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CVE: CVE-2016-5127 CWE: - 416 bugs: - 618237 - 622566 repo: vccs: - note: There was a function called isEditablePosition().This function was called with a parameter called DoUpdateStyle. It was used to decide whether or not the layout tree would need updating. The thing is a function called previousLinePosition() updates the layout tree at entry. However, despite there being an initial call to preiousLinePosition(), there may still be pending style sheets. If the attacker uses the rel=import attribute of a LINK element to try and import a file, the style sheet will be considered pending since the document isn't rendering ready. Therefore the layout tree will be updated, regardless of the state of DoUpdateStyle. commit: fb81c66590538c2487a34b8623066a22d0b27dff - note: This was a fix for MSAN. MSAN is MemorySanitizer (MSan). It is a tool that detects the use of uninitialized memory. The pending style sheet is memory that the attacker can attack. commit: 2217e8c563575ead5c9450408529340ec93ccef7 fixes: - note: '' commit: e9c943f368d15bbfe414aedf5e001792257f3eeb - note: commit: c1b06954220f96a85ce764396cf5cc5e24a9fba4 - note: '' commit: f60b4eb00abc12a1fa2575890f7c77b373a1bedc - note: '' commit: fb81c66590538c2487a34b8623066a22d0b27dff bounty: date: '2016-07-20 ' amount: 3000.0 references: - http://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2016/07/stable-channel-update.html lessons: yagni: note: applies: false question: | Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example of one of those lessons? Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put a quick explanation of how it applies. Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely that one or two of them apply. If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these. serial_killer: note: applies: false complex_inputs: note: applies: false distrust_input: note: applies: false least_privilege: note: "This applies. Attackers were given privileges they shouldn't have had due to the \nability they had to access the CSS and HTML.\n" applies: true native_wrappers: note: applies: false defense_in_depth: note: applies: false secure_by_default: note: applies: false environment_variables: note: applies: false security_by_obscurity: note: applies: false frameworks_are_optional: note: applies: false reviews: - 2149913003 - 2082893005 - 2091633002 - 2151143002 - 2084913005 upvotes: mistakes: answer: "This vulnerability was caused due to a lack of design. The developers did not\ndesign the updating of the layout tree appropriately.\n\nCWE-416 is \"Use After Free\" weakness. This is when someone references memory\nafter it has been freed, causing the program to crash. Presumably, the pending\nfiles is the free memory in this scenario. The mitigation to this was to \nset free pointers to null after freeing the pointer. In this situation the \nmain fix was making that intial check previousLinePosition() to not use dangling \nRootInlineBox. This ensures that the memory will no longer be free and vulnerable.\n\nThe developers seem to have done a fairly good job at patching the issue quickly and\neffectively.\n" question: | In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes? Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications? Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper? Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software engineering industry would find interesting. announced: '2016-07-23 ' subsystem: name: webkit answer: The location of this is based on the location of the problem code. question: | What subsystems was the mistake in? Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer" discovered: date: '2016-06-22' answer: "As stated in the previous answer, the research done online would lead one to \nbelieve that the bug was intially noticed through some sort of automated testing. \nIt appears that it was discovered using something called a ClusterFuzz. ClusterFuzz \nis a type of fuzzer. It is used to find vulnerabilities related to \nsecurity/stability.\n" google: true contest: question: | How was this vulnerability discovered? Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there. The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil. The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil. If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer". automated: true description: "This was a vulnerability that allowed remote attackers to attack Google Chrome \nbefore version 52.0.2743.82 had been released. Remote attackers can cause a \ndenial of service or possibly other problems that are not specified. \n\nThe attacks can be done using JavaScript code. The code involves @import \nat-rule in a CSS token sequence along with a rel=import attribute of a \nLINK element. This just means that the attacker is able to attack the HTML\nfile while the user is trying to import a file. This seems similar to the \nCross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability we discussed in class.\n" unit_tested: fix: true code: true answer: "After googling the CVE, it appears that the bug was found from automated tests. \nIt is unclear whether or not the code was intially unit tested. Nobody was really\ntalking about that, and there doesn't seem to be any commits related to it either.\nThe commit e9c943f368d15bbfe414aedf5e001792257f3eeb has some unit tests post fix \nto see if the fix actually worked.\n" question: | Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability? Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve improving the automated tests? For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved for this module. For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again. major_events: answer: 'Did not see any major events occuring at the time of this time. ' events: - date: name: - date: name: question: | Please record any major events you found in the history of this vulnerability. Was the code rewritten at some point? Was a nearby subsystem changed? Did the team change? The event doesn't need to be directly related to this vulnerability, rather, we want to capture what the development team was dealing with at the time. curation_level: 1 CWE_instructions: | Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!) bounty_instructions: | If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank. interesting_commits: answer: There were two commits that seemed interesting. commits: - note: "Update v8 to its newest version. This happened on the same day as the vulnerability was found. \nFrom personal experience, updating aspects of the project may lead to cause problems in other \naspects of the project.\n" commit: f791fc5aab4fd9a3c984591c366edc9f1a0145a1 - note: "They were working on a fix for something else at the time. However, it the \nisEditablePosition() function was changed which may have an affect on the vulnerability.\n" commit: 33a3a50a0d70c0e701a93c4875d50cd36c5b759f question: | Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)? Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any emerging themes? If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix. curated_instructions: | If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly. If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is set to true. upvotes_instructions: | For the first round, ignore this upvotes number. For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the upvotes score on your branch. announced_instructions: | Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/). Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format. fixes_vcc_instructions: | Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format. description_instructions: | You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony. Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD description later to get more technical. Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to keep too. |
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