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CVE: CVE-2017-9805 CWE: 502 bugs: [] vccs: - note: Moved Rest plugin into trunk commit: 6229ad7a4726717bf594e9b4e4afa90e1e028829 - note: commit: fixes: - note: Update xstream lib Struts 2.3.X commit: 677ccebe83d159d7c0a2274af703a7cc752a04b3 - note: Adds new methods and marks current as deprecated 2.3.X commit: 287e3bc8cbd66fdda04b075bc96362bfd3e2dce9 - note: Adds abstract layer to handle API change 2.3.X commit: 2776b34b44808f2a4ce2c6fee3c2f3a586bc55b0 - note: Updates flow to handle new API 2.3.X commit: 103e3b174e497bbe7058919f12b9f48a0ddf6de3 - note: Defines allowed classes per action 2.3.X commit: 6dd6e5cfb7b5e020abffe7e8091bd63fe97c10af - note: Update xstream lib Struts 2.5.X commit: 8216ec1c4d2d1f558558b2464bbcdcd1efe86bc7 - note: Adds new methods and marks current as deprecated 2.5.X commit: 2f690cfe6260ccdf3aa617baf65a4b836c49cf65 - note: Adds abstract layer to handle API change 2.5.X commit: 3bd072ca053aed787f3a16865266d8832fcd18b0 - note: Updates flow to handle new API 2.5.X commit: a64da53d5770c5404ee5eb390b826f5733171f5f - note: Defines allowed classes per action 2.5.X commit: 19494718865f2fb7da5ea363de3822f87fbda264 bounty: amt: url: announced: lessons: yagni: note: applies: false question: | Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example of one of those lessons? Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put a quick explanation of how it applies. Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely that one or two of them apply. If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these. serial_killer: note: | The potentially malicious input is serialzed XML. Because this input isn't validated, it can be used to execute arbitrary code during the deserialization process. applies: true complex_inputs: note: | Because it is deserializing XML, there is potentially a lot of complex data that is used to construct Java objects. There is no one parameter or input that must be checked but an arbitrary composition of them, greatly complicating the input. applies: true distrust_input: note: | The input was implicitly being trusted by the deserialization code. This means it wasn't sanitizing the input in any way, which would've prevented this vulnerability. applies: true least_privilege: note: applies: false native_wrappers: note: applies: false defense_in_depth: note: applies: false secure_by_default: note: applies: false environment_variables: note: applies: false security_by_obscurity: note: applies: false frameworks_are_optional: note: applies: false upvotes: 3 mistakes: answer: | This vulnerability was mostly a design mistake. The developer did not consider that the input could potentially be malicious and could be dangerous when deserialized. As such, the XML handler did not properly validate the input before the deserialization occurs, leading to the potential execution of arbitrary code. The page for CWE-502 suggests validating the input before creating a new object to store the deserialized data. The fix for this vulnerability involved 1) upgrading the dependancy used for XML deserializing but 2) creating a whitelist of allowed class names. This whitelist validates that the input is trustworthy before creating the object. If the class instance attempting to be created isn't on that list of trusted class names, it is not created. It is interesting how this vulnerability was found (a demonstration of a security service that automatically queries open-source repositories for security vulnerabilities) and that it was very quickly fixed. They also didn't annouce the vulnerability before it was fixed, and there were no public bug reports or anything to signify that it existed. They were also missing security tests that could've prevented this vulnerability from occuring in the first place. question: | In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes? Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications? Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper? Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those in the software engineering industry would find interesting. nickname: overtrusting xml handler reported: '2017-09-05' announced: '2017-09-05' subsystem: name: - plugins - rest answer: | The vulnerability was in the XML deserialization handling in the REST API plugin for struts. Path to rest plugin is "struts/plugins/rest", path to handlers is "struts/plugins/rest/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/rest/handler/" question: | What subsystems was the mistake in? Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how the bug report was tagged. Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer" discovered: date: '2017-07-17' answer: | The vulnerability was discovered by someone name Man Yue Mo who works for a company called Semmle using their LGTM service. They used a custom query that ran an automated search of the Apache Struts repository and reported back the potential vulnerability. There is a detailed description of how exactly this was done here: https://lgtm.com/blog/apache_struts_CVE-2017-9805 apache: false contest: question: | How was this vulnerability discovered? Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Apache employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the vulnerability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there. The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil. The "apache" flag can be true, false, or nil. If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you may leave the entries blank except for "answer". Write down where you looked in "answer". automated: true description: | CVE-2017-9805 is a security vulnerability that could allow the execution of arbitrary code when XML is read into the system. When the vulnerable module received an XML payload, it does not properly validate it. This means that it could receive a malicious payload that could execute arbitrary code. unit_tested: fix: false code: false answer: | There were no unit tests involved in this vulnerability. There are unit tests for XML (de)serialization but the two test files found don't cover security risks, just that the hardcoded inputs serialize and deserialize properly. question: | Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability? Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve improving the automated tests? Write the reasoning behind your answer in the "answer" field. For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved for this module. Must be just "true" or "false". For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again. Must be just "true" or "false". future_fixes: - note: commit: curation_level: 1 previous_fixes: - note: commit: - note: commit: CWE_instructions: | Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!) security_bulletin: S2-052 bounty_instructions: | If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank. interesting_commits: answer: commits: - note: commit: - note: commit: question: | Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)? Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any emerging themes? If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix. curated_instructions: | If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly. If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is set to true. upvotes_instructions: | Students: when initially writing this, ignore this upvotes number. Once this work is being reviewed, you will be giving a certain amount of upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the upvotes score on your branch. nickname_instructions: | Nickname is optional. Provide a useful, professional, and catchy nickname for this vulnerability. Ideally fewer than 30 characters. This will be shown alongside its CVE to make it more easily distinguished from the rest. reported_instructions: | Was there a date that this vulnerability was reported to the team? You can find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE data. Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format. announced_instructions: | Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE data. Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format. fixes_vcc_instructions: | Please put the SVN commit number in "commit" below, and any notes about how this was discovered in the "note" field. description_instructions: | You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony. Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD description later to get more technical. Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Struts-specific stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon that outsiders to Struts would not understand. Technology like "regular expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to keep too. incomplete_fix_instructions: | Did the above "fixes" actually fix the vulnerability? Please list any fixes for the same issue before and after this CVE below. |
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