angler-fishThe Vulnerability History Project

CVE-2018-8037

If an async request was completed the same time as the async timeout, a race condition existed that could result in a user seeing a response intended for a different user. An additional issue was present in connectors that did not correctly track the closure of the connection when an async request was completed by the application and timed out by the container at the same time. This could also result in a user seeing a response intended for another user. There essentially was a race condition where if the timeout and request were the same, undefined behavior and other responses would be observed


The coding mistake was not accounting for the undefined edge case where an async request was completed at the same time as an async timeout. The fixes are proper and account for async behavior. It is interesting that most of the code for this bug/bug fix and the surrounding code is written by one man. He must of missed this condition. Making sure that other async code that exists in tomcat covers the async race condition is crucial to prevent similar bugs in the future.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
CVE: CVE-2018-8037
CWE: 366
bugs: []
vccs:
- note: |
    They moved async data into AbstractProcessor but failed to implement correctly.
    Notice it was not a simple refactoring but a bad reimplementation
  commit: a6c64efe64349b4af9cb9c035c5bf251a10c77f6
- note: They were working on a fix for multiple attempts to close same socket at the
    time
  commit: 8460d7712dcbb72e3d4f2f8ebb9a26fc4e9ddcf9
fixes:
- note: SVN rev 1833825, from the Tomcat website.
  commit: 575cbbcef2875b8cf2871a50c426fe63c05c9d9c
- note: SVN rev 1833831, from the Tomcat website.
  commit: 2692b6e9c2e17b17214418c9ad60856c161ee6f2
- note: SVN rev 1837530, from the Tomcat website.
  commit: 4c04369c287233ea2e8e5135f6c31d02e2d76293
- note: SVN rev 1833906, from the Tomcat website.
  commit: ed4b9d791f9470e4c3de691dd0153a9ce431701b
- note: SVN rev 1833826, from the Tomcat website.
  commit: 71a8b09350a17b15a7c404b1dde8f69abb024c37
- note: SVN rev 1833832, from the Tomcat website.
  commit: 461c7f7a00058e6bf83f3e09fc86d965311861b8
- note: SVN rev 1837531, from the Tomcat website.
  commit: f94eedf02b5973598ab3dbbd4504da588e9ba6cb
- note: SVN rev 1833907, from the Tomcat website.
  commit: ccf2e6bf5205561ad18c2300153e9173ec509d73
- note: 
  commit: 
bounty:
  amt: 
  url: 
  announced: 
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: 
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?
    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.
    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.
    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: 
    applies: 
  distrust_input:
    note: 
    applies: 
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: 
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: 
  defense_in_depth:
    note: |
      The vunerability could have had much more validation in depth.
      If it had more layers, it may have prevented the wrong requests.
    applies: true
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: 
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
upvotes: 
mistakes:
  answer: |
    The coding mistake was not accounting for the undefined edge case where an async
    request was completed at the same time as an async timeout.
    The fixes are proper and account for async behavior.
    It is interesting that most of the code for this bug/bug fix and the surrounding code
    is written by one man. He must of missed this condition. Making sure that other async code that exists
    in tomcat covers the async race condition is crucial to prevent similar bugs in the future.
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?
    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?
    Use those questions to inspire your answer. Don't feel obligated to answer
    every one. Write a thoughtful entry here that those ing the software
    engineering industry would find interesting.
nickname: 
reported: '2018-06-08'
announced: '2018-07-22'
subsystem:
  name: coyote
  answer: Based on the description in the CVE and blog post.
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in?
    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged.
    Examples: "clipboard", "gpu", "ssl", "speech", "renderer"
discovered:
  date: 
  answer: Apache Mail Archives
  contest: 
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?
    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found.
    * Answer in longform below in "answer"
    * Fill in the date in YYYY-MM-DD
    * If it's clear that the vulnerability was discovered by a contest,
      fill in the name there.
    * The "automated" flag can be true, false, or nil.
    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then you
    may leave the entries blank except for "answer", BUT please write down
    where you looked in "answer".
  automated: 
description: "If an async request was completed the same time as the async timeout,\na
  race condition existed that could result in a user seeing a response intended for
  a different user.\nAn additional issue was present in connectors that did not correctly
  track the \nclosure of the connection when an async request was completed by the
  application and timed out by the container at the same time.\nThis could also result
  in a user seeing a response intended for another user.\n\nThere essentially was
  a race condition where if the timeout and request were the same,\nundefined behavior
  and other responses would be observed\n"
unit_tested:
  fix: false
  code: false
  answer: 'There were no visible automated unit tests or tests.

    '
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?
    Write the reasoning behind your answer in the "answer" field.
    For the "code" answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix and determine if and was there were unit tests involved
    for this module. Must be just "true" or "false".
    For the "fix" answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
    Must be just "true" or "false".
curation_level: 1
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE entry
  that describes your vulnerability. (Tip: this may not be a good one to start
  with - spend time understanding this vulnerability before making your choice!)
incomplete_fixes:
- note: They just needed to include in-flight async requests
  commit: b4ad8fa8e03b870ee320ac3239059abc08fe1f58
- note: 
  commit: 
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  answer: 
  commits:
  - note: |
      Improved the handling of exceptions during TLS handshakes which may have
      logged our errors.
    commit: 0bdf1daf4e270dcb52bf7d8c884ebc62963c076e
  - note: Also a bug fix with connectors. Seems like connectors are a reoccuring issue.
    commit: fdfe1e8cfba27c0281e2848df049cfb0962c0c3a
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?
    Write a brief (under 100 words) description of why you think this commit was
    interesting in light of the lessons learned from this vulnerability. Any
    emerging themes?
    If there are no interesting commits, demonstrate that you completed this
    section by explaining what happened between the VCCs and the fix.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it. Set the
  entry below to "true" as soon as you start. This will enable additional
  integrity checks on this file to make sure you fill everything out properly.
  If you are a student, we cannot accept your work as finished unless curated is
  set to true.
upvotes_instructions: |
  Students: when initially writing this, ignore this upvotes number.
  Once this work is being reviewed, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
nickname_instructions: |
  Nickname is optional. Provide a useful, professional, and catchy nickname for
  this vulnerability. Ideally fewer than 30 characters. This will be shown
  alongside its CVE to make it more easily distinguished from the rest.
reported_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was reported to the team? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE data.
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE data.
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
fixes_vcc_instructions: |
  Please put the Git commit SHA in "commit" below, and any notes about how this
  was discovered in the "note" field.
  Refer to our instructions on how to find a Git SHA from an SVN revision.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.
  Rewrite this description in your own words. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.
  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove Chromium-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to Chromium would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.
incomplete_fix_instructions: |
  Did the above "fixes" actually fix the vulnerability?
  Please list any fix commits for this vulnerability that had to be corrected
  at a later date.

See a mistake? Is something missing from our story? We welcome contributions! All of our work is open-source and version-controlled on GitHub. You can curate using our Curation Wizard.

Use our Curation Wizard

Or go to GitHub

  • There are no articles here... yet

Timeline

Hover over an event to see its title.
Click on the event to learn more.
Filter by event type with the buttons below.

expand_less