CVE-2018-16866

aka Lonely Colon Crash

CVE: CVE-2018-16866
CWE:
- 125
- 200
ipc:
  note: |
    The exploit occurs entirely in one process (one method, even).
    Inter-process communication did not come into play here.
  answer: false
  question: |
    Did the feature that this vulnerability affected use inter-process
    communication? IPC includes OS signals, pipes, stdin/stdout, message
    passing, and clipboard. Writing to files that another program in this
    software system reads is another form of IPC.

    Answer must be true or false.
    Write a note about how you came to the conclusions you did, regardless of
    what your answer was.
bugs:
- https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/9829
- https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/9839
i18n:
  note: 'The exploit involves passing '':'' to journalid. It is user language agnostic.

    '
  answer: false
  question: |
    Was the feature impacted by this vulnerability about internationalization
    (i18n)?

    An internationalization feature is one that enables people from all
    over the world to use the system. This includes translations, locales,
    typography, unicode, or various other features.

    Answer should be true or false
    Write a note about how you came to the conclusions you did, regardless of
    what your answer was.
vccs:
- note: Discovered automatically by archeogit.
  commit: ec5ff4445cca6a1d786b8da36cf6fe0acc0b94c8
- note: Discovered automatically by archeogit.
  commit: 35e2e347d38cc2f8bd7c38a0d8a5129f5fbb0ab9
- note: Discovered automatically by archeogit.
  commit: e88baee88fad8bc59d33b55a7a2d640ef9e16cd6
- note: Discovered automatically by archeogit.
  commit: a6aadf4ae0bae185dc4c414d492a4a781c80ffe5
- note: Discovered automatically by archeogit.
  commit: 787784c4c1b24a13207d18b415d60483cfbdeaa3
- note: Discovered automatically by archeogit.
  commit: a5ee33b951cfa22db53d0274c9c6c0d9d4dae39d
fixes:
- note: |
    This CVE appears to have 2 commits for the fix as well. This is the initial
    fix. It fixed the vulnerability, but introduced a regression where leading
    whitespaces were trimmed where it was not previously.
  commit: a6aadf4ae0bae185dc4c414d492a4a781c80ffe5
- note: |
    Commits for the previous CVE were found in
    https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2018-16866. This fixed the
    aforementioned regression.
  commit: 8595102d3ddde6d25c282f965573a6de34ab4421
vouch:
  note: |
    There was an extended back and forth, in which @yuwata (Yu Watanabe,
    the PR author and regular systemd contributor) was implementing fixes and
    @evverex (Evgeny Vereshchagin, also a regular systemd contributor) was
    checking his work and providing feedback.
  answer: true
  question: |
    Was there any part of the fix that involved one person vouching for
    another's work?

    This can include:
      * signing off on a commit message
      * mentioning a discussion with a colleague checking the work
      * upvoting a solution on a pull request

    Answer must be true or false.
    Write a note about how you came to the conclusions you did, regardless of what your answer was.
bounty:
  amt: 
  url: 
  announced: 
lessons:
  yagni:
    note: 
    applies: 
  question: |
    Are there any common lessons we have learned from class that apply to this
    vulnerability? In other words, could this vulnerability serve as an example
    of one of those lessons?

    Leave "applies" blank or put false if you did not see that lesson (you do
    not need to put a reason). Put "true" if you feel the lesson applies and put
    a quick explanation of how it applies.

    Don't feel the need to claim that ALL of these apply, but it's pretty likely
    that one or two of them apply.

    If you think of another lesson we covered in class that applies here, feel
    free to give it a small name and add one in the same format as these.
  serial_killer:
    note: 
    applies: 
  complex_inputs:
    note: |
      journald failed to anticipate an empty log message. Because the code to
      parse these messages is so complex, a simple oversight like this went
      unnoticed.
    applies: true
  distrust_input:
    note: 
    applies: 
  least_privilege:
    note: 
    applies: 
  native_wrappers:
    note: 
    applies: 
  defense_in_depth:
    note: 
    applies: 
  secure_by_default:
    note: 
    applies: 
  environment_variables:
    note: 
    applies: 
  security_by_obscurity:
    note: 
    applies: 
  frameworks_are_optional:
    note: 
    applies: 
reviews:
- https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/9827
- https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/9845
sandbox:
  note: |
    The exploit is a result of bad parsing, resulting in a crash. There was no
    path traversal or privelege abuse involved.
  answer: false
  question: |
    Did this vulnerability violate a sandboxing feature that the system
    provides?

    A sandboxing feature is one that allows files, users, or other features
    limited access. Vulnerabilities that violate sandboxes are usually based on
    access control, checking privileges incorrectly, path traversal, and the
    like.

    Answer should be true or false
    Write a note about how you came to the conclusions you did, regardless of
    what your answer was.
upvotes: 11
CWE_note: |
  CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html
  CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html
mistakes:
  answer: |
    The primary mistake here was failing to anticipate empty log messages (that
    are still properly terminated). This is essentially a planning error.

    CWE-125 warns "not [to] rely exclusively on looking for malicious or
    malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input,
    especially if the code's environment changes. ...Ensure that you validate
    and ensure correct calculations for any length argument, buffer size
    calculation, or offset."

    This is sound advice for our situation. A log message of ":" is not
    necessarily malicious - it's simply an undesirable input that was missed.
  question: |
    In your opinion, after all of this research, what mistakes were made that
    led to this vulnerability? Coding mistakes? Design mistakes?
    Maintainability? Requirements? Miscommunications?

    There can, and usually are, many mistakes behind a vulnerability.

    Remember that mistakes can come in many forms:
    * slip: failing to complete a properly planned step due to inattention
              e.g. wrong key in the ignition
              e.g. using < instead of <=
    * lapse: failing to complete a properly planned step due to memory failure
              e.g. forgetting to put car in reverse before backing up
              e.g. forgetting to check null
    * planning error: error that occurs when the plan is inadequate
              e.g. getting stuck in traffic because you didn’t consider the
                   impact of the bridge closing
              e.g. calling the wrong method
              e.g. using a poor design

    These are grey areas, of course. But do your best to analyze the mistakes
    according to this framework.

    Look at the CWE entry for this vulnerability and examine the mitigations
    they have written there. Are they doing those? Does the fix look proper?

    Write a thoughtful entry here that people in the software engineering
    industry would find interesting.
nickname: Lonely Colon Crash
subsystem:
  name: systemd-journald
  note: 'This is systemd''s logging subsystem

    '
  question: |
    What subsystems was the mistake in? These are subsystems WITHIN systemd

    Two areas to look:
      - Bug labels
      - Directory names

    Look at the path of the source code files code that were fixed to get
    directory names. Look at comments in the code. Look at the bug reports how
    the bug report was tagged.

    Example systemd subsystems are:
      * fsck
      * apparmor
      * fstab
      * sd-daemon

    Name should be:
      * all lowercase English letters
      * NOT a specific file
      * can have digits, and _-@/

    Can be multiple subsystems involved, in which case you can make it an array
    e.g.
        name: ["subsystemA", "subsystemB"] # ok
        name: subsystemA # also ok
discovered:
  answer: |
    This vulnerability was discovered by GitHub user @evverx, who is also a
    contributor to the systemd repo. A GitHub issue was created on August
    8th, 2018, and a Bugzilla report was filled on November 27th, 2018, by
    Laura Pardo. This vulnerability was discovered with the help of ASan.
  contest: false
  question: |
    How was this vulnerability discovered?

    Go to the bug report and read the conversation to find out how this was
    originally found. Answer in longform below in "answer", fill in the date in
    YYYY-MM-DD, and then determine if the vulnerability was found by a Google
    employee (you can tell from their email address). If it's clear that the
    vulenrability was discovered by a contest, fill in the name there.

    The automated, contest, and developer flags can be true, false, or nil.

    If there is no evidence as to how this vulnerability was found, then please
    explain where you looked.
  automated: true
  developer: false
discussion:
  note: |
    Contributors were more concerned with fixing the resulting crash, rather
    than worrying about the security side of it. There was some discussion
    involved, because the initial fix introduced a regression.

    Initial fix: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/8595102d3ddde6d25c282f965573a6de34ab4421#
    Regression issue: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/9839
    Regression fix: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/8595102d3ddde6d25c282f965573a6de34ab4421#
  question: |
    Was there any discussion surrounding this?

    A discussion can include debates, disputes, or polite talk about how to
    resolve uncertainty.

    Example include:
      * Is this out of our scope?
      * Is this a security?
      * How should we fix this?

    Just because you see multiple comments doesn't mean it's a discussion.
    For example:
      * "Fix line 10". "Ok" is not what we call a discussion
      * "Ping" (reminding people)

    Check the bugs reports, pull requests, and mailing lists archives.

    These answers should be boolean.
      discussed_as_security: true or false
      any_discussion: true or false

    Put any links to disagreements you found in the notes section, or any other
    comment you want to make.
  any_discussion: true
  discussed_as_security: false
stacktrace:
  note: |
    There are no stacktraces here, but there is a memory dump upon the crash.
    An example can be found here: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/9829
  question: |
    Are there any stacktraces in the bug reports?

    Secondly, if there is a stacktrace, is the fix in the same file that the
    stacktrace points to?

    If there are no stacktraces, then both of these are false - but be sure to
    mention where you checked in the note.

    Answer must be true or false.
    Write a note about how you came to the conclusions you did, regardless of
    what your answer was.
  any_stacktraces: false
  stacktrace_with_fix: false
description: |
  In systemd's logging system, called journald, log messages must be terminated
  with a colon. However, passing in just a colon caused the logger to crash.
  Upon crashing, the adjacent memory is dumped to the console, which attackers
  could use to create additional exploits (such as reading sensitive,
  out-of-bounds information).
unit_tested:
  fix: true
  code: true
  question: |
    Were automated unit tests involved in this vulnerability?
    Was the original code unit tested, or not unit tested? Did the fix involve
    improving the automated tests?

    For code: and fix: - your answer should be boolean.

    For the code_answer below, look not only at the fix but the surrounding
    code near the fix in related directories and determine if and was there were
    unit tests involved for this subsystem.

    For the fix_answer below, check if the fix for the vulnerability involves
    adding or improving an automated test to ensure this doesn't happen again.
  fix_answer: |
    The unit tests were updated in the same commit as the fix. Six new test
    cases were added, two of which test a log message of ":".
  code_answer: |
    There were unit tests for the functions, but none of them test passing
    ":" into syslog_parse_identifier
reported_date: '2018-11-27'
specification:
  note: |
    This vulnerability spawned from systemd's custom log parsing, and no
    external spec was used, let alone violated.
  answer: false
  instructions: |
    Is there mention of a violation of a specification? For example, the POSIX
    spec, an RFC spec, a network protocol spec, or some other requirements
    specification.

    Be sure to check the following artifacts for this:
      * bug reports
      * security advisories
      * commit message
      * pull request
      * mailing lists
      * anything else

    The answer field should be boolean. In answer_note, please explain
    why you come to that conclusion.
announced_date: '2018-11-27'
curation_level: 1
published_date: '2019-01-11'
forgotten_check:
  note: |
    The crux of this vulnerability revolves around forgetting to check the case
    where an empty log message, ":", is passed.
  answer: true
  question: |
    Does the fix for the vulnerability involve adding a forgotten check?

    A "forgotten check" can mean many things. It often manifests as the fix
    inserting an entire if-statement or a conditional to an existing
    if-statement. Or a call to a method that checks something.

    Example of checks can include:
      * null pointer checks
      * check the current role, e.g. root
      * boundary checks for a number
      * consult file permissions
      * check a return value

    Answer must be true or false.
    Write a note about how you came to the conclusions you did, regardless of
    what your answer was.
CWE_instructions: |
  Please go to http://cwe.mitre.org and find the most specific, appropriate CWE
  entry that describes your vulnerability. We recommend going to
  https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/699.html for the Software Development
  view of the vulnerabilities. We also recommend the tool
  http://www.cwevis.org/viz to help see how the classifications work.

  If you have anything to note about why you classified it this way, write
  something in CWE_note. This field is optional.

  Just the number here is fine. No need for name or CWE prefix. If more than one
  apply here, then place them in an array like this
    CWE: ["123", "456"] # this is ok
    CWE: [123, 456]     # also ok
    CWE: 123            # also ok
autodiscoverable:
  note: |
    This vulnerability was discovered with the help of ASan, an automatic
    input sanitization testing tool. It's possible that a fuzzer could find this
    vulernability, too, but it would likely need to be able to call the logger
    directly.
  answer: true
  instructions: |
    Is it plausible that a fully automated tool could have discovered
    this? These are tools that require little knowledge of the domain,
     e.g. automatic static analysis, compiler warnings, fuzzers.

    Examples for true answers: SQL injection, XSS, buffer overflow

    In systemd, the actually use OZZ Fuzz. If there's a link to it, add it here.

    Examples for false: RFC violations, permissions issues, anything
    that requires the tool to be "aware" of the project's
    domain-specific requirements.

    The answer field should be boolean. In answer_note, please explain
    why you come to that conclusion.
vcc_instructions: |
  The vulnerability-contributing commits.

  These are found by our tools by traversing the Git Blame history, where we
  determine which commit(s) introduced the functionality.

  Look up these VCC commits and verify that they are not simple refactorings,
  and that they are, in fact introducing the vulnerability into the system.
  Often, introducing the file or function is where the VCC is, but VCCs can be
  anything.

  Place any notes you would like to make in the notes field.
bugs_instructions: |
  What bugs and/or pull requests are involved in this vulnerability?

  For systemd, this is typically their GitHub issues, but could also include
  bugs from other databases. Put a URL instead of a single number.
yaml_instructions: |
  =================
  ===YAML Primer===
  =================
  This is a dictionary data structure, akin to JSON.
  Everything before a colon is a key, and the values here are usually strings
  For one-line strings, you can just use quotes after the colon
  For multi-line strings, as we do for our instructions, you put a | and then
  indent by two spaces

  For readability, we hard-wrap multi-line strings at 80 characters. This is
  not absolutely required, but appreciated.
fixes_instructions: |
  Please put the commit hash in "commit" below.

  This must be a git commit hash from the systemd source repo, a  40-character
  hexademical string/

  Place any notes you would like to make in the notes field.
bounty_instructions: |
  If you came across any indications that a bounty was paid out for this
  vulnerability, fill it out here. Or correct it if the information already here
  was wrong. Otherwise, leave it blank.
interesting_commits:
  commits:
  - note: 'The vulnerability was introducedd in this commit.

      '
    commit: ec5ff4445cca6a1d786b8da36cf6fe0acc0b94c8
  - note: 'This is the initial attempt at fixing the vulnerability.

      '
    commit: a6aadf4ae0bae185dc4c414d492a4a781c80ffe5
  - note: |
      This fixes a regression that the initial fix introduced, where whitespace
      was being trimmed when it shouldn't be.
    commit: 8595102d3ddde6d25c282f965573a6de34ab4421
  question: |
    Are there any interesting commits between your VCC(s) and fix(es)?

    Use this to specify any commits you think are notable in some way, and
    explain why in the note.
order_of_operations:
  note: |
    It's not that the check happened too late, it's that it never happened
    at all! The fix involved added the check, not changing the code order.
  answer: false
  question: |
    Does the fix for the vulnerability involve correcting an order of
    operations?

    This means the fix involves moving code around or changing the order of
    how things are done.

    Answer must be true or false.
    Write a note about how you came to the conclusions you did, regardless of
    what your answer was.
curated_instructions: |
  If you are manually editing this file, then you are "curating" it.

  Set the version number that you were given in the instructions.

  This will enable additional editorial checks on this file to make sure you
  fill everything out properly. If you are a student, we cannot accept your work
  as finished unless curated is properly updated.
upvotes_instructions: |
  For the first round, ignore this upvotes number.

  For the second round of reviewing, you will be giving a certain amount of
  upvotes to each vulnerability you see. Your peers will tell you how
  interesting they think this vulnerability is, and you'll add that to the
  upvotes score on your branch.
nickname_instructions: |
  A catchy name for this vulnerability that would draw attention it.
  If the report mentions a nickname, use that.
  Must be under 30 characters. Optional.
reported_instructions: |
  What date was the vulnerability reported to the security team? Look at the
  security bulletins and bug reports. It is not necessarily the same day that
  the CVE was created.  Leave blank if no date is given.

  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
announced_instructions: |
  Was there a date that this vulnerability was announced to the world? You can
  find this in changelogs, blogs, bug reports, or perhaps the CVE date.

  This is not the same as published date in the NVD - that is below.

  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
published_instructions: |
  Is there a published fix or patch date for this vulnerability?
  Please enter your date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
description_instructions: |
  You can get an initial description from the CVE entry on cve.mitre.org. These
  descriptions are a fine start, but they can be kind of jargony.

  Rewrite this description IN YOUR OWN WORDS. Make it interesting and easy to
  read to anyone with some programming experience. We can always pull up the NVD
  description later to get more technical.

  Try to still be specific in your description, but remove project-specific
  stuff. Remove references to versions, specific filenames, and other jargon
  that outsiders to this project would not understand. Technology like "regular
  expressions" is fine, and security phrases like "invalid write" are fine to
  keep too.

  Your target audience is people just like you before you took any course in
  security