angler-fishThe Vulnerability History Project

CVE-2018-1305
aka Servlet Load Order

Security constraints were only applied once a Servelet was loaded. That means they were applied only to the URL pattern. So depending on the order the Servlets were loaded you could cause some constraints to not be applied. This then leaves open holes for exploits such as elevated privilege. You instead need the Servlets to all load first so all the security constraints are taken care of.


It seems their issue was both a design mistake and a bit of an oversight on their part. Initally back in 2010 they believed they wanted to be able to deploy servlets at different times. This still is true. But what they didn't think was that in the future the servlets would have secuirty constraints placed on them and this order would be exploitable. They mitigated this risk by forcing the servlets to run their security checks on web application start instead of on their own time. This solution seems wise to me. Now the timing doesn't really matter because it is all happening before the application launches.
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CVE: CVE-2018-1305
CWE: 488
bugs: []
vccs:
- note: a CVE-2011-1088 fix to delay servlets
  commit: ece65c1a428094b1c6c17de3d7593f64e1bb1286
- note: 
  commit: 
fixes:
- note: SVN rev 1823310, from the Tomcat website.
  commit: 3e54b2a6314eda11617ff7a7b899c251e222b1a1
- note: SVN rev 1824323, from the Tomcat website.
  commit: 4d637bc3986e5d09b9363e2144b8ba74fa6eac3a
- note: SVN rev 1823314, from the Tomcat website.
  commit: 2349801827f09fb6582a8afdeca704294106ad9a
- note: SVN rev 1824358, from the Tomcat website.
  commit: de6b4fd58b64828f374503b9ec76a12017b92895
- note: SVN rev 1823322, from the Tomcat website.
  commit: 2aac69f694d42d9219eb27018b3da0ae1bdd73ab
- note: SVN rev 1824360, from the Tomcat website.
  commit: c63b96d72cd39287e17b2ba698f4eee0ba508073
- note: 
  commit: 
bounty:
  amt: 
  url: 
  announced: 
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: "They thought they might need the servlets to load at seperate times \nthan
      the web app itself. They learned after this error that this wasn't\nactually
      necessary and were able to replace it. \n"
    applies: true
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?
    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.
    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.
    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: 
  distrust_input:
    note: 
    applies: 
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: 
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: 
  defense_in_depth:
    note: 
    applies: 
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: 
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
upvotes: 
mistakes:
  answer: "It seems their issue was both a design mistake and a bit of an oversight
    on \ntheir part. Initally back in 2010 they believed they wanted to be able to\ndeploy
    servlets at different times. This still is true. But what they didn't\nthink was
    that in the future the servlets would have secuirty constraints placed\non them
    and this order would be exploitable. They mitigated this risk by forcing\nthe
    servlets to run their security checks on web application start instead of on\ntheir
    own time. This solution seems wise to me. Now the timing doesn't really matter\nbecause
    it is all happening before the application launches. \n"
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?
    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?
    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
nickname: Servlet Load Order
reported: '2018-02-01'
announced: '2018-02-23'
subsystem:
  name: Catalina
  answer: It was inside apache's servlet subsystem.
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?
    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged.
    Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: '2018-02-01'
  answer: "I couldn't seem to find the actual bug report on their bug site bugzilla.\nI
    was able to find their announcement of the vulnerablilty in their patch notes.\nThese
    say that the bug was discovered by the apache team. This is the only real \nexplanation
    given but it seems it was discovered by devs and not outsiders.\n"
  contest: 
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?
    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found.
    * Answer in longform below in "answer"
    * Fill in the date in YYYY-MM-DD
    * If it's clear that the vulnerability was discovered by a contest,
      fill in the name there.
    * The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you
    may leave the entries blank except for "answer", BUT please write down
    where you looked in "answer".
  automated: false
description: "Security constraints were only applied once a Servelet was loaded. That
  means \nthey were applied only to the URL pattern. So depending on the order the
  Servlets\nwere loaded you could cause some constraints to not be applied. This then
  leaves \nopen holes for exploits such as elevated privilege. You instead need the
  Servlets\nto all load first so all the security constraints are taken care of. \n"
unit_tested:
  fix: false
  code: false
  answer: |
    The code is automatically unit tested before being deployed. This
    vulnerability was not tested though. They did not change their unit tests during
    or after the fix. This is probably because they just replaced how they were
    loading the security constraints and so it didn't need testing as it couldn't
    work the way it did before.
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?
    Write the reasoning behind your answer in the "answer" field.
    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module. Must be just "true" or "false".
    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
    Must be just "true" or "false".
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
incomplete_fixes:
- note: 
  commit: 
- note: 
  commit: 
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: "There was actually about 8 years of code between the inital set up of the
    \nservlets deploying the way they do and the decision to no longer deploy them
    this way.\nDue to this there were many interesting commits but actually none of
    them interfering\nwith servlet deploying code except for the VCC and fixes.\n"
  commits:
  - note: 
    commit: 
  - note: 
    commit: 
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?
    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?
    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this
    section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  Students: when initially writing this, ignore this upvotes number.
  Once this work is being reviewed, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
nickname_instructions: |
  Nickname is optional. Provide a useful, professional, and catchy nickname for
  this vulnerability. Ideally fewer than 30 characters. This will be shown
  alongside its CVE to make it more easily distinguished from the rest.
reported_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was reported to the team? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE data.
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE data.
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the Git commit SHA in "commit" below, and any notes about how this
  was discovered in the "note" field.
  Refer to our instructions on how to find a Git SHA from an SVN revision.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.
  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.
  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.
incomplete_fix_instructions: |
  Did the above "fixes" actually fix the vulnerability?
  Please list any fix commits for this vulnerability that had to be corrected
  at a later date.

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