pages being from the same origin.
    applies: true
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: false
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: false
  defense_in_depth:
    note: |
      This applies because there isn't another layer of defense when a
      script is trusted and accesses resources from another webpage.
    applies: true
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: false
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: false
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: false
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: false
reviews:
- 1960013002
- 1927063002
- 1918763002
- 1919873002
upvotes: 5
mistakes:
  answer: |
    This vulnerability occured when the original creator of Iterable.h had a
    simple coding mistake, didn't fully understand software engineering
    security, or didn't fully understand how to work and code with v8 objects.
    It was a line of code that got the job done but came with security
    implications if used correctly by a malicious attacker.

    The lesson learned from this vulnerability is fully know and understand
    the objects that you're working with, and to have defense in depth.
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those in the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
announced: '2016-05-14 17:59:08.493000000 -04:00'
subsystem:
  name:
  - blink
  - v8
  answer: Chromium contains its own web layout engine, Blink, that enables communication
    to the renderer and allows the Chromium application to use its own coding styles,
    coding layouts, and naming systems. The vulnerable file in this CVE is Iterable.h,
    which helps iterate over and executes JavaScript source code.
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '2016-04-22'
  answer: The vulnerability was found manually by Mariusz Mlynski.
  google: false
  contest: 
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: |
  The custom layout web framework that chromium (Blink) creates a global proxy
  objects which changes its type during runtime. When it changes, it
  bypasses Same Origin Policy (allows one web page to access data/resources from
  another webpage as long as they have the same origin), which can allow
  malicious attackers to run arbitrary JavaScript code to access private
  resources.
unit_tested:
  fix: false
  code: false
  answer: |
    No automated unit tests were done in this vulnerability. The original
    creator was able to detect this error with a rather simple test after the
    issue was first posted, this is said in the code review of the fix commit.
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: |
    Chromiums rendering enginering was completely reformatted after this
    vulnerability occured, around 3 months after this vulnerability was
    discovered.
  events:
  - date: '2016-08-30'
    name: Reformatting of Chromium's Rendering Engine, Blink
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: 
  commits:
  - note: |
      This commit completely reformats the method that originally had the
      vulnerability, it overwrites the fix from the last commit.
    commit: 1c8e1a7719e9d223cc84e838c9a31a0210f5878b
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?

    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.