CVE-2016-1675

CVE: CVE-2016-1675
CWE:
- 284
- 79
bugs:
- 600182
repo: https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8/
vccs:
- note: |
    New development for... it looks like possibly Outlook... appears to have created a
    frame handler that is used in Chrome later. This handler loads up specific
    scripts specified by the user, and if a certain value is triggered a malicious
    party an easily take advantage of this feature. LocalFrame is the culprit for this
    aspect of the vulnerability.
  commit: 4f8b841946bb8a058e4eddd96ac216658d735c59
- note: |
    This is exactly where the issue stems from... setDefersLoading is where the
    vulnerability is later shown to be originating from.
  commit: 1be5bb45d20ea544b712e877ed10dce4d6d676ee
fixes:
- note: ''
  commit: 73563fee12defb21a8f955993b68907169e1ea6d
bounty:
  date: '2016-05-25 15:45:00.000000000 -04:00'
  amount: 7500.0
  references:
  - http://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2016/05/stable-channel-update_25.html
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: |
      The whole fix for this problem appears to be "yagni". The fix was literally
      just a removal of anything that utilized the FrameLoader::setDefersLoading function.
    applies: true
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: 
  distrust_input:
    note: 
    applies: 
  least_privilege:
    note: "Least privilege applies here, as an issue with Use After Free can be mitigated\nby
      utilizing principals of least privilege. If we can minimize the access\nthat
      any one user has to specific memory spaces, we can stop worrying\nso much about
      them changing or destroying that memory space. \n"
    applies: true
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: 
  defense_in_depth:
    note: 
    applies: 
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: 
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
reviews:
- 1873583002
- 1858833003
upvotes: 2
mistakes:
  answer: |
    The general design flaw from this problem seems to have stemmed from an attachment
    functionality from an outlook process. It's strange that this was used all the way up
    to the time it was... and it's interesting to see how high coupling can really
    affect a software system over a long period of time. It sometimes makes sense to use
    older functions to accomplish common tasks, but when it becomes so depricated that it's
    just getting in the way it needs to be removed.
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
announced: '2016-06-05 19:59:03.787000000 -04:00'
subsystem:
  name: M-49
  answer: Appears to be in the loader subsystem.
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '2016-04-03'
  answer: |
    XSS is a major issue, and the finder of the bug basically was just testing different
    areas of chrome with XSS vulnerabilities when he found this. Merging was then done
    to bypass the use of this function.
  google: false
  contest: 
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: |
  Prior to the fix for this vulnerability, remote attackers were able to bypass the
  Same Origin Policy by mishandling Document attachments during the FrameLoader and
  LocalFrame document attachment process. Essentially it allowed for an elevation of
  privilege, creating issues with security within the software (Along with cross-site
  scripting vulnerabilities). This could allow for malicious code to be executed, or
  give to the attacker privileges that could harm the rest of the system.
unit_tested:
  fix: true
  code: true
  answer: |
    There were no unit tests used to fix this issue. Disallowing the use of this
    function is important, as it may allow for loading of objects in the background
    that should not be loaded. The finder of the bug was not using unit tests to fix
    the module, and the function in question that was having issues was simply not
    using said function.
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
major_events:
  answer: |
    It appears that the biggest "major history" for this vulnerability is the actual
    finding of the vulnerability. Someone actually coded the exploit that takes
    advantage of this vulnerability.
  events:
  - date: '2016-04-03'
    name: exploit coded
  - date: 
    name: 
  question: |
    Please record any major events you found in the history of this
    vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem
    changed? Did the team change?

    The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather,
    we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time.
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: |
    N/A, the fix to this problem seemed to be a simple "don't use this anymore",
    so there aren't any particularly interesting commits for this vulnerability.
  commits:
  - note: 
    commit: 
  - note: 
    commit: 
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?

    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed
    this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.