CVE-2017-9798

aka Optionsbleed

CVE: CVE-2017-9798
CWE: 416
ipc:
  note: This involves memory management, not multiple processes.
  answer: false
  question: |
    Did the feature that this vulnerability affected use inter-process
    communication? IPC includes OS signals, pipes, stdin/stdout, message
    passing, and clipboard. Writing to files that another program in this
    software system reads is another form of IPC.

    Answer should be boolean. Explain your answer
bugs:
- 100872
- 105598
i18n:
  note: It's a memory management issue.
  answer: false
  instructions: |
    Was the feature impacted by this vulnerability about internationalization
    (i18n)? An internationalization feature is one that enables people from all
    over the world to use the system. This includes translations, locales,
    typography, unicode, or various other features.

    Answer should be boolean. Write a note about how you came to the conclusions
    you did.
repo: 
vccs:
- note: |-
    Moving code around - not necessarily to blame per se

    Formerly ca8088ad1e5634b34a5ac68565fcaee6e8538c78 before HTTPD rewrote Git history.
  commit: 3eeeb76fb482bae7400eac7a4562fe8475756afd
- note: |-
    This was a more targeted change where the author could have conceivably considered this issue.

    Formerly f73f60777899928262c3b86679c1c920ab178776 before HTTPD rewrote Git history.
  commit: 3f38fb87652a34e9bd9fef09883cbd9e2f1e2cc4
- note: |-
    This was a more targeted change where the author could have conceivably considered this issue.

    Formerly 68c600aa674f6305c9d3de1c80fae21b7dd89e3f before HTTPD rewrote Git history.
  commit: 85e8fbd0e21fec6cb8c6cb0af6cdb8c592bbec67
- note: |-
    This commit mentions the temp pool - which was part of the vulnerability later found.

    Formerly 358cb8b46fc7b09f9117d3a990d4fd7e8241d598 before HTTPD rewrote Git history.
  commit: 00cdb469d7104b486a9c2c9be0e045c744dc8a46
fixes:
- note: |-
    Simply added a condition to check the pools

    Formerly 40e03b310047418c1339823c981182eb36a60e85 before HTTPD rewrote Git history.
  commit: e465e656be9cf5b69f6d100824d95fcd30c213a1
- note: 
  commit: 
bounty:
  amt: 
  url: 
  announced: 
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: 
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: 
  distrust_input:
    note: "This vulnerability can be exploited by users because they are able to\nmodify
      the .htaccess file to provide an unrecognized HTTP Method within\na <Limit>
      directive.      \n"
    applies: true
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: 
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: 
  defense_in_depth:
    note: 
    applies: 
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: 
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
reviews: []
upvotes: 
CWE_note: Mentioned as a use-after-free
mistakes:
  answer: "This vulnerability was caused by a design error. The CWE suggests choosing\na
    language that provides automatic memory managaement or freeign pointers \nand
    setting them to null during implementation. These were not applied in the \nfix.
    Instead the fix sought to prevent .htaccess exploits by only allowing \nmethods
    that were registered at initialization.\n"
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
nickname: Optionsbleed
reported: 
announced: '2017-09-18'
published: 
subsystem:
  name: core
  answer: Since it's in server/core.c, it's in core.
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged.
discovered:
  date: '2017-09-18'
  answer: |
    This vulnerability was found by two people. Hanno Böck on September 18,
    2017 and Jon King of OPNAV N1, Giulio Comi of Horizon Security on
    Oct 16, 2018
  contest: false
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    The "google" flag can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may
    leave this part blank.
  automated: false
  developer: false
description: |
  Users are able to corrupt the global methods table by setting the Limit
  directive in their .htaccess file or if their httpd.conf has unexpected configurations.
  This results in unpredictable behavior and allows attackers to read data from
  process memory that they do not have access to. An attacker can deliberately trigger
  the  vulnerability and attempt to access data from freed memory.

  A good explanation can be found at: https://blog.fuzzing-project.org/60-Optionsbleed-HTTP-OPTIONS-method-can-leak-Apaches-server-memory.html
unit_tested:
  fix: false
  code: false
  fix_note: |
    The fix commits did not involve tests, and unit tests for server core.c
    could not be found.
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module.

    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
  code_note: |
    The fix commits did not involve tests, and unit tests for server core.c
    could not be found.
specification:
  answer: true
  answer_note: |
    The vulnerability involved some strange misconfigurations, so the
    HTTPD documentation was mentioned as a specification in describing it.
  instructions: |
    Is there mention of a violation of a specification? For example,
    an RFC specification, a protocol specification, or a requirements
    specification.

    Be sure to check all artifacts for this: bug report, security
    advisory, commit message, etc.

    The answer field should be boolean. In answer_note, please explain
    why you come to that conclusion.
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
autodiscoverable:
  answer: true
  answer_note: This could be found by fuzzing the config file.
  instructions: |
    Is it plausible that a fully automated tool could have discovered
    this? These are tools that require little knowledge of the domain,
     e.g. automatic static analysis, compiler warnings, fuzzers.

    Examples for true answers: SQL injection, XSS, buffer overflow

    Examples for false: RFC violations, permissions issues, anything
    that requires the tool to be "aware" of the project's
    domain-specific requirements.

    The answer field should be boolean. In answer_note, please explain
    why you come to that conclusion.
yaml_instructions: 
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  commits:
  - note: 
    commit: 
  - note: 
    commit: 
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
nickname_instructions: |
  A catchy name for this vulnerability that would draw attention it. If the
  report mentions a nickname, use that. Must be under 30 characters.
  Optional.
reported_instructions: |
  What date was the vulnerability reported to the security team? Look at the
  security bulletins and bug reports. It is not necessarily the same day that the
  CVE was created.  Leave blank if no date is given.
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date. A good
  source for this is Chrome's Stable Release Channel
  (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/).
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below (see my example in
  CVE-2011-3092.yml). Fixes and VCCs follow the same format.
published_instructions: |
  Is there a published fix or patch date for this vulnerability?
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.